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RELIGIOUS EXCLUSION AND THE ORIGINS OF DEMOCRACY

Şener Aktürk

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Why did modern democracy originate in Western Europe? Some of the first and most enduring parliaments began to appear and gain significance in that region around the same time that Jews and Muslims were being expelled or otherwise eradicated from England, France, Hungary, Portugal, and Spain between the 1290s and the 1490s. Western Europe toward the end of the Middle Ages became the most religiously homogeneous region in the world, and this extraordinary religious homogeneity was related to the origins and consolidation of early parliaments. Conversely, though much later, religious diversity would contribute to the collapse of short-lived parliamentary regimes in non-Western polities such as the Czarist and Ottoman empires. The ongoing debate about diversity and democracy has been fruitful and thought-provoking but inconclusive because most scholars fail to distinguish among types of diversity: ethnic, linguistic, racial, and religious. The most challenging type of diversity for democracy, past and present, has been religious diversity.

Many leading thinkers have suggested that some sort of cultural homogeneity, which they variously describe as "fellow feeling" or national unity, is a necessary precondition of representative democracy. In contrast, scholars who have investigated the relationship between democracy and diversity (ethnic, linguistic, and racial) have often concluded that democracy and diversity do not have a negative relationship, and that "there is no correlation between the levels of racism and xenophobia in a society and its support for right-wing populism."[1]

But the challenge of "the multicultural diversity that migrants generate—especially in the form of immigration from Muslim-majority countries" is primarily a challenge of religious difference, and not ethnic or racial difference.[2] Thus, right-wing populists such as France's Marine Le Pen have shifted from racism toward fear of Muslims, seeking to exploit popular suspicion of different religious norms as well as the

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inability of leftist parties to craft an appeal that can accommodate religious minorities' identities and interests and also attract liberal-left voters at large. The "majoritarian nationalism" that is on the rise around the world, whether in France, India, Israel, or the United Kingdom, consistently exploits hostility toward religious minorities.[3] This highlights the challenge that religious diversity poses for democratic polities past and present.

After the eradication of Jews and Muslims from the areas of medieval Europe that correspond to today's England, France, Hungary, Portugal, and Spain, all those living in these places became at least nominally Christian (Latin Catholic) sometime before the Protestant Reformation. The origins of parliamentary democracy in Western Europe are directly related to the religious exclusion of non-Christians, and paradigmatic cases of consolidated democracy in Western Europe—especially England but also France—continued to have Christian-only electorates and Christian-only parliaments for centuries, which provided them a remarkable advantage in consolidating democracy. In contrast, key non-Western polities that experimented with representative parliaments under constitutional monarchy, most importantly the Ottoman Empire starting in 1876 and the Czarist Empire starting in 1906, saw these experiments break down due to political conflicts over ethnoreligious diversity.

The parallel development of representative institutions and religious exclusion in medieval Western Europe is observable across four complementary dimensions. Across both developments, the actors, the chronology, the geography, and the institutions driving ethnoreligious exclusion and parliamentary growth were often the same. Ethnoreligious exclusion and parliamentary development were not only strongly correlated but were also causally related.

Several mechanisms linked the eradication of non-Christians to the development of West European parliaments: the Christian clergy's critical role in forming and filling early parliaments; the codification of non-Christians as royal property, which made them targets of movements aiming to limit kingly power; and the lack of acrimonious debates on first principles, which facilitated the perpetuation of parliaments in religiously homogeneous polities. My argument contributes to the sequencing debate between "democracy-first" and "state-first" perspectives by suggesting a "population-first" perspective. In Western Europe, the creation of a religiously homogeneous population, the "demos" of democracy, went hand in hand with the formation of parliaments.

