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From salary to resistance: mobility, employment, and violence in Dibra, 1792–1826

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In 1792, Osman of Mat, an Albanian bandit leader, assaulted Prilep, in the modern Republic of Macedonia, with 300 Albanians to claim the local military commandership (*bölükbaşı*).[1] Following their defeat, the inhabitants of the town were forced to deliver 104 *kuruş* (nearly £10 sterling) to the bandits while Osman roamed the town's surroundings.[2] The desperate deputy governor of Prilep asked Yusuf Bey of Dibra for help. He in turn dispatched Molla (*mullah*) Yunus of Peshkopi with 800 Albanians to Prilep.[3] The moment the mullah arrived at Prilep, however, Osman of Mat left for Štip, a nearby town, to help another patron, Torkullu Mehmed Sipahi. Osman's departure, however, did not relieve the inhabitants of Prilep. They asked Molla Yunus to return later as his services were no longer needed. To this the mullah responded indifferently, saying, 'I want the payment (*ulûfe*)'.[4] Once the deputy governor found out that he would not be able to handle the problem on his own, he fled the town. In the meantime, the judge of the town alerted the government in his petition that more than 2000 bandits led by Molla Yunus, Yaşar Bey, Yusuf Bey, Hasan Dora, Receb Dora, and Osman of Mat had ravaged the town and harassed the people.[5] The inhabitants had to pay roughly another 266 *kuruş* to the mullah to ensure his departure for another town.[6]

At about the same time, Torkullu Mehmed Sipahi was intimidating the inhabitants of Štip in order to become the notable of the town. His struggle to secure local power, however, seems to have proved ill-fated as the Nazırzâdes, a local dynasty of Štip, banished Mehmed Sipahi. Upon hearing he was to be sentenced in the fortress of Kavala, a town in modern Greece, Mehmed Sipahi took up arms.[7] This was not, however, a personal endeavour; he sought the help of Osman of Mat. Upon arrival in Dibra, Mehmed Sipahi is claimed to have said, 'If you make me enter Štip once again, I will give each person 100 *kuruş*'.[8] This proclamation prompted a certain Molla İbrahim with 200 bandits, Osman of Mat, and Yusuf Bey of Dibra to gather an armed force of around 2000 bandits and to enter Štip.[9] Subsequently, the bandit mob opened up the granaries and purchased all the available wheat and barley at half the market value. They also raided the town market, seizing 104 *kuruş*. In addition, they were said to have imposed a 2500 *kuruş* tribute on the inhabitants. Upon receipt of payment, they were said to have returned to Dibra.[10]

No matter how striking this episode of intense violence may have been, the case was not peculiar to Dibra, but was, rather, an empire-wide phenomenon. This was both the immediate result of the collapse of Ottoman central authority in the Balkans as well as an

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episode in the era of the 'mountain bandits', most of whom were Albanians.[11] The mountain bandits' reign stemmed mostly from the state of the Ottoman army, which 'evolved from a combination of voluntary feudatory militias and Janissary-style conscripted infantries into a system of state-funded militias, with periods of short-term conscription', particularly following the 1768–1974 Russo-Turkish War.[12] In the late eighteenth century, Albanians functioned as mountain bandits at times and armed irregulars at other times. These episodes of violence the Albanian highlanders took part in at the behest of the Albanians pashas offer important insights for understanding how freelance employment as bandits and irregular employment under the service of the imperial army contrasted with the reforms of the Ottoman army in the era of 'New Order', or *Nizâm-ı Cedid*.[13]

Most studies of the reform era are narrated through the prism of the Ottoman government, reproducing the centre–periphery dichotomy, often attributed to the defunct decline paradigm. For a long time, under the shadow of decentralisation at the expense of the Ottoman power, most bandits of the Balkans were treated largely as culprits of the violence as a result of the 'collapse' of Ottoman authority in the Balkans. Recently, revisionist studies provide a nuanced understanding of the political turmoil of the Balkans at the turn of the eighteenth century by focusing on the fluid identities of the notorious bandits and their incorporation in to the imperial polity.[14] By focusing on the fluid military employment practices of the Albanian highlanders in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, this article reinserts the 'mountain bandits' into the political turmoil of the period. Rather than rogue bandits, these actors constituted a significant group of military labourers offering their services to myriad patrons.

By specifically dealing with the military recruitment dynamics present in Dibra, currently located in the Republic of Macedonia, this article demonstrates that incidents of violence occurred in tandem with the empire's increasing practice of irregular recruitment. Rather than presenting the Albanian highlanders and pashas as outlaws defying any sort of authority whatsoever, this article reconceptualises them as actors negotiating and reasserting their own demands within the changing conditions of the military employment market. The consequent violence, articulated in this article, followed different trajectories and phases dependent on the prospects offered by the employment market. By establishing the connection between episodes of violence with market opportunities, this article complicates our interpretation of the violent outbreaks in the late eighteenth century.

Second, the irregular recruitment of Albanian highlanders in the greater Dibra region illustrates the dynamics between the central government and peripheral provinces in the wake of the military reforms. Expanding upon the political networks controlled by the Albanian pashas and the strategies the Albanian irregulars pursued for realising their new demands, this article details the imperial officials' heightened concerns regarding imperial officials employing irregulars in general, and Albanians in particular. The violent turbulence in Dibra, accordingly, shows how the Albanian pashas' and irregulars' services clashed with the prospects of the 'New Order' reforms. In the new order, which questioned the mobilisation of the rural landless and lawless, the terms of employment dictated by Albanian pashas and irregulars were no longer viable. By examining the different phases of the unsustainable employment relationship in Dibra, this article argues that the military reforms transformed the Albanians from those providing well-trained irregulars in return for a salary to the harbingers of resistance.

Economy of migration and mobility in Dibra

The greater Dibra region was divided into two distinct regions: the lower Dibra (*Debre-i Zîr* in Turkish, today Peshkopi in eastern Albania) and the upper Dibra (*Debre-i Bâlâ*, today Dibra in the Republic of Macedonia).[15] The mountains made the greater Dibra region 'un particularisme exacerbé'.[16] Lower Dibra had five mountains and sits on a plain 600 metres above sea level. Upper Dibra, meanwhile, was in the mountainous area, or *Malësia*.[17] In terms of demographics, around the year 1900, the urban Dibra had a population of 12,000, ten per cent of whom were Orthodox Christians.[18] The mountains, to a certain extent, determined the economics of Dibra. No different from the cultivated lands of Albania, only 8.2 per cent of which were arable, Dibra's geography did not support agriculture.[19] Due to its mountainous geography, most inhabitants of Dibra chose to migrate far away on a seasonal or temporary basis as pastoral and agricultural labourers.[20] This practice was called *kurbet* in Albanian. For example, up to 69 per cent of the male labour force in Dibra and Tetovo participated in periodic labour migration.[21]

Albanian migration to Istanbul began as early as the late sixteenth century.[22] Periodic migration continued through the later eighteenth century and, by the mid-nineteenth century, Michel Palairet argues, it became a mass phenomenon.[23] Albanians flocked to the greater Istanbul region and the coastal regions of Asia Minor in particular.[24] In addition to long-term migration, Albanians engaged in transhumant pastoralism. However, 'murderous attacks on the shepherds by the Debar Albanians, and seizure of stock', Palairet argues, led Albanians to depend increasingly on itinerant work, thus rendering the hill settlements nothing more than dormitories.[25]

The imperial forces grew concerned with the expansion of Albanian migration throughout the empire during the eighteenth century. Especially following the Patrona Halil Rebellion, which was an urban protest against the new taxes resulting from the dethronement of Ahmed and the execution of the Grand Vizier İbrahim Pasha, the Ottomans treated the immigrants as a threat to public security in Istanbul. As Halil was ethnically Albanian and as he was able to mobilise 22,000 Albanians in the capital, Ottoman officials chose to replace the word 'immigrants' with Albanians.[26] In the aftermath of the rebellion, the imperial authority ordered coffeehouses and public baths where migrant Albanians congregated to be shut down.[27] The Ottoman administration associated rising crime rates with migration particularly after the rebellions in 1730 and 1740. The officials, thus, paid particular attention to policing the migrants, who were predominantly Albanian.[28] As part of this policy, the imperial officials ordered restrictions on the mobility of Albanian migrants.[29] Furthermore, this policing of migrant Albanians was not an exclusively urban phenomenon. In the 1770s, the imperial authorities prohibited Albanians from assuming tax farming contracts outside their homelands, and the imperial policy confined the Albanians to their homeland.[30]

Ottoman officials resorted to the expulsion of unemployed migrant Albanians from major cities. The concern was not limited to the cities, as the officials were simultaneously concerned with the trouble Albanians might cause in the countryside. The Ottoman administration was particularly concerned with the prospective employment opportunities Albanian migrants could find in the service of provincial notables.[31] Ali Pasha of Ioannina, whose official position was to maintain mountain passes and bridges (*derbend nâzırı*), received several imperial orders chastising him and his sons for his negligence in

permitting the passage of Albanians from the Tosk, Gheg, and Mat regions to the Balkans.[32] Restrictions on Albanian mobility out of Albania proper were, at times, subject to negotiation with the imperial offices. For example, Receb Pasha of Tetovo was appointed deputy governor of Skopje on condition that he paid the utmost attention to ensuring that northern Albanians did not move to the Balkans.[33]

The Albanian migration was, thus, not confined to finding 'peaceful' jobs; highlanders also sought employment prospects in armed conflicts. In Dibra, village communities adapted their economy, combining pastoralism with mercenary work and migration as itinerant labourers.[34] Like the Swiss and Scottish young men who left the countryside to find employment in the mercenary armies of Europe in the early modern era, the Albanian highlanders sought such means of subsistence.[35] Accordingly, as highlanders, Dibra Albanians engaged in banditry on the Macedonian plains for a living.[36] For the Ottoman administration, especially in the eighteenth century, the Albanian migration and the subsequent violence were pressing concerns. Yet, the same concerns were also significant assets when the Ottoman armed forces gradually came to rely on this labour force.

