Old and new polarizations and failed democratizations in Turkey

Abstract

This chapter identifies two conceptual distinctions to differentiate Turkey’s current polarization-cum-autocratization from earlier episodes of polarization and to explain how polarization undermines Turkey’s democratization. First, one needs to adopt a “political and relational” definition of polarization. Second, one must distinguish between exclusionary and inclusionary polarizations. Episodes of polarization are started by actors who re-bundle preexisting societal rifts and generate new ones to pursue political goals. But polarization becomes “pernicious,” i.e. begins to erode democracy, “relationally,” i.e. through the actions of these polarizing agents and the reactions of their opponents. In Turkey, exclusionary polarizations were instigated by nationalist elites to exclude various minorities, producing an outright undemocratic legacy. By comparison, inclusionary polarizations had democratizing potential because they were started by political entrepreneurs who pursued popular mobilizations and promised inclusive benefits to disadvantaged groups. Democratization failed in these cases due to shortcomings of intra-elite politics. Three differences distinguish the current polarization from earlier episodes. First, the current polarization, which also started as inclusionary, resulted from the AKP’s relative mass-party characteristics and anti-regime core identity. The latter factors drove the AKP to pursue more “revolutionary” policies and heightened existential threat perception among opponents. Second, the AKP’s ability to subdue authoritarian state institutions that had suppressed earlier polarizations, led to longer-lasting polarization. Consequently, polarization produced deeper social divisions and more severe democratic backsliding than earlier episodes had. Paradoxically, the cure for current polarization-cum-authoritarianism may be found in new polarizations led by democratic-reformist elite coalitions and programs.