Publications without Fulltext
Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/3
Browse
12 results
Search Results
Publication Metadata only Sex, wealth, and courage: kinds of goods and the power of appearance in plato's protagoras(Philosophy Documentation Center, 2018) Department of Philosophy; Storey, Damien; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 293535I offer a reading of the two conceptions of the good found in Plato’s Protagoras: the popular conception—‘the many’s’ conception—and Socrates’ conception. I pay particular attention to the three kinds of goods Socrates introduces: (a) bodily pleasures like food, drink, and sex; (b) instrumental goods like wealth, health, or power; and (c) virtuous actions like courageously going to war. My reading revises existing views about these goods in two ways. First, I argue that the many are only ‘hedonists’ in a very attenuated sense. They do not value goods of kind (b) simply as means to pleasures of kind (a); rather, they have fundamentally different attitudes to (a) and (b). Second, the hedonism that Socrates’ defends includes a distinction between kinds of pleasures: (a) bodily pleasures and (c) the pleasures of virtuous actions. This distinction between kinds of pleasures—some that do and some that do not exert the ‘power of appearance’—allows Socrates to address one of the central beliefs in the popular conception of akrasia, namely that it involves a special kind of unruly desire: non-rational appetites for pleasures like food, drink, or sex. Socrates replaces the motivational push of non-rational appetites with the epistemic pull of the appearance of immediate pleasures like food, drink, and sex.Publication Metadata only Conditional uniqueness(inst Philosophy Slovak acad Sciences and inst Philosophy Czech acad Sciences, 2022) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390in this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. the moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other.Publication Metadata only Human cognitive closure and mysterianism: reply to Kriegel(Springer, 2017) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390In this paper, I respond to Kriegel's criticism of McGinn's mysterianism (the thesis that humans are cognitively closed with respect to the solution of the mind-body problem). Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.Publication Metadata only Three and a half ways to a hybrid view in animal ethics(Springer) Streiffer, Robert; Department of Philosophy; Killoren, David Joseph; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 377526The distinctive feature of a hybrid view (such as Nozick's "utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people") is that it divides moral patients into two classes: call them dersons and uersons. Dersons have a deontological kind of moral status: they have moral rights against certain kinds of optimific harms. Uersons, by contrast, have a utilitarian kind of moral status: their interests are morally important (in proportion to the magnitude of those interests), but uersons do not have deontological moral rights or any other kinds of deontological protections. In this paper, we discuss and critically evaluate three ways of supporting a hybrid view: a case-based argument; an autonomy-based rationale; and a rationale based in a capacity for what we call deep commitments. Finally, we discuss a way in which considerations about the moral significance of relationships might support an approximation of a hybrid view.Publication Metadata only Bataille and Kristeva on religion(Fordham University Press, 2015) Department of Philosophy; Direk, Zeynep; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 5771N/APublication Metadata only Sloterdijk's anthropotechnics foreword(Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2021) Department of Philosophy; Department of Philosophy; Roney, Patrick; Rossi, Andrea; Faculty Member; Teaching Faculty; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; N/A; N/AN/APublication Metadata only Sensible world and the world of expression(Routledge Journals, Taylor and Francis Ltd, 2014) Department of Philosophy; Chouraqui, Frank; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; N/AN/APublication Metadata only Critical philosophy of race as political phenomenology: questions for Robert Bernasconi(Routledge Journals, Taylor and Francis Ltd, 2017) Department of Philosophy; Direk, Zeynep; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 5771This article is a response to Robert Bernasconi's critical philosophy of race. I start by speaking of the specific style in which life and philosophy are related in his work. I argue that he devises a political phenomenology which considers the lived experiences of racialization and inquires into their historical conditions, which have become "practico-inert" in facticity. Bernasconi's thesis that the history of race is not determined by racial essentialism and his account of race as a border concept call for an expansion of the notion of race that will better serve the cause of the global fight against racism.Publication Metadata only Animality in Lacan and Derrida: the deconstruction of the other(Springer, 2018) Department of Philosophy; Direk, Zeynep; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 5771In The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida's last seminar, Derrida criticizes Lacan for making no room for animality in the Other, in the unconscious transindividual normativity of language. In this paper, I take into account the history of Derrida's interactions with Lacan's psychoanalysis to argue that Derrida's early agreement with Lacan's conception of subjectivity as split by the signifier gives place in his late thought to a deconstruction of Lacan's fall into humanist metaphysics, which makes a sharp moral distinction between the animal and the human in order to subordinate animals to the domination of mankind.Publication Metadata only Untitled (negative exercises)(Routledge Journals, Taylor and Francis Ltd, 2021) Department of Philosophy; Rossi, Andrea; Teaching Faculty; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; N/AN/A