Department of Philosophy2024-12-2920240969-725X10.1080/0969725X.2024.23222842-s2.0-85192553713https://doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2024.2322284https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/22016This essay starts with the possibility of situating Derrida's aporetic ethics in the domain of normative ethics and argues that Derrida's reflection on ethics is enrooted in the specific way he conceives the phenomenological notion of auto-affection. In the second section, I analyze, in the early work, auto-affection with signs and show its centrality in Derrida's first encounter with Levinas's philosophy. Derrida refuses to substitute the hetero-affective relation to the Other for auto-affection as the source of universal law and normativity. He does not sacrifice universality and tackles the problem of autonomous ethical decision-making even though he welcomes through affectivity the signification of the singular other, which is irreducible to conceptual, emotive, and normative self-relation. This background helps us understand the rootedness of ethical aporias in a reflection on auto-affection.HumanitiesAsian studiesJournal article1469-28991217144300012Q240131