Albanian irregulars in the Ottoman army

In the second half of the eighteenth century, mobility became a valuable commodity between the Albanian highlanders and the Ottoman government. The mountains not only encouraged Albanian mobility, but were also instrumental in rendering them good soldiers. Similar to codes found in other highland societies, the customary law, *kanun* or the Code of Lekë Dukgjini, encouraged a traditional culture of violence among the Albanian highlanders.[37] Blood feuds were encoded in the law; this encouraged the highlanders to become proficient in arms.[38] Incessant small-scale warfare among the clans served as the perfect training for soldiers, rendering Albanians particularly good soldiers in early modern Europe and the Middle East.[39] Accordingly, the Albanians' military charisma was an essential asset for the Ottoman administration, despite the trouble they caused throughout the empire.[40]

When the janissaries no longer served as the primary corps on the battlefield, and their pay and ration tickets became trade items, this deficit produced a demand to fill their absence. The army relied increasingly on ethnic warrior bands, of which Albanians constituted a significant portion. As a result of this demand in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Albanian highlanders started to serve as irregular mercenaries, which continued in the early nineteenth century.[41] This transformation, which has been labelled the *levend-sekbân* phenomenon in Ottoman historiography, resulted in the temporary employment of irregulars serving either the state or provincial notables.[42] Despite refusing to share the command structures with these mobile groups, the armed forces increasingly came to rely on the provincial aristocracies, which were composed of Kurds, Cossacks, Tatars, Georgians and Circassians, as well as 'the ubiquitous mountain Albanians'.[43] As the urgent need to man the battlefield remained a pressing concern for the army, the Ottomans 'recognized the lawless and the landless as the source of the manpower', conceding that 'their misbehaviour had been the cause of much harm to the countryside but indicating also that the lack of campaigns had cut them off gainful employment'.[44]

Due to this persistent deficit in available soldiers, the Ottoman administration issued another set of orders restricting the mobility of Albanians. These restrictions accomplished two goals: they addressed concerns around public security and, more importantly, they secured the administration's ability to mobilise Albanian irregulars on demand. Prior to a campaign, the Ottoman government would restrict Albanians' mobility to employ them as irregulars in the Ottoman army. In 1799, immediately following the French expedition to Egypt, many Albanian notables served in the army of the sultan.[45] Due to the Ottoman army's urgent need for troops just before the campaign of 1809, an episode in the Russo-Turkish War of 1806–1812, they restricted Albanian migration to Egypt.[46] Despite the myriad imperial orders restricting Albanian mobility, the Albanian highlanders continued to occupy a key role in the empire, not only as the retinue serving the provincial notables, but also as irregulars comprising a significant portion of the Ottoman armies.

Hiring Albanian irregulars in the early nineteenth century was no different from an employment contract in the labour market.[47] Despite changes in terms over the century, Albanians received payment directly from central government. These payments included a considerable signing on bonus. Enlistment periods lasted for six months, and could be renewed for additional two-month periods.[48] Apart from regular salaries, the Albanian mercenaries demanded at least two months' cash in advance, which enticed impoverished rural youth. Mercenaries often used these advances to purchase a firearm or horse.[49] An Albanian military contractor, who 'as a perfect condottiere, arranged everything for his men with the hirer', was commissioned to procure a certain number of troops after negotiating the price, duration, and often precise location of the service to the employer.[50] As with contract troops in early modern Europe, the Albanians were not cheap as they comprised a high proportion of veterans but proved themselves on the battlefield.[51]

This military exchange between Albanian pashas and the Ottoman government in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was beneficial to both parties. On the one hand, the military specialisation of Albanian pashas offered new career prospects. Mehmed Ali Pasha of Kavala is the most notable example of this phenomenon.[52] By providing the Ottoman forces with well-trained irregulars on demand, the Albanian pashas profited immensely. This collaboration with the imperial government in recruiting irregular troops and provisioning the army in times of war provided the Albanian pashas with a relative autonomous power in their own realms.[53] On the other hand, this trade enabled the Ottoman army 'to enter large scale military confrontations with unprecedented numbers of troops, large volumes of provisions and tons of ammunition' in a more advantageous way compared to the inefficiency of the standing army.[54] Rather than precipitating a 'decline' of Ottoman authority in its provinces, the reciprocity between these parties demonstrates the military component of the imperial transformation to what Yaycıoğlu defines as 'a horizontal and participatory empire, in which central and provincial actors combined to rule the empire together'.[55]

Albanian contractors and freelance employment in Dibra

Through their ability to meet the Ottoman government's urgent, war-induced needs, most Albanian pashas, including Ali Pasha of Ioannina and Kara Mahmud Pasha of Shkodër, acquired privileges to pursue their own political plans of self-aggrandisement.[56] Contractors like Yusuf Bey often succeeded in forcing the Ottoman government to appoint them

to their positions.[57] In this collaboration, the irregular network established by the Albanian pashas participated in the political struggles the pashas waged to secure their own footing in the competition over resources in the Balkans. While the irregulars met the imperial need of manning the army in times of war, the same pool of irregulars constituted a major component of the pashas' autonomous political power bases. This was especially true in peace time, when the political instability in the Balkans created power struggles among the local notables. The ability to command a sizeable militia force was decisive in maintaining their power bases.[58] The Albanian irregulars, who constituted the transregional networks and implemented some forms of sanctioned imperial violence, were relabelled 'bandits' once they refused to demobilise and began to live off the land.[59] Whether irregulars or 'bandits', the Albanian pashas employed the Albanian highlanders to support their political and economic affairs. In political terms, their mobilisation was instrumental in the pashas' efforts to protect their interests from other encroaching notables. Albanian contractors who pursued the course of local politics in the Albanian highlands operated these networks of violence by actively mobilising irregulars. In economic terms, as leaders of the bandit networks, the Albanian pashas benefitted from the highlanders' violence. They used the bandits to expand their economic enterprises and to find revenue sources for covering the costs of maintaining such a militia force.

The Albanian pashas' command of highlanders was decisive in the political competition in the Balkans at the end of the eighteenth century. Ottoman Albania was divided into two spheres: the Bushatli family ruled northern Albania and Ali Pasha of Ioannina ruled the south.[60] When Kara Mahmud Pasha, the leader of the Bushatli family, appointed his brother İbrahim Pasha to Tirana in 1795, it was a decisive moment in the political orientations in the greater Dibra region. According to the petitions of the notables of Dibra, İbrahim Pasha, who had had a hostile relationship with the locals of Mat for a long time, decided to winter in Mat en route to Tirana.[61] İbrahim Pasha, according to the governor of Rumelia, seized 20,000 sheep from a village in Dibra and an additional 15,000 from Mat. He also took sixty men from Dibra and thirty from Mat as hostages.[62] To counter this violent assault, the leaders of Mat intimidated the Ottoman government with the threat that they would ally with the notables of Peskhopi if they were forsaken.[63] As the greater Mat region was 'a region with a degree of collective identity that acted as a military unit in times of conflict, in the sense of a *bajrak*', i.e. a banner, the alliance had military value.[64]

Though the connection was not clear in the beginning, the bandits of Dibra and Peshkopi attacked Kičevo, a town in the modern Republic of Macedonia, in retaliation. The harassment in Mat created tension between Dibra and Peshkopi. This was a result of the broader factionalism in Ottoman Albania. If one considers Dibra and Peshkopi as an integrated settlement, as the Ottoman connotation of *Debreler*, i.e. Dibras, suggests, the 'bilateral factionalism' operated by means of reconfigurations of the political networks.[65] Accusing the notable of Dibra, the notables of Peshkopi stated collectively that 'this misdeed stemmed from Yusuf Bey, [as] we do not have a single act defying the imperial order and consensus'.[66] In response, Yusuf Bey petitioned the government stating he was innocent of the misdeeds at Kičevo.[67] The opposing petitions, in which the locals strategically employed gossip and rumours concerning the bandit insurgency, were valuable currency not only serving the factionalism, but also bolstering their own position within Ottoman politics.[68]

The fact that the notables of Peshkopi in their later petitions denied any sort of connection with Kara Mahmud Pasha exemplifies the factionalism.[69] Following an investigation, Mustafa Pasha, the governor of Rumelia, found that the notables of Peshkopi had, indeed, corresponded with the Bushatli family, who then dispatched a man with instructions to coordinate political acts against Yusuf Bey.[70] Given this information, the governor confirmed that the bandits of Dibra and Peshkopi were responsible for the conflict in Kičevo. Though Ömer Sipahi was in charge of the military aspect of the incident, the governor noted that the leader was Yusuf Bey adding that 'it was clear they would not dare [to attack] without Yusuf Bey's word and deed'.[71] Though there is no evidence of the recruitment procedure of the Albanian highlanders, the Kičevo case demonstrates how the Albanian pashas used the highlanders as political instruments. This case shows that Albanians were voluntarily recruited for reasons other than economic ones. Similar to other highlander societies, the warrior ethos, which made them prone to feuds and military clashes, also inspired loyalty to their leaders, whose political rivalries determined the mobilisation process.[72]

