Stress-driven strategic games in cancer

Abstract

Tumor cells face chronic genotoxic, metabolic, hypoxic, and immune stress that shapes their evolution. While stress-response molecular pathways are well characterized, cancer biology lacks a predictive framework for how cells select among alternative adaptive strategies and how these selections interact to produce tumor-level behavior. We propose that evolutionary game theory, previously applied to cooperation in cancer, should be extended to position stress adaptation itself as the organizing principle of tumor evolution. In this framework, stress-adaptive strategies constitute frequency-dependent games whose payoffs depend on population composition. We introduce a three-level distinction between cell states (transcriptional snapshots), game states (local configurations of stress and neighbor composition that define the active payoff structure), and cell strategies (conditional behavioral policies mapping game states to fitness-relevant outputs). This perspective explains the maintenance of intratumor heterogeneity through frequency-dependent selection, the reversibility of resistance through bet-hedging dynamics, and therapy resistance as an equilibrium outcome rather than genetic inevitability. Integrating insights from single-cell genomics, spatial profiling, and lineage tracing, we outline testable predictions and experimental approaches for measuring payoff structures. Therapeutically, the framework suggests exploiting adaptive trade-offs, restricting phenotypic plasticity, and reshaping competitive landscapes. Re-framing cancer as an evolving game of stress adaptation provides a unifying structure for predictive oncology.