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Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/6

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Quartile: search.filters.quartile.Q4Subject: search.filters.subject.Business and economics

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    PublicationOpen Access
    Random assignment under weak preferences
    (Elsevier, 2009) Department of Economics; Yılmaz, Özgür; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 108638
    The natural preference domain for many practical settings of the assignment problems is the one in which agents are allowed to be indifferent between objects, the weak preference domain. Most of the existing work on assignment problems assumes strict preferences. There are important exceptions. but they provide solutions only to the assignment problems with a social endowment, where agents own objects collectively and there are no private endowments. We consider the general class of assignment problems with private endowments and a social endowment. Our main contribution is a recursive solution for the weak preference domain. Our solution satisfies individual rationality, ordinal efficiency and a recently introduced fairness axiom, no justified-envy.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
    (Elsevier, 2010) Department of Economics; Yılmaz, Özgür; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 108638
    A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects. When there are no private endowments, the set of ordinally efficient random assignments is characterized by the eating algorithm (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001). When there are private endowments, the main requirement is individual rationality; however, the eating algorithm fails to deliver this property. Our contribution is the natural generalization of the eating algorithm for this general class of problems. The family of this generalized eating algorithm characterizes the set of individually rational and ordinally efficient random assignments. A special solution in this family, the individually rational probabilistic serial (PS(IR)), also achieves a new fairness axiom, no justified-envy. However, it is not immune to strategic manipulation. We show that individual rationality, no justified-envy and strategy-proofness are incompatible.