The Albanian highlanders' service to the notables of the Balkans cannot be entirely attributed to political and/or tribal loyalty. Rather, the political instability in the Balkans at the turn of the century encouraged 'freelance' violence to achieve considerable wealth in a relatively short time. Like the anecdote of the Molla Yusuf at the beginning of this article, Yaşar Bey, who was a 'trusted man' of Yusuf Bey of Dibra, is said to have arrived in Veles, a town in the modern Republic of Macedonia, in 1792. He led 300 Albanians with the claim of collecting a payment from previous military service. Until collecting 183 *kuruş*, the mob was unsurprisingly said to have lived off the land.[73] No different from the rest of the notables of the empire, Yusuf Bey of Dibra, as an employer of the armed Albanian groups, 'brought large groups of diverse Ottoman subjects and officials in a shared culture of violence that was central to Ottoman strategies of governance'.[74]

On 22 September 1800, the governor of Bitola wrote that 'the vermin' of Dibra and Peshkopi were to attack Prilep'.[75] The attack, which was also supported by other bandits from the neighbouring regions, was interesting in the sense that the political turmoil it created led to an encounter between irregulars-*cum*-bandits serving different patrons. That is, as the bandits of Dibra and Peshkopi were about to attack Prilep, the Ottoman government appealed to the notables of the neighbouring districts in order to employ irregulars. While the sons of the conquerors (*evlâd-ı fatihan*), who were nomadic populations settled in the Balkans and integrated into the army in the late seventeenth century, were deployed to suppress the assault, the governor of Bitola assumed command of the irregulars provided by the notables of the region.[76] This case differed from the campaigns against the empire's foes; what the 'confederative military symbiosis' found in front of them as foes were, more often than not, composed of the same groups of men, most probably the Albanian soldiers serving the notables of the Balkans.[77]

In July 1801, the bandits of Dibra, 2000 to 3000 armed men, were once again on the offensive, approaching Kičevo, Prilep, and Veles this time. In the attack, if not a seasonal campaign of the highlanders, the bandits plundered the Macedonian plains, seizing property and dishonouring people in particular.[78] It is not clear if Yusuf Bey of Dibra commanded the assault. Regardless of the ambiguity, Yusuf Bey sought to reap the benefits from the chaos the bandits had brought about. Following the pillage, an imperial order had Yusuf Bey of Dibra block the roads and passages the Albanian bandits could take.[79]

Even though Yusuf Bey was dealing with the defence of Kičevo and commissioned his brother, Abbas Bey, to block the roads and passages that the Albanians used, the governor of Bitola stated that Yusuf Bey hinted at a possible failure due to the immense number of bandits.[80]

Yusuf Bey's hint at his probable failure should be taken with a grain of salt, as he regarded the insurgency as an opportunity to increase his power base and his prestige in the imperial capital. Warning about the seventy to eighty towers and two castles the bandits held under their control, Yusuf Bey noted that he would need seven to eight hundred *kile* cannonballs, in addition to troops to be recruited from nearby districts, and sufficient provisions for the forces.[81] To justify his demand, if he was provided with what he asked, Yusuf Bey argued, he would duly acknowledge any sort of punishment if, and only if, one single Albanian bandit entered Rumelia province passing from Dibra. These demands made the governor suspicious as he was not certain whether the bey's request would be used to realise the imperial service's goals or those of someone else.[82] If Yusuf Bey were not granted imperial aid, the governor noted, the former would attack the bandits in any case. But his likely failure would make him more miserable, thus making the bandits unruli-er than before.[83] Even though Numan Pasha later emphasised the timely and loyal service both Yusuf Bey and his brother Abbas Bey offered the imperial government, it is not clear whether the government provided him with the soldiers and artillery he requested.[84]

Albanian highlanders' freelance employment served a plethora of interests, ranging from establishing political equilibrium to obtaining considerable wealth. In the summer of 1803, the local officials of Ohrid and Kičevo complained that Yusuf Bey provoked the bandits of Dibra and Mat and that they harassed the inhabitants of the two towns, probably living off their land.[85] As the greater Dibra region cases suggest, the Albanian pashas' employment of irregulars as 'bandits' in their political and economic endeavours resulted in further deterioration of public security in the region. The economies of violence with which the Albanian pashas were infamously associated followed an inverse correlation between macro-level peace and micro-level warfare in the Balkans. When the imminent threats emerged at the peripheries of the empire, the Albanian pashas directed their mobilisation efforts to the battlefields on the frontiers. Yet, once the macro-level peace returned, the armed Albanians under the command of the pashas engaged in violence on the micro-level. For the Ottoman administration, however, it was a violation of public security in times of war and peace. The constant instability in the Balkan countryside raised suspicions about the sustainability of the Albanian contractors.

Political factionalism in Dibra

The bandits' freelance campaigns came to a halt once the political competition reached an unprecedented pace in the greater region. Ali Pasha of Ioannina, from 1808 onwards, adopted a more expansive policy in northern Albania (Ghëg-inhabited lands) after controlling much of southern Albania (Tosk-inhabited lands). As the pasha's expansion necessitated a reconfiguration of the regional networks, it corresponded with the reformulation of the ages-old political factionalism between Dibra and Peshkopi. The disruption created by the reshuffling of political factionalism subsequently changed the direction of violence in which the Albanian irregulars fought. As Ali Pasha of Ioannina was already engaged in a struggle with İbrahim Pasha, the governor of Elbasan, Yusuf Bey of Dibra became another

target in the pasha's expansion.[86] Following Ali Pasha's deployment of soldiers to occupy the region of Dibra, the Grand Vizier warned both Ali Pasha and Yusuf Bey in 1808 to cease mutual hostilities.[87]

As the imperial orders to sooth the tension between the two Albanian pashas failed, in 1812, Ali Pasha mobilised an army to counter Yusuf Bey of Dibra.[88] Compared to the threat Ali Pasha posed, the Ottoman administration evidently saw Yusuf Bey as the lesser evil. This is why the Ottoman government tolerated Yusuf Bey's expansion of the 'temporary' alliances he had established with the Albanian pashas further north.[89] Nevertheless, the imperial orders asking the two parties to quell the accelerating tension ultimately failed and Ali Pasha defeated his foe without deploying the army he had mobilised. Buying out Hüseyin Bey of Mat, one of Yusuf Bey's trusted men, Ali Pasha had delivered with him some sort of a sniper rifle (*alet-i harb*) as a gift to Yusuf Bey. The package, however, was nothing less than a Trojan horse; it exploded the moment Yusuf Bey opened it, causing severe wounds and ultimately his death thirteen days later.[90]

The dramatic death of Yusuf Bey did not resolve Ali Pasha of Ioannina's ambitions. As the former was replaced by his brother Abbas Bey, Ali Pasha of Ioannina started co-opting the notables of Peshkopi, and with them the highlanders, in order to challenge Dibra.[91] In July 1819, the factionalism between the notables of Dibra and Peshkopi gained momentum once again. The notables of the Peshkopi mobilised approximately 8000 soldiers to deploy against Abbas Bey of Dibra.[92] The confrontation, wherein the notables of Peskhopi sided with Ali Pasha and the notables of Dibra sided with Mustafa Pasha Bushatli, significantly reduced the frequency of freelance plunder.[93] When combined with Albanian social norms, i.e. regional and political clan structures, familism, and patronage, the factionalism defined a new 'non-kin relationship that must be protected and secured'.[94] In other words, the employment of Albanian highlanders followed the friendship networks of a family and/or a household, leading to opposition between the factions as Nathalie Clayer's case of the late Ottoman Albania attests.[95]

For the Albanian bandits-*cum*-irregulars, it was not only their material interests at stake. In fact, as part of the clan structures, the Albanian pashas must have offered at least some sort of material support. It was loyalty, however, that mattered in times of crisis. It was at the moment of heightened factionalism that the campaigns the Albanian highlanders conducted in central Macedonia turned into a violent outbreak collapsing inwardly. As political and clan hostility climaxed, the highlanders of Peshkopi and Mat, who were reported to have been 8000 in number, attacked Dibra, seizing property and killing people as usual.[96] Following this crushing defeat, Abbas Bey resigned from the administration of the town. According to his petition, he was in despair after depleting his political power to administer the town.[97] As political power went hand in hand with the ability to fund and maintain militia forces, Abbas Bey lost his lot, conceding that he was deprived of any sort of power to run the town after having spent all his wealth.[98]

Yet, losing on the battlefield did not seal the fate of the Albanian pashas. The Ottoman government manipulated the delicate configurations of power in the Balkans on a daily basis. The triumphant notables of Peshkopi strove to replace Abbas Bey and nominated a powerful man, Hasan Bey of Peshkopi. Due to the delicate situation with respect to the fate of Ali Pasha of Ioannina, however, the Ottoman administration prevented the bey's nomination because of his loyalty to the pasha. The nomination of another Hasan Bey, who was Yusuf Bey's son, was equally problematic as he was affiliated with the Bushatlis

in Shkoder.[99] After discussions in the capital, the Ottoman governors supported Abbas Bey once again, enticing him with promises of Ali Pasha's imminent downfall.[100]

