Department of Philosophy2024-11-0920160031-811610.1007/s11098-015-0583-12-s2.0-84945208790http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0583-1https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/11400In this paper, I respond to Millar's recent criticism of na < ve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way) to na < ve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world). I intend to show that Millar's arguments are not convincing.PhilosophyJournal Article1573-0883377971700009Q11988