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Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/3

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    Beauvoir's ethics of ambiguity and human rights
    (Philippine Natl Philosophical Res Soc, 2017) Department of Philosophy; Şimga, Fatma Hülya; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 47321
    This paper focuses on Simone de Beauvoir 's ethics. My aim is to discuss the intimate relation of freedom and rights in order to suggest that the ethical implications ofher phenomenological-existentialist analysis of the human condition, developed mainly in The ethics of ambiguity, can make a valuable contribution to ethical value and corroboration of human rights, the conceptual grounding ofwhich is sometimes received with intellectual skepticism. I argue that in Beauvoir's ethical theory, grounded on the will to freedom, not only do rights become more intelligible but their significance also becomes more communicable. By making freedom conditional upon willing not only that oneself be free but that everyone else may also be free, Beauvoir advances a universal demand for the most basic conditions necessary for individuals to realize themselves. Accordingly, Beauvoir's conception of genuinefreedom, incorporating the value offreedom and the duty to act in recognition of this value, gives us the possibility to argue for the requisite freedoms as well as the necessity to substantiate these freedoms in human rights.
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    Recognitional identification and the knowledge argument
    (Kruzak, 2015) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390
    Frank Jackson's famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge about experiences is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. Some physicalists (e.g., John Perry) have countered by arguing that what Jackson's Mary, the perfect scientist who acquires all physical knowledge about experiencing red while being locked in a monochromatic room, lacks before experiencing red is merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, and that since lacking a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity does not entail lacking any pieces of knowledge of worldly facts, physicalism is safe. I will argue that what Mary lacks in her room is not merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity and that some physicalists have failed to see this because of a failure to appreciate that Mary's epistemic progress when she first experiences red has two different stages. While the second epistemic stage can perhaps be plausibly considered as acquiring merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, there is good reason to think that the first epistemic stage cannot be thus considered.
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    Debt as a form of life
    (Philosophy Today Depaul Univ, 2020) Department of Philosophy; Rossi, Andrea; Teaching Faculty; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; N/A
    This article is a review of two recently translated books by Italian philosopher Elettra Stimilli: The Debt of the Living: Ascesis and capitalism (Albany: SUNY Press, 2017; translated by Arianna Bove) and Debt and Guilt: A Political Philosophy (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018; translated by Stefania Porcelli). The essay critically engages with (1) Stimilli's interpretation of the nexus between ascesis and capitalism; (2) her account of the ascetic dimensions of contemporary economies of debt; (3) her reflections on the subversive potential of ascesis in the context of contemporary regimes of neoliberal governance.
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    Dummett and Davidson on the dependence of thought on language
    (Beytulhikme Felsefe Cevresi, 2021) N/A; Department of Philosophy; Özaltun, Eylem; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 219281
    Both Dummett and Davidson believe that language is constitutive of thought. However, they do not believe exactly the same thing. Dummett believes that language is prior to thought, whereas Davidson believes that neither is prior to the other. Still, they share a common core that can be put as follows: language is necessary for thought. In order to understand this claim that I look at their arguments and show that for both philosophers the argument from objectivity is the main argument to secure their conclusion. I argue that for both of them natural language is the source of the objectivity of thoughts.