The Roles of Popes and Clerics

The Roman pontiffs and the clergy who helped to build some of medieval Europe's earliest parliaments were also directly involved in eradicating Jews and Muslims. In 1216, the papacy approved the Order

of Preachers (or O.P., and known as the Dominicans after their founder) to spread the gospel, convert non-Christians, and combat heresy. Via their modes and methods of internal organization, the Dominicans provided a model of representative governance that was emulated by urban elites and their town councils across the Holy Roman Empire. The Dominicans' pursuit of their mission to convert Jews and Muslims, including in Italy and Spain, while fighting alleged heretics (especially in the south of France) led to the O.P. becoming a key force in campaigns of persecution leveled against non-Christians.[4]

The Dominicans were not the only influential order in the Church. An abbey run by the Benedictines (an older religious order) at Cluny in east-central France spread what became known as the Cluniac reforms of monastic life and activity through a network of hundreds of monasteries across Western Europe. These Cluniac houses influenced the rise of autonomous councils in nearby towns. Cluniac luminaries such as Peter the Venerable (c. 1092–1156) were leading ideologues of anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish persecution.[5]

Historians have identified mobilization for the Crusades as a strong predictor of the rise of urban autonomy. Crusaders on their way to the Middle East became directly involved in massacring West European Jews and Muslims: The former were massacred in the Rhineland in 1096, during the First Crusade, while the 1147 siege of Lisbon during the Second Crusade saw massacres of Muslims, among others.[6] The perpetrators at Lisbon included crusaders from England and other places around the North Sea whose ships, bound for the Levant, had put in at Porto on the coast north of Lisbon.

Popes and clerics more generally are credited with laying the religious foundations of parliaments and representation in medieval Europe.[7] And as I have written elsewhere, after the reforms associated with Pope Gregory VII (r. 1073–85), the "increasingly powerful clerical order under papal leadership lobbied for religious homogenization and deployed many papal-clerical agents and instruments of power (e.g., Crusades, excommunication, interdict, deposition of monarchs, the use of regular and secular clergy against monarchs, the unleashing of mendicant orders, authorization of Inquisitions, and approval or annulment of dynastic marriages) to compel monarchs to eradicate their non-Christian subjects."[8]

As part of their centuries-long struggles against monarchs—typified by dramatic episodes such as Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV's January 1077 decision to wait three days in the snow for Pope Gregory's absolution at Canossa in Italy, and the December 1170 martyrdom of England's Archbishop Thomas Becket at the behest of an angry King Henry II—the prelates of the Church came to target non-Christians. Clerics did so in part because they saw Jews and Muslims as monarchical assets: In medieval Europe, non-Christians were typically sorted by

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law into categories such as "serfs of the royal chamber," which allowed monarchs to exploit the Jewish and Muslim communities for economic and military gain.

The reforms associated with Gregory VII, and later those associated with Pope Innocent III and the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), are identified as turning points for both early parliamentarism and the eradication of Jews and Muslims. Therefore, it is not coincidental that "representative institutions first emerged on the Iberian Peninsula and in the British Isles in the late-twelfth and early-thirteenth centuries"[9] and that the Jews and Muslims were eradicated in England and the north of the Iberian Peninsula around that same era.

Momentous protodemocratic limitations of royal authority such as England's Magna Carta (1215) and Hungary's Oath of Bereg (1233) belong to the same period, and both the great charter and the oath included anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim measures. England and France, the oldest and the most consolidated Western democracies, though often depicted in ways that stress their differences as models of democratic development (English gradual change versus French revolutionary upheaval, for example), provide case studies in how, during the Middle Ages, the building of parliamentary institutions was intertwined with the eradication of religious minorities.

England's Jewish Expulsion and the Model Parliament

During the thirteenth century, England became the first sovereign country to establish a permanent parliament with regular meetings, and the first country permanently to expel all its Jews. Both developments sprang from pressures that the English barons and higher clergy brought to bear on three successive Plantagenet kings: John (r. 1199–1216), plus his son and grandson, Henry III (r. 1216–72) and Edward I (r. 1272–1307). While the Fourth Lateran Council had required that Jews and Muslims under Christian rule wear a distinctive badge, England was the first country to force Jews to wear such an emblem. In 1290, as noted, England also became the first country to expel its Jewish population.[10]

During this same era, English kings famously found their authority constrained by the Magna Carta. A reluctant King John had agreed to this document only after rebellious barons and their armed men seized London in May 1215. During the takeover, they attacked Jews.[11] Later in the century, England would become the first sovereign country to have a permanent, representative parliament. This body acquired its regular form with what scholars would later call the Model Parliament, which Edward I summoned in 1295 through a writ holding that "what touches all must be approved by all." Limits on the monarchy and a stronger parliament were the handiwork, to no small degree, of the very same nobles and clerics who were targeting Jews.