The Greek War of independence and resistance

When the Greek War of Independence started in 1821, disrupting peace and stability on the macro level, it also simultaneously interrupted the violence which the Albanian pashas and highlanders were engaged in.[101] In their struggle against the Ottoman government, the Greeks fought in two distinct formations: *armatoles*, who were commissioned by the Ottomans to maintain law and order, and *klephts*, who were pastoralist and usually predatory bandits, faced Albanian contractors and bandits.[102] They, therefore, mostly encountered military units comparable to those of Albanian contractors and bandits. Apart from the political confrontation, the War also crystallised the 'long and relentless competition between Greek and Albanian for control and exploitation of the mountain fastness and adjacent lowlands of Epirus, Macedonia, Thessaly, and Rumely [*sic*.]'.[103] While the Greeks were 'bandits with a cause', the Albanian highlanders, however, pursued a different cause. Due to the reallocation of cash resources to the war effort, many leaders of the Ottoman forces chose to form or maintain their irregular forces under their own command. The Albanian pashas, however, had an additional incentive for securing their positions as intermediaries between the irregulars and the Ottoman officials.[104] The contractors and irregulars of Dibra duly found employment prospects in the war effort. As Hasan Bey, Yusuf Bey's son, replaced Abbas Bey, who became the deputy governor of Ohrid, Mustafa Pasha Bushatli informed the government that Hasan Bey was ready for imperial service.[105] The pasha, however, noted that the bey lacked the financial power needed to recruit soldiers.[106]

The question of salaries at the height of the Greek War of Independence, however, was ambiguous. Corresponding with his treasurer in Istanbul, the governor of Shkoder wrote that '[the soldiers of] Dibra [are] well accustomed to salaries despite the definite abolition of [granting] salaries'.[107] For the troops coming from Dibra, including those recruited by Hasan Bey, the pasha noted that the bey and his associates were 'so inappropriate, in other words, dark and broke'.[108] As the governor granted Hasan Bey of Dibra a total of 89,000 *kuruş* with the hope of receiving reimbursement from the imperial government, the officials in the capital were frustrated with these salary requests. Because of the urgent need for mobilisation, however, the Ottoman government agreed to grant 100,000 *kuruş* to the pasha, paying the utmost attention to the fact that the payment in question was in the form of imperial aid (*'atiye*) rather than salary (*'ulûfe*).[109] At a time when the Ottoman finances were in dire straits, the demand for advance payments sparked further concerns: no different from the early modern irregulars in Europe, the Albanians had developed a strong sense of communal solidarity 'by well-developed autonomous internal structures' akin to guilds.[110]

The solidarity the irregulars demonstrated with respect to signing on bonuses was not confined to the highlands of Dibra. Seyyid Ali Pasha, the commander of the forces in Morea in 1822, had paid the one-month salaries of the Albanian mercenaries, but the latter countered the commander, demanding the rest of the payment.[111] This demand was not peaceful; they formed a mob (*cumhur*) almost causing a scandal before confronting the enemy. The pasha surrendered to their demand and paid the Albanians, thanks to

credit he borrowed from another pasha. Nevertheless, it was not the end of the incident. The Albanian chiefs 'sent away some of their soldiers by paying only a month's salary against three-month service, using the money they had received from him'.[112] As demands for payment struck a blow to Ottoman finances, the communal solidarity Albanian highlanders demonstrated in settling financial matters further eroded the Ottomans' desire to employ the Albanian irregulars. The latter's enthusiasm for monetary gain was even reflected pejoratively by the official chroniclers. For instance, Ahmed Lütfi Efendi regarded them as unruly and ungrateful mobs, who 'could well be dispatched to hell if someone pays them a salary'.[113]

Albanian highlanders' motivation for joining the army was, at best, questionable. Yet, there were no promising means for replacing them. Yusuf Pasha of Serres, who was the commander of the castles of Patras and Lepanto in 1822, criticised most of the mercenary troops he could mobilise for his upcoming charge. First, he was not content with the 'sons of the conquerors'. The pasha complained that the soldiers, who would be of great importance if dispatched according to the conditions, which stipulated basically the mobilisation of adult and able males in arms in return for tax exemptions, did not meet expectations, as the bulk of the soldiers were merely peasants and shepherds.[114] Second, he forsook the irregulars the notables of the Balkans could muster simply because the latter were in a miserable situation following the crushing defeat in Morea the previous year. Accordingly, the pasha did not expect the arrival of new soldiers because of the notables' deputies' impoverishment at home. Unable to capitalise on the two alternatives, he wanted to command Albanian irregulars. For that matter, he was determined in securing the employment of Hüseyin Pasha of Vranje, Abbas Bey of Dibra, Zoguoğlu Mahmud Pasha, and Hıfzı Bey, the governor of Skopje.[115]

In August, Yusuf Pasha employed 12,000 Albanians by paying handsome salaries. Due to the political rivalry between him and Ömer Pasha of Vrioni, though, the chiefs whose services he secured refused to cross into Morea. Since the chiefs had also started manipulating the irregulars, Yusuf Pasha ordered an examination of salary accounts, which revealed that many chiefs owed money to the pasha. Then, many irregulars withdrew leaving only 1500 men behind.[116] As Yusuf Pasha was struggling with the Albanian irregulars, Mehmed Reshid Pasha, who was the commander in charge of the second siege of Missolonghi, sought to secure the services of Abbas Bey of Dibra, who had, in the meantime, been promoted to the rank of pasha.[117] After paying the Albanian irregulars 8000 *kuruş* in advance, Mehmed Reshid Pasha wanted to guarantee the irregulars' proper service. He did so by commanding that there would be no payment if the troops did not show up on time, regardless of excuse, and if they attacked subjects seeking mercy.[118]

In 1825, despite the delivery of a total of one million *kuruş* to satisfy the arrears for the year 1824 and the salaries of the first months of 1825, 600 irregulars started a protest in Patras against the forty-day delay in payment.[119] Not long after, around 300 irregulars from Dibra and Mat joined the mob and took Osman Bey, Yusuf Pasha's son, hostage, demanding as ransom payment of the arrears. Unless they were paid in full until the end of the month, the mob threatened to execute Osman Bey.[120] Following the retreat from Patras, Yusuf Pasha's retinue decided to move the treasury to Serres because of the threat the Albanian irregulars posed. Once the mob heard that the treasury was on its way to Serres, they departed immediately, keeping Osman Bey as a hostage.[121] Mustafa Mazhar, who was Yusuf Pasha's other son and the notable of Serres, petitioned the government in

December 1823. He complained about the arrival of 1000 irregulars who demanded 400,000 *kuruş*, which they claimed to be the total amount owed.[122]

Mustafa Mazhar, however, was at a loss to determine whether the amount the chiefs demanded was the actual amount owed. As an attack to seize the treasury was very likely, the notable of Serres frantically asked for an immediate settlement of the accounting matters of the irregulars, whom Mustafa Mazhar found boneheaded (*sebükmağz*).[123] To this, however, the Ottoman government responded calmly that, first and foremost, Yusuf Pasha had to submit the total expenses he incurred in hiring irregulars for the imperial capital before making any payments out of the treasury.[124] The way the Ottoman officials dealt with these demands indicate the flexibility of Ottoman recruitment practices. First, the government suggested a peaceful settlement by mild words. If not settled, the government suggested intimidation by means of mustering troops from nearby districts. Mustafa Mazhar, who was concerned about the time it would take to summon troops, wrote that the intimidation might mean throwing the baby out with the bathwater, and said that he 'did not know what would happen next if they are not dispersed'.[125]

The Ottoman administration's ultimate solution was to recruit another group of irregulars. However, from the local perspective, dispersing 1000 men was not easy, if Mustafa Mazhar's words are to be believed. Afraid of making thing worse, the notable underlined that it was not a good time to mobilise any more troops. He was unsure about the number of troops that could be mustered in the region, and was also frustrated that Serres itself was almost abandoned – only the elderly remained, as the younger ones had already joined the army.[126] That Albanians likely murdered Osman Bey and ravaged Serres demonstrated the problems associated with irregular troops. What the incident in Serres reveals, however, is that the increasing difficulties in mobilising the army led the Ottoman recruitment policy-makers to rely on another body for a more disciplined army.

Rebellion in Dibra

The unreliable, if not unruly, acts of the Albanian irregulars in the course of the Greek War of Independence led the Ottoman officials to view them differently from ordinary irregulars. Hakan Erdem argues this differentiation was such that some high-level Ottomans, including the Grand Vizier Mehmed Reshid Pasha, believed some Albanian leaders were on the edge of a 'nationalist' conspiracy.[127] What happened in the greater Dibra region in the late 1820s further confirmed Albanian highlanders' unreliability, not only as irregulars, but also as imperial subjects. 'For a long time', Mustafa Pasha, the governor of Shkoder, wrote in 1827, 'the people of Dibra, Peshkopi, and Mat developed indications of non-submission to the Ottoman authority'.[128] As these people were already infamous for banditry and for hijacking roads, the governor was frustrated by the fact that they neither provided the necessary troops, nor the cash equivalents whenever the Ottoman government demanded recruitment.

Facing the rising tide of anarchy in the region, the governor grew concerned with the highlanders' violation of the previous agreement, which had been concluded by means of a criminal surety with the notables of the three towns.[129] According to this surety, 'it was agreed that, whenever demanded, they would hasten to serve the sultan as best as they could like the rest of the other Muslim troops'.[130] In addition to his inappropriate acts *ab antiquo*, the governor complained that Abbas Pasha repeatedly committed acts of treason

against the Ottoman army, and thus accused him of being one of the primary reasons for the army's defeat. This explicit resentment, which could very well be another case of gossip and rumour against the Albanian pasha, indicates the growing tension between the people of the region and the Ottoman government stemming from the recruitment of irregulars.

