2024-11-0920000965-757610.1111/1467-9396.002232-s2.0-0034121940http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00223https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/10458This paper investigates a government's choice of strategic trade policy when the domestic firm observes a private noisy signal about the stochastic market demand while in competition with a rival firm. The government chooses between quantity controls and subsidies to maximize profits of the domestic firm. Assuming that firms compete a la Cournot in a third country, it is shown that the optimal trade policy depends not only on demand uncertainty but also on the predictability of the true market demand by the firms.EconomicsJournal Articlehttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-0034121940anddoi=10.1111%2f1467-9396.00223andpartnerID=40andmd5=11dc85343ae56eff1515949e46d890d7N/A11750