Democratic resistance under populist autocratization: repression, civil society and strategies

Abstract

This article aims to contribute to the studies on democratic resistance amid populist autocratization by analyzing repression against civil society, democratic responses, and the interplay between them. It explores how and in what forms repression and democratic resistance develop, are contained and sustained during such autocratization, with an emphasis on populist electoral autocracies. Civil society plays a role in engaging with populist autocracies that possess electoral legitimacy, in contrast to the situation under closed autocracies, although these interactions occur under challenging conditions. The mutually reinforcing relationship between liberal constitutional constructs and civil society challenges the stability of a populist electoral autocracy. The article employs several instances, primarily focusing on Türkiye's populist electoral autocracy, to assess conceptual findings on repression, investigate the autocratic challenges, and illustrate strategies for democratic resistance. It highlights the roles of feminist mobilizations, human rights defenders, democratic partnerships, and judicial review against ongoing repression in nondemocratic contexts where democratic resistance appears robust. Despite the challenges faced by civil society in non-democracies, the vibrant practices of democratic resistance underscore the necessity for reforms in liberal-democratic constitutional frameworks. These reforms may encompass inclusive formal arrangements for civil society and institutional arrangements for democratic partnerships by reconsidering the civic-institutional relationship. In light of democracy-learning and democracy-defending experiences in nondemocracies, further research is needed on constitutional innovations, particularly regarding enhanced political participation, democratic partnerships, protection for human rights defenders, guarantees for political opposition, prevention of judicial repression, and rights-enforcing judiciaries. © 2025 by Theoretical Inquiries in Law.