This final tension ultimately sealed Abbas Pasha's fate. The governor was informed that Abbas Pasha was preoccupied with mustering troops, which the former preferred to call 'vermin'.[131] Upon this, Kasım Bey, a relative of Mustafa Pasha, approached Dibra. While the rest of the notables acknowledged Ottoman authority, Abbas Pasha blatantly defied it and fled the town.[132] After a short episode of violence, the Grand Vizier in Istanbul declared the restoration of order by peaceful means stating that, 'the region was capable of providing around fifteen thousand *useful* troops, it was necessary to disperse them like other provinces do'.[133] In the meantime, Abbas Pasha, who was heard to be heading to Bitola, was sent into exile, if not retired forcefully, to İğneada. There he served once again under the command of Yusuf Pasha of Serres.[134]

The elimination of Abbas Pasha in 1827 came one year after the 'Auspicious Event', by which the centuries-long Janissary corps were replaced with the 'Victorious Soldiers of Muhammed' after a fierce civil war in the Ottoman capital.[135] The imperial administration's impetus for the two incidents was the same: centralisation. The policies for creating a 'modern' army unfolded during the era of Selim III. These policies seriously questioned the presence of ethnic groups among the irregulars, which made up a significant portion of the Ottoman army by 1800.[136] The Ottoman officials then sought the means of replacing non-productive segments of the agricultural industry with the conscription of Anatolian and Rumelian peasants.[137] The fact that the Ottoman army increasingly relied on the Turkish speakers of the empire has led scholars to argue this was the beginning of a 'proto-Turkish army'.[138] Regardless of nationalist concerns, however, the Ottoman government took measures to limit the irregulars commanded by the provincial notables. Rather, they aimed to incorporate these militias into the central military command as regulars.[139]

The Dibra rebellion makes evident that the tacit contract concluded between the imperial government and tribal and nomadic populations living in Rumelia and Anatolia was terminated. The termination brought about a military confrontation, which replaced the arrangements for the recruitment of irregulars.[140] In other words, the reformed army that was established to confront the 'enemies of the religion and state' became a means of disciplining the communities resisting conscription. However, the transformation of Albanian highlanders' recruitment from irregular to regular was not straightforward. The Ottoman military administration continued to employ irregular forces, no matter how self-ordained they were. This trend of employing irregulars in the Ottoman military administration persisted, especially for the period 1826–1839.[141] Tobias Heinzelmann argues that the Ottoman military command's continuity in recruiting irregular troops through the 1840s and 1850s demonstrates that the Ottoman plans were mere rhetoric.[142] The Albanian irregulars – despite the decrease in their number – served the Ottoman army during the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War in addition to the Circassians on the eastern borderlands.[143] What was abandoned was not the service the Albanian contractors and irregulars offered the imperial army, but rather the way they negotiated, if not dictated, their terms of employment prior to service.

The regular recruitment set the fires of rebellion in the greater Dibra region. In 1832–1833, after crushing the revolts, the Ottoman government conscripted around 20,000 Albanians and Bosnians. These conscripts were 'persuaded' to fight after the imperial army seized hostages from local populations and kept them in fortresses.[144] The new practices of persuasion turned the peripheral provinces of the empire into a hotbed of rebellion. Yet, the terms of conscription oscillated between sheer force and negotiation. In the 1840s, when the Ottoman governors initiated another wave of conscription in the Albanian provinces, the Albanian irregulars and their chiefs were able to negotiate the terms of recruitment. In this scheme, the Albanian recruits were to serve in the regular standing army, but in their own pre-existent social structures led by the chief's family as officers.[145] Furthermore, they would serve in their home provinces in their local costumes and be organised in a similar way to the reserve army before their transformation to regular units.[146] The forcible conscription of some 20,000 Albanians between 1842 and 1845, however, caused widespread discontent in the region.[147] It is not surprising that the following rebellion, which broke out in 1844 in Skopje, Tetovo, Prishtina and extended to the greater Dibra region, was waged against the pillars of the *Tanzimat* reforms: conscription and newly imposed taxation.[148]

Conclusion

The case of Dibra illustrated above leads to larger inquiries into the transformation of Ottoman recruitment policies, from the prominence of salary to the rise of a conscripted army. The military reform, which accelerated during the reign of Selim III, contradicted the terms of employment for irregular forces. From the perspective of the reforms, the interdependency between the imperial government and the Albanian irregulars was not sustainable. The whole ordeal in Dibra, which was no exception but rather a particular example in the peripheral provinces of the empire, reveals three factors causing this unsustainability. First, the enterprise between the Albanian pashas, as 'contractors' of irregulars, and the military administration was detrimental to the power balance in the Balkans. The Ottoman military command's increasing dependency on irregular troops was not compatible with the imperial ambition of centralisation. The inverse correlation between the contractors' acts of violence and the macro-level peace conditions augmented the imperial concerns of stability and public order. The networks of violence the 'contractors' commanded by which irregulars-*cum*-bandits ravaged the countryside for concerted political moves or sheer economic gain was fundamentally contrary to the ideals underlying the reforms.

Second, irregulars' prevailing loyalty to the commanders, rather than the country, contradicted the goal of creating reformed soldiers ready to fight and die for the empire without creating a nuisance for the ruling elite.[149] Irregulars demonstrated strict adherence to their tribal and clan structures or prioritised monetary interests, thus lacking the military dedication the Ottoman commanders were eager to find in their forces. Last but not least, Albanian irregulars' solidarity, often expressed before showing up on the battlefield, disrupted military strategy. The Albanian irregulars' professionalism, exhibited in collective solidarity, particularly regarding financial demands, clashed with the Ottomans' understanding of professionalism. The bands of irregulars acting as autonomous corporate

entities and protecting the interests of each member proved problematic for the prospects of the military reforms, let alone the moments of crisis on the battlefield. Conceding how good Albanian soldiers were, a mid-nineteenth-century French observer noted, however, that any attack on a member of their band proved most dangerous for the attacker, because 'toucher à un, c'est toucher à tous'.[150]

What happened in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in the greater Dibra region was decisive in the acceleration of the military reforms of the empire. These reforms, aimed to recruit the Albanian highlanders as 'regular' troops, instead of irregular forces, thus diminishing Ottoman commanders' reliance on Albanian military contractors. However, the gradual change in recruitment practices alienated the Albanian provinces of the empire. This alienation took the form of a military confrontation between the imperial government and the Albanian highlanders, which rendered the north-western peripheries of the empire a hotbed of constant rebellion in the nineteenth century. In this clash, as the majority of Albanians resisted conscription, the Ottoman government not only attempted to suppress the resistance by the army it constituted from the conscripts of the same region, but also rendered the highlanders imperial subjects to be 'reformed', disparaging their loyalty and salaried service and denouncing their resistance.

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Notes

1. Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (hereafter BOA), C. DH. 27/1340 5 Zilkade 1206 (June 1792).
2. An account on Osman of Mat, without the connection with his patron Yusuf Bey, is discussed also by Frederick F. Anscombe, *Albanians and "Mountain Bandits"* in *The Ottoman Balkans, 1750–1830*, ed. Frederick F. Anscombe (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006), pp.89–90. In this period, one *kese* meant 500 *akçe* whereas 1 *kuruş* equalled 120 *akçe*. For the Ottoman currency units, see Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.163.
3. BOA, C. DH. 27/1340 5 Zilkade 1206 (25 June 1792).
4. Ibid.
5. BOA. C. DH. 9/427, no date.

6. After Prilep, the mullah and his forces resided in Kičevo, another town in the modern Republic of Macedonia, harassing the inhabitants. The mullah promised their withdrawal on condition of payment of nearly 104 *kuruş*. Being too poor to pay such an amount, they paid 50 *kuruş* instead, ensuring that Molla Yunus returned to Dibra.
7. BOA. C. DH. 34/1655, no date.
8. BOA, C. DH. 27/1340 5 Zilkade 1206 (25 June 1792). In another document, Torkullu Mehmed Sipahi is said to have offered 10 *kuruş* per Albanian who would help realise his cause. Cf. BOA. C. DH. 128/6365, 21 Şevval 1206 (12 June 1792).
9. The number of the bandits is not certain as it varies in documents. Two documents list 2000, while another document indicates 1500. Cf. BOA, C. DH. 128/6365, 21 Şevval 1206 (12 June 1792); C. DH. 27/1340 5 Zilkade 1206 (25 June 1792); BOA. C. DH. 34/1655, no date.
10. C. DH. 27/1340 5 Zilkade 1206 (25 June 1792).
11. Yücel Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Dağlı İsyanları (1791–1808)* [*The Mountaineer Rebellions in the Ottoman Empire (1791–1808)*] (Ankara: Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakülyesi Yayınları, 1983); Anscombe, *Albanians and "Mountain Bandits"*; Antonis Anastasopoulos, *Albanians in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Balkans* in *The Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, the Greek Lands: Toward a Social and Economic History*, ed. Elias Kolovos, et al. (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2007).
12. Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Military Recruitment Strategies in the Late Eighteenth Century* in *Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia, 1775–1925*, ed. Erik Jan Zürcher (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), p.21. For a classical work on armed irregulars, called interchangeably '*sekbân*' or '*levend*' depending on political conjecture and the military reform, respectively, see Mustafa Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler* [*The Irregulars in the Ottoman History*] (Istanbul: İstanbul Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi, 1965).
13. For the seminal works on the New Order, see Stanford J. Shaw, 'The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-ı Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III', *The Journal of Modern History* Vol.37, no.3 (1965), pp.291–306; Avigdor Levy, 'Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century', *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol.18, no.3 (1982), pp.227–49.
14. Tolga U. Esmer, 'Economies of Violence, Banditry and Governance in the Ottoman Empire Around 1800', *Past & Present* Vol.224, no.1 (2014), pp.163–99; Ali Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).
15. Today, Dibra as a town is in the Republic of Macedonia. As an administrative region, however, it is a district (*Rrethi i Dibrës*), whose headquarter is located in Peshkopi (*Debre-i Zir*). The latter borders on the districts of Mat and Mirdita to the West, Kukës to the North, Bulqiza to the South and the Republic of Macedonia to the east. Robert Elsie, *Dibra* in *Historical Dictionary of Albania* (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2010), p.111.
16. For brief information on Dibra and Peshkopi, see Nathalie Clayer, *Aux origines du nationalisme albanais: La naissance d'une nation majoritairement musulmane en Europe* (Paris: Karthala, 2007), pp.89–95.
17. The mountains, which were Reçi, Dardha, Çidhna, Muhurri, and Luznia in the lower Dibra and Gryka e Vogël, Gryka e Madhe, Bulqiza, and Selishta in the upper Dibra, respectively, constituted their own *bajrak*s. Clayer, ibid., p.91. Needless to say, being 'highlanders' in the nineteenth century meant being savage as the population in the mountains were the target of Europeans who assumed to bring 'civilisation' to these 'tribal savages' while they were also identified as Muslims who needed to be 're-educated' in their faiths. Isa Blumi, 'Contesting the Edges of the Ottoman Empire: Rethinking Ethnic and Sectarian Boundaries in the Malësore, 1878–1912', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Vol.35, no.2 (May 2003), p.240.
18. Peter Bartl, *Die albanischen Muslime zur Zeit der nationalen Unabhängigkeitsbewegung (1878–1912)* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1968), p.68. According to the poll tax census carried out in 1845/1846, there were 1889 non-Muslims in the two Dibra regions. BOA. C. DH. 186/9257, 1246 (1845/6).
19. In 1918, pastures constituted 35.70 per cent of the cultivated soil in Albania, forests 34.30 per cent, and meadows 1.90 per cent, respectively. Siegfried Gruber and Robert Pichler, 'Household