The rule of law and accountability are hailed as key features of democratic development in the West, and "the most celebrated monument of these features of medieval Europe is probably the Magna Carta of 1215."[12] Magna Carta was a triumph of the nobility and the clergy, led by Stephen Langton, the archbishop of Canterbury, against King John. Pope Innocent III's recognition of Langton as archbishop in 1207 spurred a long conflict with John, who refused until 1213 to recognize Langton's election (by canons of Canterbury Cathedral who had gone to Rome to vote in Innocent's presence). It bears mentioning that Magna Carta was not only the most famous hallmark of accountability and the rule of law in medieval Europe, but also included two clauses (numbered in modern times 10 and 11) that mentioned "the Jews" by name and restricted their ability to collect certain debts or interest payments.[13]

In a clear demonstration of the general West European pattern, the strengthening of parliamentarism and the exclusion of Jews in medieval England were intertwined and both processes were driven by the struggle between the clergy and the monarchy.

The association between the monarch and the Jewish minority was sufficiently strong that the Jews were regularly targeted and eventually expelled during the power struggle of the clergy and nobility against the king. Archbishop Langton, the highest-ranking English prelate, pushed for the enforcement of the Fourth Lateran Council's infamous badge requirement, among other discriminatory measures. Earl Simon de Montfort of Leicester, whose successful opposition to King Henry III makes him arguably first in importance among all the noblemen who aided the development of English parliamentarism, expelled the Jews from Leicester in 1231 and canceled the debts owed to them. This was meant to display Simon's superior religiosity and to assert his authority against the king's. In short, the clergy and nobility were united in opposing the king and the Jews, and the successful struggle of the clerics and nobles to strengthen the rule of law and parliamentarism in England also entailed persecuting and eventually expelling the Jews.

When King Edward I expelled the Jews from his kingdom by royal edict in 1290, he was acting under unrelenting parliamentary pressure. For this move, "Parliament granted Edward a tax of £116,000," which was "the largest single grant of taxation given to any English medieval king."[14] For the next 361 years, Jews could not move back to England. Just five years after the expulsion came Edward's Model Parliament. The clerical presence in it was pronounced, consisting of "almost 100 clergy (including 67 abbots)," or close to a fourth of the total membership of this arguably oldest of all continuously existing national parlia-

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ments.[15] In a clear demonstration of the general West European pattern, the strengthening of parliamentarism and the exclusion of Jews in medieval England were intertwined and both processes were driven by the struggle between the clergy and the monarchy, with the former successfully pushing for the persecution of Jews throughout, often with support from the nobility.

Even after Jews were allowed back into Britain by Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell in 1656, it took more than two centuries for the first observant Jew to enter Parliament. That was Lionel de Rothschild in 1858. Significantly, Rothschild had first won election in 1847 and then again in 1850 (both times representing the City of London), but could not take his seat due to the required oath "upon the true faith of a Christian" that all new members had to swear. The Jews Relief Act of 1858 finally removed this barrier, but as its name indicates, it covered only Jews and not other non-Christians.

The interval between the Model Parliament and Rothschild's swearing-in as a House of Commons lawmaker was 563 years. Thus, the English (after 1707, the British) Parliament did not have a member who openly espoused a non-Christian organized religion for almost six centuries. The short-lived Czarist and Ottoman parliaments, by contrast, each had from its respective outset members who came from religious minorities. Britain's closest military-political competitor and follower in building representative institutions, France, also had a pattern of religious exclusion and parliamentary development that was remarkably similar.

France's Jewish Expulsion and the Estates General

For much of the Middle Ages, France (not all of which was ruled by the king in Paris) was more religiously diverse than England. France had a much larger population—as of about 1300, perhaps seventeen-million people versus about three million for England plus Wales. Likewise, the Jewish minority in France was many times larger than the Jewish community in England had ever been. Moreover, a belief system known as Catharism was very popular in southern France, and a small Muslim colony called Fraxinetum had even survived in the region until 972. The Church deemed Catharism a Christian heresy, and in 1209 the papacy launched an armed campaign, the Albigensian Crusade, to destroy it. This effort had largely succeeded by 1229, followed by the institution of the Inquisition in Toulouse, which hunted down alleged Cathars for decades.

