Department of Philosophy2024-11-100048-389310.1007/s11406-021-00350-62-s2.0-85102437853http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00350-6https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/16713In this paper, I provide an answer to the question "what is it for a reason to be the reason for which a belief is held?" After arguing against the causal account of the reason-for-which connection, I present what I call the rationalization account, according to which a reason R a subject S has for a belief P is the reason for which S holds P just in case R is the premise in S's rationalization for P, where the argument from R to P becomes S's rationalization in virtue of her endorsing it. In order to bring explicitly into view the version of the rationalization account I aim to argue for, I draw two distinctions, one between occurrent and dispositional endorsement and the other between personal and public endorsement. I show that the version of the rationalization account thus clarified receives intuitive support from various cases and survives some formidable objections that might be tempting to level against it.PhilosophyJournal Article1574-9274627302300001Q21999