Structures in Albania in the Early 20th century', *The History of the Family* Vol.7, no.3 (2002), p.356.

20. Ibid., p.357.
21. Michel Palairet, *The Migrant Workers of the Balkans and Their Villages (18th Cent.-World War II)* in *Handwerk in Mittel- und Südosteuropa: Mobilität, Vermittlung und Wandel im Handwerk des 18 bis. 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Klaus Roth (Münich: Selbstverlag der Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1987), p.24.
22. Suraiya Faroqhi, 'Migration into Eighteenth-Century "Greater Istanbul" as Reflected in the Kadi Registers of Eyüp', *Turcica* no.30 (1998), p.173.
23. Palairet, *The Migrant Workers*, pp.23–4.
24. Robert Pichler, *Strategies of Migrant Workers in the Highland Villages of Southern Albania in the 19th and 20th Centuries* in *Household and Family in the Balkans: Two Decades of Historical Family Research at the University of Graz*, ed. Karl Kaser (Wien: Lit, 2012), p.422. Bathhouses in Istanbul were also particular destinations for Albanians in the eighteenth century. For further information, see Nina Ergin, 'The Albanian Tellâk Connection: Labor Migration to the Hammams of 18th-Century Istanbul, Based on the 1752 *İstanbul Hamâmları Defteri*', *Turcica* no.43 (2011), pp.231–56; *Mapping Istanbul's Hammams of 1752 and Their Employees* in *Bread from the Lion's Mouth: Artisans Struggling for a Livelihood in Ottoman Cities*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi (New York; Oxford: Berghahn, 2015). For the Albanian towns sending migrants to Istanbul at the turn of the nineteenth century, see also Cengiz Kırlı, 'A Profile of the Labor Force in Early Nineteenth-Century Istanbul', *International Labor and Working-Class History* no.60 (2002), p.136.
25. Michel Palairet, *The Balkan Economies c. 1800–1914: Evolution without Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.345.
26. M. Münir Aktepe, *Patrona İsyanı (1730)* [*The Patrona Rebellion (1730)*] (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1958), p.170; Betül Başaran, *Selim III, Social Control and Policing at the End of the Eighteenth Century: Between Crisis and Order* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), p.23.
27. Fariba Zarinebaf, *Crime and Punishment in Istanbul, 1700–1800* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), p.59.
28. For the rebellion in 1740, see Robert W. Olson, 'Jews, Janissaries, Esnaf and the Revolt of 1740 in Istanbul: Social Upheaval and Political Realignment in the Ottoman Empire', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* Vol.20, no.2 (1977), pp.185–207.
29. In the eighteenth century, the surveys of places of 'trouble' in Istanbul, i.e. bathhouses and coffeehouses and so on, were a frequent tool of the policy. Accordingly, expulsion of unemployed Albanian migrants was not confined to Istanbul. Ergin, *Mapping Istanbul's Hammams*, p.108; Zarinebaf, *Crime and Punishment*, p.129; Eyal Ginio, 'The Administration of Criminal Justice in Ottoman Selânik (Salonica) during the Eighteenth Century', *Turcica* Vol.30 (1998), p.189.
30. Anscombe, *Albanians and "Mountain Bandits"*, p.102.
31. See, for instance, the imperial orders restricting the employment of Albanian mercenaries under the service of the Balkan notables, BOA. C. DH. 23/1135, 20 Zilkade 1214 (15 April 1800); BOA. C. DH. 83/4126, 29 Zilkade 1214 (24 April 1800).
32. See, for instance, BOA. C. DH. 304/15169, Ramazan 1214 (January/February 1800); BOA. C. DH. 23/1135, 10 Rabiulevvel 1218 (30 June 1803); BOA. C. DH. 22/1089, 20 Rabiulevvel 1218 (10 July 1803). On Ali Pasha's rise, see the seminal work of Dennis N. Skiotis, 'From Bandit to Pasha: First Steps in the Rise to Power of Ali of Tepelen, 1750–1784', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Vol.2, no.3 (1971), pp.219–44. For a recent study, see Katherine Elizabeth Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
33. BOA. C. DH. 34/1694, 10 Zilhicce 1218 (22 March 1804).
34. Pichler, *Strategies of Migrant Workers*, p.436.
35. For the cases of Swiss and Scottish irregulars, see John Casparis, 'The Swiss Mercenary System: Labor Emigration from the Semiperiphery', *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* Vol.5, no.4 (1982), pp.593–642; James Miller, *The Scottish Mercenary as a Migrant Labourer in Europe, 1550–1650*,

in *Fighting for a Living*: *A Comparative Study of Military Labour 1500–2000*, ed. Erik Jan Zürcher (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013). Accordingly, Albanian *stradiot*s served in the early modern armies of Europe. Frank Tallett, *Soldiers in Western Europe, c. 1500–1790*, in *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative Study of Military Labour 1500–2000*, ed. Erik Jan Zürcher (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), p.163.

36. Clayer, *Aux origines du nationalisme albanais*, p.91.
37. For the law, see Margaret Hasluck, *The Unwritten Law in Albania* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1954); Shtjefën Gjeçov and Leonard Fox, eds., *Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit = The Code of Lekë Dukagjini* (New York: Gjonlekaj Pub. Co., 1989). For a comparative account on customary laws, see Caspar ten Dam, 'How to Feud and Rebel: 1. Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians', *Iran & The Caucasus* Vol.14, no.2 (2010), pp.331–65; 'How to Feud and Rebel: 2. Histories, Cultures and Grievances of the Chechens and Albanians', *Iran and the Caucasus* Vol.15, nos.1–2 (2011), pp.235–73; Stéphane Voell, *Identity and Traditional Law in Albania and Georgia* in *Ethnic and Linguistic Diversity in Southeast Europe and the Caucasus*, ed. Thede Kahl and Iona Nechiti (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences, 2016).
38. For blood feuds in other isolated societies, see Jenny Wormald, 'Blood Feud, Kindred and Government in Early Modern Scotland', *Past & Present* no.87 (1980), pp.54–97; Christopher Boehm, *Blood Revenge: The Enactment and Management of Conflict in Montenegro and Other Tribal Societies* (2nd ed, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987); Stephen Wilson, *Feuding, Conflict and Banditry in Nineteenth-Century Corsica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
39. Erik Jan Zürcher, 'Introduction: Understanding Changes in Military Recruitmen and Employment Worldwide', in *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative Study of Military Labour 1500–2000*, ed. Erik Jan Zürcher (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), p.32.
40. Anastasopoulos, *Albanians in the Eighteenth-Century*, p.46.
41. Gültekin Yıldız, *Neferin Adı Yok: Zorunlu Askerliğe Geçiş Sürecinde Osmanlı Devleti'nde Siyaset, Ordu ve Toplum (1826–1839)* [*The Private has No Name: Politics, Military, and Society in the Ottoman State during the Transition to Conscription Army (1826–1839)*] (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2009), p.198; Virginia H. Aksan, *Mobilization of Warrior Populations in the Ottoman Context, 1750–1850* in *Fighting for a Living*, *A Comparative Study of Military Labour 1500–2000,* ed. Erik Jan Zürcher (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), p.344.
42. Halil İnalcık, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700', *Archivum Ottomanicum* Vol.VI (1980), p.303. For a general account of the irregulars, see Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*. However, Rhoads Murphey warns that one should take the '*sekbân* domination of the empire' with a grain of salt due to the total number of the irregulars. Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700* (London: UCL Press, 1999), p.190.
43. Virginia H. Aksan, 'Locating the Ottomans Among Early Modern Empires', *Journal of Early Modern History* Vol.3, no.3 (1999), p.121.
44. Aksan, 'Ottoman Military Recruitment Strategies', p.28.
45. Particularly, the Porte hired 2700 Albanian irregulars, 1500 of which were to be raised by İbrahim Pasha of Shkoder. Kahraman Şakul, *The Evolution of Ottoman Military Logistical Systems in the Later Eighteenth Century: The Rise of a New Class of Military Entrepreneur* in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), p.324.
46. BOA. C. DH. 13/628 29 Cemaziyelahir 1224 (11 August 1809).
47. For this kind of recruitment, see Jan Lucassen and Erik Jan Zürcher, *Introduction: Conscription and Resistance. The Historical Context* in *Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia, 1775–1925*, ed. Erik Jan Zürcher (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp.5–7.
48. Virginia Aksan, *Ottoman War and Warfare, 1453–1812*, in *War in the Early Modern World*, ed. Jeremy Black (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p.168.
49. Y. Hakan Erdem, *Perfidious Albanians and Zealous Governors: Ottomans, Albanians and Turks in the Greek War of Independence* in *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760–1850. Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation*, ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos and Elias Kolovos (Rethymno: University of