As we have seen, the papal calls for crusades that began in 1096 led to attacks on Jews, and the Fourth Lateran Council more than a century later publicly stigmatized them. As in England, Jews in France often functioned as moneylenders since Christians could not collect interest

(an act that the Church condemned as the sin of usury). In France as in England, Jews had been set on a path to eradication and movements to curb the monarchy took on an anti-Semitic cast: "Jews in France were attacked as a proxy for the king himself."[16]

King Philip IV (r. 1285–1314) convened the first French parliament, the Estates General, in 1302. Like its English counterpart, this body included many Catholic clergymen, and all the deputies were Catholic Christians. In 1306, King Philip followed his contemporary Edward across the Channel by expelling the Jews from his country. The French monarchy, even more than the English, was locked in a bitter and violent conflict with the papacy, and the Estates played a role in bolstering the king's religious credentials. "Philip was the first king of France to require his subjects to address him regularly as the 'most Christian king.'"[17] By claiming to be the most Christian king, Philip IV was not only competing against other monarchs, but also against Pope Boniface VIII (r. 1294–1303), whom the French parliament accused of being a criminal and a heretic (the immediate issue was Philip's claim to be able to tax the French clergy). Boniface died soon after being seized at Anagni near Rome by mercenaries whom Philip sent against him in 1303.

A few years later, Philip moved the seat of the papacy from Rome to Avignon on the Rhône River in what is now southern France, with French popes elected under his influence. The first Avignon pope, Clement V (r. 1305–14), designated the French as the new chosen people, and France was declared a sacred kingdom with saintly monarchs.[18] Clement and the next seven pontiffs after him were all French, and reigned from Avignon's massive Palace of the Popes until 1378. This situation had never happened before, and was never repeated. The French king ostentatiously competed with the papacy in shows of piety. These unprecedented developments suggest that an attempt to prove the French monarch's status as "the most Christian king" and France's status as a sacred kingdom inhabited by the new chosen people may have motivated Philip IV and the Estates General to expel Jews in 1306.

King Philip IV's repression of the Knights Templar began the following year. His crushing of this wealthy and influential military order—to which he owed large sums of money—can be seen as the last step in the same process of elevating the French king to a sacred status as "the ultimate defender of the Catholic faith" who was "fully invested with a Christlike function that put him above the pope."[19]

Although some Jews were allowed to return in 1315, another expulsion in 1394 put an end to Jewish life in France until the eighteenth century. As in England earlier, the struggle between the monarchy and the Church smoothed the path to the exclusion, persecution, and eventual expulsion of the entire Jewish population. What was left was a Christians-only polity that could have nothing but a Christians-only parliament. From 1302, the year of the first Estates General, until af-

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ter the French Revolution of 1789, French parliaments had no Jewish or other non-Christian members. The Czarist and Ottoman experiments in parliamentarism were far more religiously diverse, yet this diversity contributed to the early collapse of each.

Jews, Muslims, and Czars

By illustrating how quickly religious diversity can facilitate the collapse of a nascent parliamentary regime, the history of Russia tends to confirm that religious homogeneity is a necessary condition of long-term parliamentary development. The medieval Russian polities of Veliky Novgorod (1136–1478) and Pskov (1348–1510) had parliamentary traditions and quasi-republican governments, and each was populated solely by Orthodox Christians. After the 1905 Revolution, Russia established its first representative parliament, the Imperial Duma, which included many Jews, Muslims, and others who were not Orthodox Christians.

In April 1906, the Duma began meeting. In June came a deadly pogrom against Jews in Białystok, Poland (then part of the Czarist Empire). Deputies (including Jewish members) accused the interior minister of inaction, set up a parliamentary commission to investigate the incident, sent deputies to the scene, and suggested that elements of the central government were guilty despite official attempts to blame local Polish residents for the violence. There were acrimonious debates in the body of nearly five-hundred members, and in July Czar Nicholas II dismissed this first and most vocal of what would be four Imperial Dumas. The second Imperial Duma, elected in early 1907, contained a much larger and more assertive Muslim faction than its predecessor, but only lasted a few months before Nicholas decreed its dismissal.

