Department of International Relations2024-11-0920170032-268710.1007/s11077-016-9261-12-s2.0-84981170326http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11077-016-9261-1https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/13748How national financial systems can avoid costly banking crises is a persistent and intriguing question for institutional scholars and policymakers worldwide. In this context, although considerable research has recently focused on structural, institutional, and agency-level factors in explaining the global financial crisis, it mostly offered each of these explanatory factors in isolation, thus leaving interactions among these interrelated factors incomplete. Building on a deviant case study on Australian exceptionalism examined in a comparative perspective, this paper introduces an integrative framework that views financial stability as a function of these interactions that reinforce prudent financial behavior. In doing so, it offers an insight into the previous research on institutional complementarity and how to guard against similar crises in the future. It suggests that financial stability (instability) is more likely when interactions among structural and institutional complementarities and agents reinforce conservative (opportunistic) banking.Public administrationSocial sciencesInterdisciplinaryJournal Article1573-0891402393000005Q111398