Department of Business Administration2024-11-0920080022-238010.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00746.x2-s2.0-42249084927http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00746.xhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/14495Exporting relationships between manufacturers and foreign importers pose unique coordination problems because, on the one hand, transactions are recurrent and both firms make non-trivial relationship-specific investments, but at the same time, the exchange partners maintain separate legal entities with individual profit claims. This study examines the role of contracts as a governance mechanism in these relationships that are neither market-based discrete transactions, nor can be governed through ownership-based hierarchies. Drawing upon recent research on contract law and interorganizational relationships, we develop and empirically test a model that incorporates both the antecedents and performance implications of the nature of contract governing exporter-importer relationships.BusinessManagementJournal Article1467-6486254991000001Q13089