The exceptional democratic qualities of medieval Veliky Novgorod and Pskov are well known. Some scholars argue that even today, these two places lean more liberal-democratic than do other parts of Russia due in part to this historic legacy.[20] The key representative institution of medieval Novgorod was the *veche*. This assembly, comprising the city's free males, elected and removed officials (including the princes) and decided major governance questions. Yet as Olga Sevastyanova writes, "until the end of the fourteenth century it wasn't the *veche,* but the oath-agreements of the citizens, ratified by the ceremony of kissing the cross or an icon that expressed the unity of Novgorod as a city and a republic."[21]

As the ceremony of kissing the cross or an icon attests, the representative institutions of Novgorod and Pskov (which had seceded from Novgorod) stood on a base of religious homogeneity. These quasi-democratic city-states, which survived for centuries at the northwestern edges of present-day Russia, were annexed by the far more religiously

diverse and autocratic Russian Empire around the turn of the sixteenth century.

The four Imperial Dumas that met under Nicholas II were far more religiously diverse than the medieval and early-modern British and French parliaments had been. The First Duma had fifteen Jewish and fourteen Muslim deputies. Only weeks before the Białystok pogrom, 151 deputies including eleven Jewish members proposed a civil-equality law that would in principle have abolished "all restrictions based on religion and nationality." The czar dissolved the body "because, as he alleged, [the Duma] had concerned itself with matters outside its jurisdiction, e.g., with the activities of local authorities (an obvious reference to Bialystok)," while the Jewish deputies and six Muslim deputies signed a protest manifesto that urged the people "to refuse to pay taxes or to furnish recruits for the armed forces." All signatories were banned from future Duma elections, and some were sentenced to imprisonment or fled abroad to avoid it.[22]

The Second Duma had 35 Muslim deputies. A half-dozen joined forces with Russian socialists, while the remainder became a Muslim bloc led by the Azerbaijani deputy Ali Mardan Topchibashi. The Muslim bloc's political activism posed fundamental challenges to the Russian establishment. Among the demands of these deputies were legal and educational changes to include Muslim canonic and common laws and national languages. The Muslim bloc also called for Muslim clergy to be seated in the Duma alongside Orthodox Christian clergy.[23]

Nicholas II's June 1907 dissolution manifesto charged 55 deputies with plotting against the state, and warned the non-Russian members that they "should not and will not be [in the Duma] in such number as to give them the possibility of decisive influence on purely Russian questions."[24] To follow through on this, he further declared that he was changing the electoral law to decrease non-Russian representation. The Third Duma contained just ten Muslims, and became the only one that was allowed to serve a full five-year term. Most Jewish deputies had gone abroad after the First Duma collapsed, and many leading Muslim representatives emigrated to the Ottoman Empire or Europe after the Second Duma was dismissed.

Bitter controversies and political meltdowns of the sort that sank the first two Imperial Dumas would have been unthinkable in the early decades or even centuries of English and French parliaments, simply because there were no Jewish, Muslim, or other non-Christian members in them. Had there been a Jewish faction, a Muslim faction, or both in the English and French parliaments, they too would have run into turmoil when demands were heard to investigate pogroms, establish civil equality, or revise laws and schooling to accommodate minority religions' customs and concerns. Yet until Lionel de Rothschild took his seat at Westminster in 1858, following by sixteen years his counterpart Achille Fould, the first

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Jewish member to be elected to the French Chamber of Deputies, English and French parliaments had no members who were not Christians.

The Ottoman Empire and Turkish Parliaments

The experiences of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic also confirm that religious diversity can fuel the swift collapse of a nascent parliamentary regime, which in turn suggests that religious homogeneity is needed for long-term parliamentary development. The Ottoman Empire adopted its first and only constitution in 1876, and under it was convened the first Ottoman parliament. When its Chamber of Deputies met in March 1877, roughly 40 percent of the 119 members of this lower house were non-Muslims. This body met for only three months before Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) dissolved it in June. A second set of elections was held later that year and a second, 96-member Chamber met in December. Forty of the members were non-Muslims. In February 1878, following a military defeat at the hands of Czarist Russia, the sultan dismissed this second parliament and suspended the constitution. The first era of Ottoman parliamentarism was over, having lasted only about a year.