Crete, 2007), p.214; Aksan, 'Ottoman Military Recruitment Strategies', p.29; Halil İnalcık, *Arnawutluk* in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. P. Bearman, et al. (2nd ed, Leiden: Brill, 1960), pp.657–58.
50. Erdem, *Perfidious Albanians*, p.214; İnalcık, *Arnawutluk*, pp.657–58.
51. Tallett, 'Soldiers in Western Europe', p.139.
52. Lucassen and Zürcher, *Introduction: Conscription and Resistance*, p.6. For Mehmed Ali Pasha, see Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
53. Cengiz Kırlı, 'Tyranny Illustrated: From Petition to Rebellion in Ottoman Vranje', *New Perspectives on Turkey* Vol.53 (2015), p.12.
54. Şakul, *The Evolution of Ottoman Military*, p.326; Erdem, *Perfidious Albanians*, p.215.
55. Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire*, pp.1–2.
56. Anscombe, *Albanians and "Mountain Bandits"*, p.96.
57. Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Military and Social Transformation, 1826–28: Engagement and Resistance in a Moment of Global Imperalism* in *Empires and Autonomy: Moments in the History of Globalization*, ed. Stephen M. Streeter, John C. Weaver, and William D. Coleman (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2009), p.66.
58. Considering that most provincial notables of the eighteenth century, if not earlier centuries, came from the bandits, as Barkey claims, the bandits 'represented alternative centres of militarization that were dealt with in the old patrimonial style, through incorporation and reward'. Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), p.17.
59. Tolga U. Esmer, 'Notes on a Scandal: Transregional Networks of Violence, Gossip, and Imperial Sovereignty in the Late Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* Vol.58, no.1 (2016), p.105.
60. On Kara Mahmud Pasha, see Stanford J. Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789–1807* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp.230–36.
61. BOA. HAT. 70/2952-İ, no date.
62. The harassment continued as the pasha deceived the inhabitants of Dibra by collecting 6000 *kuruş* in return for the seized sheep. BOA. HAT. 70/2952-E, no date.
63. BOA. HAT. 70/2952-İ, no date.
64. Robert Elsie, *The Tribes of Albania: History, Society and Culture* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015), p.269. *Bajrak*s were part of the greater *fis* (clan) structure by which the Ottomans facilitated the draft of Albanians for the Ottoman army. Stéphane Voell, 'The Kanun in the City. Albanian Customary Law as a Habitus and Its Persistence in the Suburb of Tirana, Bathore', *Anthropos* Vol.98, no.1 (2003), p.93.
65. I borrow the 'bilateral factionalism' from Jane Hathaway, *Bilateral Factionalism in the Ottoman Provinces* in *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire: Halcyon Days in Crete V: A Symposium Held in Rethymno, 10–12 January 2003*, ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2005).
66. BOA. HAT. 70/2952-E 7 Ramazan 1209 (28 March 1795).
67. BOA. 70/2952-J, no date
68. Esmer, 'Notes on a Scandal', p.104.
69. BOA. HAT. 70/2952-G, no date; BOA. HAT. 70/2052-K.
70. BOA. HAT. 70/2952-E 7 Ramazan 1209 (28 March 1795).
71. BOA. HAT. 70/2952-E 7 Ramazan 1209 (28 March 1795).
72. Miller, *The Scottish Mercenary*, p.177.
73. BOA, C. DH. 27/1340 5 Zilkade 1206 (June 1792).
74. Esmer, 'Economies of Violence', p.168.
75. BOA. HAT. 79/3271-A, 3 Cemaziyelevvel 1215 (22 September 1800).
76. The governor also noted that Ali Pasha of Ioannina and Yusuf Bey of Dibra were sent letters for their contribution; it seems, however, that they did not send any soldiers. BOA. HAT. 96/3875-A, 3 Cemaziyelevvel 1215 (22 September 1800). BOA. HAT. 96/3875 7 Cemaziyelevvel 1215 (26 September 1800). On 'sons of the conquerors', see M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, *Rumeli'de Yürükler, Tatarlar ve Evlâd-ı Fatihan* [*Nomads, Tatars and the Sons of Conquerors in Rumelia*] (Istanbul:

Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1957), pp.74–5; Reşat Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), pp.72–74; Y. Hakan Erdem, *Turks as Soldiers in Mahmud II's Army: Turning the Evlad-ı Fatihan into Regulars in the Ottoman Balkans* in *Beyond the Balkans: Towards an Inclusive History of Southeastern Europe*, ed. Sabine Rutar (Zurich and Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2014).

77. For the term 'confederative military symbiosis', see Aksan, *Ottoman Military and Social Transformation*, p.66.
78. BOA. HAT. 57/2612-A, 3 Rabiulevvel 1216 (14 July 1801).
79. BOA. C. DH. 156/7775, Evâhir-i Rabiulevvel (9 August 1801)
80. BOA. HAT. 57/2612-A, 3 Rabiulevvel 1216 (14 July 1801).
81. BOA. HAT 53/2472 21 Cemaziyelahir 1216 (29 October 1801). *Kile* is originally a measurement of volume. Ágoston, warning about regional variations, notes that 1 *kile* equals 36 litres. Gábor Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.244.
82. BOA. HAT 53/2472 21 Cemaziyelahir 1216 (29 October 1801).
83. Ibid.
84. BOA. HAT. 57/2612-C, no date. With regards to the artillery, the governor noted that there was none in Bitola directing the discussion of the matter to the Ottoman government. BOA. HAT 53/2472 21 Cemaziyelahir 1216 (29 October 1801).
85. BOA. HAT. 96/3865-D, 12 Rabiulahir 1218 (1 August 1803); BOA. HAT. 96/3865-E, Rabiulahir 1218 (August 1803); BOA. HAT. 96/3865-İ, Rabiulahir 1218 (August 1803).
86. Hamiyet Sezer Feyzioğlu, '19. Yüzyıl Başlarında Arnavutluk'ta İktidar Mücadelesi [Power Struggle in Albania in the Early 19th Century]', *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* Vol.23, no.36 (2004), p.111 ff.
87. BOA. C. DH. 66/3268, 9 Receb 1223 (31 August 1808).
88. BOA. HAT. 252/14313, 13 Cemaziyelahir 1227 (24 June 1812).
89. Particularly, Yusuf Bey of Dibra approached Kara Mustafa Pasha of Shkoder, Mahmud Pasha of Prizren, Mustafa Pasha of Gjakovë, Receb Pasha of Tetovo, and Malik Pasha of Prishtina. BOA. C. DH. 58/2862, 9 Receb 1227 (19 July 1812).
90. BOA. HAT. 281/16735, no date.
91. BOA. HAT. 401/21401, 22 Ramazan 1234 (15 July 1819).
92. BOA. HAT. 401/21401, 22 Ramazan 1234 (15 July 1819). Evidently the hostility had two sides, each side sending their own petitions to the Ottoman government. See, for instance, the petitions penned by the deputy judge (*nâ'ib*) of Dibra, see BOA. HAT. 401/21401-İ, no date; BOA. HAT. 401/21401-F, no date; and those by the notables of Peshkopi BOA. HAT. 401/21401-C, no date; BOA. HAT. 401/21401-H, no date, and the one penned by Abbas Bey BOA. HAT. 401/21401-E, no date.
93. BOA. HAT. 670/32684, no date.
94. Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, *Humiliation and Reconciliation in Northern Albania: The Logics of Feuding in Symbolic and Diachronic Perspectives* in *Dynamics of Violence: Processes of Escalation and De-Escalation in Violent Group Conflicts, Sociologus*, ed. Georg Elwert, Stephan Feuchtwang, and Dieter Neubert (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999), pp.135, 143.
95. Nathalie Clayer, *Local Factionalism and Political Mobilization in the Albanian Province in the Late Ottoman Empire: A Consul Caught up in a Conflict between Villagers and the Ottoman Authorities* in *Popular Protest and Political Participation in the Ottoman Empire: Studies in Honor of Suraiya Faroqhi*, ed. Eleni Gara, M. Erdem Kabadayı, and Christoph K. Neumann (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2011), p.204.
96. BOA. HAT. 729/34698, no date. In another correspondence, the number of highlanders varies between 8000 and 10,000. Cf. BOA. HAT. 401/21401-B, no date.
97. BOA. HAT. 729/34698, no date.
98. BOA. HAT. 400/21032-I, 7 Receb 1235 (20 April 1820); BOA. HAT. 400/21032-J, 7 Receb 1235 (20 April 1820).
99. BOA. HAT. 670/32684, no date.

