Department of Philosophy2024-11-0920200211-402X10.5565/REV/ENRAHONAR.12842-s2.0-85087808288https://dx.doi.org/10.5565/REV/ENRAHONAR.1284https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/13698That the study of the first-person reports of intentional actions, happenings, thoughts, and sensations as revealing the structure of self-consciousness was a central theme of Anscombe's work in philosophy of mind has not been sufficiently registered in the literature. I aim to show that this theme animated many of her works throughout her writing career and her “The First Person” (1974) can be best understood as one of these works and in the light of others.PhilosophyWhat is wrong with baldy? radical non-referring view of “I”Journal Articlehttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85087808288&doi=10.5565%2fREV%2fENRAHONAR.1284&partnerID=40&md5=2da00362f0f595855fea3e271e259a4554338600001010456