Three decades later, in July 1908, came a revolution led by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The CUP—backed by the multireligious protest movement it had mobilized, plus parts of the armed forces—forced Abdülhamid II to unsuspend the 1876 Constitution and declare parliament reopened lest he lose his capital to rebel military units. The Second Constitutional Era had begun. The elections of late 1908 were the most competitive that the Ottomans would ever hold. The new Chamber of Deputies, in which the CUP was dominant, had 269 Muslim members, 48 Christians, and four Jews. The number of Jewish legislators remained unchanged through the following elections of 1912 and 1914, while Christian deputies fell in number to 35 and then 33 across those two ballotings.[25]

The renewed Ottoman parliament was preoccupied by a wide range of debates related to religious and sectarian diversity. There were demands for separate military units in which only Greek Orthodox Christians could serve, as well as demands for electoral and government-job quotas guaranteeing representation to Armenian and Greek Christians, respectively. Deputies close to different religious authorities (the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, for example) argued over who would administer various Christian schools and churches. Contentions regarding press freedom and how to define the Ottoman nation raged, as did disputes about policies toward the Christian-majority regions of Crete and Macedonia and the deportations of Christian minorities (Armenians and Greeks).

Some Christian and especially Jewish deputies backed the Ottoman government's policies, as did most Muslim deputies. But most Christian deputies were government critics. Some Christian proposals, such as

making Easter a holiday for Christian members of parliament on par with the Islamic holiday of Eid, were amicably approved. Most demands, however, such as quotas and Christian deputies' calls for state officials to face prosecution for anti-Christian crimes, seemed to the bulk of Muslim deputies provocative and threatening to the survival of the Ottoman state and society.

The Islamic clergy, the *ulema,* played a key role in preserving the religiously diverse demography of Ottoman society, which ironically made them the autocratic sultan's conditional allies against parliamentarism. This was almost exactly the opposite of the role that the Catholic clergy had played in building medieval Europe's parliaments: Catholic clerics under papal leadership had been decisive both in eradicating Jews and Muslims to create Christian-only polities, and in limiting kingly power via representative political institutions inspired by clerical models.

The Ottoman Empire's Islamic clergy, by contrast, did not engineer the eradication of religious minorities, though (like the Catholic clergy) it also did not support political equality and access to office for religious minorities. Thus, the Islamic clergy, finding itself unwilling or unable to eradicate non-Muslims yet uneasy at the prospect of their gaining political equality with Muslims in a parliamentary system, became a potential ally of autocracy in the Ottoman context of high religious diversity. Moreover, while the Catholic clergy had played a leading role in furnishing the blueprint for representative assemblies and pushing back the power of monarchs in medieval Western Europe, only a slice of the Islamic clergy played even a minor role in legitimizing constitutional parliamentary government. The main drivers were secular groups such as the Young Turks and the CUP.

As the account above suggests, the first four years of the renewed Ottoman parliament were contentious and vibrant. A military insurrection seeking to overthrow the new regime failed and led to Abdülhamid II's 1909 deposition. His replacement, Sultan Mehmed V (r. 1909–18), became a figurehead of the new parliamentary regime. More military insurrections ensued, each resulting in a change of cabinets that parliament promptly approved. No peaceful transfer of power ever took place. The year 1912 brought "elections with a cudgel" under CUP incumbents who were setting themselves up as a one-party regime and in the process casting what would prove to be a long shadow over Turkish political history.

Ottoman parliaments continued to be religiously diverse. The CUP used the presence of Christian deputies as a justification for single-party rule: They were seditious, the narrative went, and were plotting with their coreligionists in foreign governments to dismantle the Ottoman Empire. Like Abdülhamid II, the CUP feared that a robust parliament would become an avenue for religious conflict, and desired to crush the nascent parliamentary regime.[26]

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The Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War I and lost most of its territory to Britain and France, being reduced to a much smaller Anatolian heartland. The attempted occupation and partition of Anatolia by Britain, France, Greece, and Italy provoked a Turkish-Muslim resistance, based in Ankara, that led to the founding of the Republic of Turkey. The Turkish parliament that convened in Ankara in 1920 provides another case study of the relationship between religious diversity and parliamentary democracy. This 1920 assembly differed strikingly from the Ottoman parliaments in having no Christian, Jewish, or other non-Muslim deputies. Here was a throwback to the all-Christian assemblies of the first half-millennium of English and French parliamentarism, and to medieval Novgorod.