100. BOA. HAT. 400/21032-I, 7 Receb 1235 (20 April 1820); BOA. HAT. 400/21032-J, 7 Receb 1235 (20 April 1820).
101. On the Greek War of Independence and the Greek irregulars, see, respectively, Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821–1833* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Dennis N. Skiotis, *Mountain Warriors and the Greek Revolution* in *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, ed. V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Giannes S. Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821–1912* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987); Achilles Batalas, *Send a Thief to Catch a Thief: State-Building and the Employment of Irregular Military Formations in Mid-Nineteenth Century Greece* in *Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation*, ed. Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
102. Similar to the Albanians, the line between the *armatoloi* and *klephts* was extremely fine as most of the former were selected from the pool of the latter by the Ottomans. Skiotis, *Mountain Warriors*, pp.311–13.
103. Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause*, pp.26–7.
104. Erdem, *Perfidious Albanians*, p.220.
105. BOA. HAT. 481/23558, 17 Cemaziyelevvel 1237 (9 February 1822); BOA. C. DH. 215/10709, 5 Cemaziyelahir 1237 (27 February 1822).
106. BOA. HAT. 937/40510-A, 23 Şaban 1238 (5 May 1823).
107. BOA. HAT. 911/39854, 11 Zilkade 1238 (20 July 1823). The infamous nickname 'dark' were mostly associated with the banditry in the late eighteenth century, Kara Mahmud Pasha being the most notable example.
108. BOA. HAT. 911/39854, 11 Zilkade 1238 (20 July 1823).
109. BOA. HAT. 911/39854, 11 Zilkade 1238 (20 July 1823).
110. Tallett, 'Soldiers in Western Europe', p.149.
111. Erdem, *Perfidious Albanians*, p.215.
112. According to Seyyid Ali Pasha, after the departure of the mercenaries, the chiefs had only ten men under their command despite initially bringing 100 men. Ibid.
113. Quoted in Veysel Şimşek, 'The First "Little Mehmeds": Conscripts for the Ottoman Army, 1826–53', *The Journal of Ottoman Studies* no.44 (2014), p.290.
114. BOA. HAT. 922/40080-B, 15 Zilkade 1238 (24 July 1823).
115. Ibid. The Zoguoğlu family, or the Zogolli in Albanaian, was one of the four families ruling Mat in the nineteenth century, from which Ahmed Zogu, to be later known as King Zog, stemmed in the twentieth century. Elsie, *The Tribes of Albania*, p.269.
116. Erdem, *Perfidious Albanians*, p.220.
117. BOA. HAT. 928/40290, 23 Safer 1239 (29 October 1823). For other sieges of Missolonghi, see David Brewer, *The Greek War of Independence: The Struggle For Freedom from Ottoman Oppression* (New York and London: Overlook Duckworth, 2011), pp.269–71.
118. BOA. HAT. 920/40026, 13 Ramazan 1240 (1 May 1825).
119. BOA. HAT. 905/39715-N, 27 Rabiulahir 1241 (9 December 1825).
120. BOA. HAT. 905/39715-M, 25 Rabiulahir 1241 (7 December 1825).
121. BOA. HAT. 904/39695, 27 Rabiulahir 1241 (9 December 1825).
122. Apart from the mercenaries of Dibra and Mat, who were 320 in number and commanded by twenty chiefs (*bölükbaşı*), the rest were, unsurprisingly, northern Albanian. That is, Rüstem Ağa and Sinan Ağa from Prizren, Receb Aga from Skopje, Süleyman Ağa and Arif Aga from Prishtina, İbrahim Aga from Tetovo, and Çam Muhtar Ağa and Topal Numan Ağa commanded 600 Albanians. BOA. HAT. 904/39695-C, no date.
123. BOA. HAT. 904/39695-A, 27 Rabiulahir 1241 (9 December 1825). Reinkowski discusses, in the case of Mirdite, another group of Albanian highlanders, the transformation of Albanians from an ethnic group offering good service and loyalty to their association with pejorative terms like 'bonehead'. Even though he dates the transformation to have taken place in the 1860s, the invective directed at the Albanians evidently has earlier origins. Maurus Reinkowski, *The Imperial Idea and Realpolitik - Reform Policy and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire* in

Comparing Empires: Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century, ed. Jörn Leonhard and Ulrike von Hirschhausen (Göttingen: Vandenhock & Ruprecht, 2011), p.467.

124. BOA. HAT. 904/39695, 27 Rabiulahir 1241 (9 December 1825).
125. BOA. HAT. 904/39695, 27 Rabiulahir 1241 (9 December 1825).
126. BOA. HAT. 904/39695, 27 Rabiulahir 1241 (9 December 1825).
127. Erdem, *Perfidious Albanians*, p.215. Noting the frustration with the conduct of the Ottoman troops, Skiotis claims that 2000 to 3000 Albanian highlanders rebelled against the Ottoman forces during the war. Skiotis, *Mountain Warriors*, p.326.
128. BOA. HAT. 406/21194, 11 Cemaziyelevvel 1243 (30 November 1827).
129. Criminal surety, or *kefâlet senedi*, according to Canbakal, usually refers to the responsibility of submitting defendants either to a court or to the authorities. As these sureties evolved in the later centuries, they also came to mean vows to 'maintain order, to collaborate with authorities, to deliver culprits, or less commonly, to be obedient themselves'. Hülya Canbakal, 'Vows as Contract in Ottoman Public Life (17th–18th Centuries)', *Islamic Law and Society* 18, no. 1 (2011), pp.92–3. Cf. Işık Tamdoğan, '*Nezir* ya da XVIII. Yüzyıl Çukurova'sında Eşkıya, Göçebe ve Devlet Arasındaki İlişkiler [*Nezir* or the Relations among the Bandits, Nomads, and State in 18th Century Çukurova]', *Kebikeç* no.21 (2006), pp.135–46.
130. BOA. HAT. 406/21194, 11 Cemaziyelevvel 1243 (30 November 1827).
131. BOA. HAT. 407/21232, 11 Cemaziyelevvel 1243 (30 November 1827). Association of the rebels with a pejorative discourse was an established tradition in the Ottoman chroniclers. Felix Konrad, 'Coping with "the Riff-Raff and Mob": Representations of Order and Disorder in the Patrona Halil Rebellion (1730)', *Die Welt des Islams* Vol.54, no.3/4 (2014), p.393.
132. Even though it is not clear, Hasan Bey, Yusuf Bey's son, assumes the administration of the town once again. BOA. HAT. 407/21237, 19 Cemaziyelevel 1243 (8 December 1827).
133. BOA. HAT. 406/21194, 11 Cemaziyelevvel 1243 (30 November 1827), emphasis added.
134. The pasha was to receive 5000 *kuruş* as pension in addition to monthly payments of 1000 *kuruş*. BOA. HAT. 669/32646, no date.
135. For the establishment of the regular army, see Yıldız, *Neferin Adı Yok*.
136. Kasaba argues that almost half of the Ottoman army consisted of locally recruited irregular troops in the campaigns in which the Ottomans participated in the first three decades of the nineteenth century. Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*, p.100.
137. Yıldız, *Neferin Adı Yok*; Kahraman Şakul, 'Osmanlı Askerî Tarihi Üzerine Bir Literatür Değerlendirmesi [A Literature Review on Ottoman Military History]', *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* Vol.1, no.2 (2003), p.570.
138. Hakan Erdem, *Recruitment for the "Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad" in the Arab Provinces, 1826–1828* in *Histories of the Modern Middle East: New Directions*, ed. Israel Gershoni, Hakan Erdem, and Ursula Wökock (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
139. Şimşek, 'The First "Little Mehmeds"', p.271.
140. For information on the tacit contract, see Yıldız, *Neferin Adı Yok*, pp.238–9.
141. Ibid., pp.139–40.
142. Tobias Heinzelmann, *Changing Recruitment Strategies in the Ottoman Army, 1839–1856* in *The Crimean War 1853–1856: Colonial Skirmish or Rehearsal for World War*, ed. J. W. Borejsza (Warszawa: Neriton, 2011), p.30.
143. James J. Reid, 'Irregular Military Bands and Colonies in the Balkans under Ottoman Rule 1789–1878', *Études balkaniques* no. 3 (1996), p.151; *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse 1839–1878* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000), p.136. For the Circassians, see Mehmet Beşikçi, 'Başıbozuk Savaşçıdan "Makbul" Tebaaya: 1877–1878 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'nda Osmanlı Ordusunda Çerkez Muhacirler [From Irregular Warriors to "Acceptable" Subjects: Circassian Refugees in the Ottoman Army in the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War]', *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi* no. 23 (Fall 2015), p.87.
144. Şimşek, 'The First "Little Mehmeds"', p.279.
145. Heinzelmann, *Changing Recruitment Strategies*, p.31.

146. Tobias Heinzelmann, *Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Genel Askerlik Yükümlülüğü 1826–1856* [*From the Holy War to National Defence: Conscription in the Ottoman Empire 1826–1856*] (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2009), p.166.
147. Şimşek, 'The First "Little Mehmeds"', p.278. The resistance against conscription, however, was not monolithic. For instance, Ali Hakkı of Dibra, a notable of the town in the 1840s, tried to incorporate himself into the Ottoman administration by offering his intermediary services for conscription in northern Albania. Heinzelmann, *Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına*, pp.164–5.
148. For brief information on the rebellion, see Theodor Ippen, *Beiträge zur inneren Geschichte Albanens im XIX. Jahrhundert* in *Illyrisch-Albanische Forschungen*, ed. Ludwig Von Thallóczy (Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1916).
149. Veysel Şimşek, 'The Grand Strategy of the Ottoman Empire, 1826–1841' (PhD thesis, McMaster University, 2015), pp.76–7.
150. Quoted in Reid, *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire*, p.130.