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Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/3
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Publication Metadata only On an argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure(Springer, 2016) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390In this paper, I aim to show that McGinn's argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.Publication Metadata only Dianoia & Plato's divided line(Brill, 2022) Department of Philosophy; Storey, Damien; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 293535This paper takes a detailed look at the Republic’s Divided Line analogy and considers how we should respond to its most contentious implication: that pistis and dianoia have the same degree of ‘clarity’ (σαφήνεια). It argues that we must take this implication at face value and that doing so allows us to better understand both the analogy and the nature of dianoia.Publication Metadata only Ascetic worlds notes on politics and technologies of the self after Peter Sloterdijk(Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2021) Department of Philosophy; Rossi, Andrea; Teaching Faculty; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; N/ABuilding and expanding on Peter Sloterdijk's work, in this essay I explore the interrelation between anthropotechnics qua practice of the self and the political sphere, with a view, in particular, to providing a genealogy of some of its recent developments. I first analyse the birth of anthropotechnics within the framework of the axial revolution (Karl Jaspers), as withdrawal and return to a common world bereft of certainty and self evidence (section 2). Next, I show how the rise of asceticism shaped some of the central problematiques of classical politics and, in particular, political agonism and metaphysics, the latter here understood as a geometrical theory of political order (section 3). Against this background, I discuss how modern anthropotechniques have altered the classical relation between individual askesis and collective security, and how this, in turn, has paved the way for a certain understanding of self-mobilisation to saturate the government of the self in the twenty-first century (section 4).Publication Metadata only Naive realism and phenomenological directness: reply to Millar(Springer, 2016) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390In this paper, I respond to Millar's recent criticism of na < ve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way) to na < ve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world). I intend to show that Millar's arguments are not convincing.Publication Metadata only Physicalism and phenomenal concepts(Springer, 2013) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390Frank Jackson's famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of phenomenal concepts does not imply the metaphysical independence of phenomenal properties, physicalism is safe. This paper distinguishes between two versions of this novel physicalist strategy-Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS)-depending on how it cashes out "conceptual independence," and argues that neither helps the physicalist cause. A dilemma for PCS arises: cashing out "conceptual independence" in a way compatible with physicalism requires abandoning some manifest phenomenological intuitions, and cashing it out in a way compatible with those intuitions requires dropping physicalism. The upshot is that contra Brian Loar and others, one cannot "have it both ways.".Publication Metadata only Aristotelian penalties: action-centred rectification and character-centred punishment(Imprint Academic Ltd., 2017) N/A; Department of Philosophy; Platanakis, Charilaos; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; N/AThis article offers an account of Aristotle’s penology that is sensitive to his corrective justice (EN V.4) and the archon counterexamples (opening of EN V.5). By emphasizing the rectificatory nature of corrective justice, I argue for its independence from its distributive counterpart and its contrast, both formal and functional, with Pythagorean reciprocity. After criticizing the various justifications of the archon counterexamples, I propose a rôle-based justification that is compatible with Aristotelian corrective justice. By eliminating the inconsistency between corrective justice and the archon counterexamples, I distinguish between different types of penalty in Aristotle, action-centred rectification and character-centred punishment, as well as their respective domains and functions.