Unlike the religiously diverse Ottoman parliaments, the all-Muslim Ankara parliament witnessed several peaceful transfers of power from one cabinet to another between 1920 and 1923, followed in that latter year by new national elections. Although the Turkish Republic reverted to one-party rule between 1925 and 1945, it witnessed another exemplary transition to multiparty democracy with the peaceful transfer of power following the 1950 elections, which moved Dankwart Rustow to compare Sweden and Turkey as two cases of successful democratization in his seminal 1970 article on democratic transitions.[27] Rustow acknowledged that Sweden and Turkey shared only one precondition in common, vaguely identifying this as "national unity." At the time he was writing, Sweden had a near-homogeneous Protestant Christian (Lutheran) heritage and Turkey had a near-homogeneous Muslim heritage.

Past Echoes, Present Challenges

What lessons should we draw from these stories of democratization, both failed and successful, in the presence of religious diversity? The West European experience is not encouraging, since the same forces that fostered parliamentarism also purged non-Christians, leading to centuries of Christians-only legislatures. Given this background, contemporary calls to restore the original political communities of Western countries would likely underwrite the exclusion of religious minorities. Outside the West, by contrast, political communities tended more toward religious diversity (as in the Ottoman and Czarist cases). Their failures and successes with parliamentarism give us useful hints and warnings about both multicultural democracy's promise and its limits. Religious diversity above all has been especially challenging for democracies to handle, and therefore requires the utmost attention from policymakers and scholars alike.

Early in the twentieth century, the Imperial Duma alliance of most Jewish and Muslim deputies with the largest Russian liberal party, the Constitutional Democrats, held the promise of forging a multicultural po-

litical identity. So did the alliance of all Jewish deputies (and many Armenian and Greek deputies) with the CUP during the Ottoman Empire's Second Constitutional Era. The Jewish and Muslim Czarist deputies, like the Christian and Jewish Ottoman deputies, were working with political leaders of the ethnoreligious majority toward the pluralistic thickening of a multicultural identity resembling the "multicultural nationalism" conceptualized not long ago in the *Journal of Democracy* by Tariq Modood.[28]

These attempts failed in general, but still could claim particular successes. The Ottoman parliament's ready agreement that Easter could be a holiday for the Christian deputies was an example of such thickening. Similarly, Muslim and non-Muslim members of the Ottoman parliament agreed in 1909 on extending compulsory military service to non-Muslims, which provides an even more symbolically significant and substantively consequential example of a multicultural Ottoman identity being made "thicker" by means of pluralism. In 1908, when the sultan relaunched the 1876 Constitution, large celebratory crowds of Christians, Jews, and Muslims gathered in cities from Istanbul and Salonica to Jaffa and Jerusalem. They draped public and private buildings with Ottoman flags in a clear display of multicultural patriotism.[29]

Czar Nicholas II's dismissal of the Second Imperial Duma with the asseveration that minorities should not be in the parliament "in such number as to give them the possibility of decisive influence on purely Russian questions" echoes across populist parties around the world today. This line of reasoning, which led to the collapse of the Russian parliamentary experiment, might also find supporters in contemporary European parliaments. Europe's Muslim minorities are today underrepresented in legislatures, but their representation is likely to rise. This may trigger further accusations that Muslim minorities are having a decisive influence on purely national questions in these Christian-heritage societies.[30]

Fears of "parallel societies" also echo the fears triggered by demands for Christian-minority job quotas in the Ottoman bureaucracy and separate military units for Ottoman Greeks. Any hint of ethnoreligious power sharing in the military and security bureaucracy often triggered a majoritarian reaction. Even more consequential was the czar's dismissal of the Duma in reaction to its efforts—with Jewish deputies leading the way—to investigate the Białystok pogrom.

In all these examples, the inability of mainstream political parties to articulate and defend a political program that accommodated religious minorities' identities and interests proved a crucial ingredient in the collapse of experiments in multicultural democracy. In addition to the British multicultural nationalism that Modood convincingly explains, other successful examples where mainstream political parties advocate multicultural nationalism in non-Western contexts, such as Brazil and India, are particularly promising and practically significant as potential role models.[31]

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NOTES

1. Sheri Berman, "Democracy and Diversity in Western Europe," *Journal of Democracy* 35 (October 2024): 78; M. Steven Fish and Robin S. Brooks, "Does Diversity Hurt Democracy?" *Journal of Democracy* 15 (January 2004): 154–66.

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