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    The digital twin synchronization problem: framework, formulations, and analysis
    (Taylor & Francis Inc, 2023) Matta, Andrea; Department of Business Administration; Tan, Barış; Department of Business Administration; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics
    As the adoption of digital twins increases steadily, it is necessary to determine how to operate them most effectively and efficiently. In this article, the digital twin synchronization problem is introduced and defined formally. Frequent synchronizations would increase cost and data traffic congestion, whereas infrequent synchronizations would increase the bias of the predictions and yield wrong decisions. This work defines the synchronization problem variants in different contexts. To discuss the problem and its solution, the problem of determining when to synchronize an unreliable production system with its digital twin to minimize the average synchronization and bias costs is formulated and analyzed analytically. The state-independent, state-dependent, and full-information solutions have been determined by using a stochastic model of the system. Solving the synchronization problem using simulation is discussed, and an approximate policy is proposed. Our results show that the performance of the state-dependent policy is close to the optimal solution that can be obtained with full information and significantly better than the performance of the state-independent policy. Furthermore, the approximate periodic state-dependent policy yields near-optimal results. To operate digital twins more effectively, the digital twin synchronization problem must be considered and solved to determine the optimal synchronization policy.
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    Bounded rationality in clearing service systems
    (Elsevier, 2020) Department of Industrial Engineering; Canbolat, Pelin Gülşah; Faculty Member; Department of Industrial Engineering; College of Engineering; 108242
    This paper considers a clearing service system where customers arrive according to a Poisson process, and decide to join the system or to balk in a boundedly rational manner. It assumes that all customers in the system are served at once when the server is available and times between consecutive services are independently and identically distributed random variables. Using logistic quantal-response functions to model bounded rationality, it first characterizes customer utility and system revenue for fixed price and degree of rationality, then solves the pricing problem of a revenue-maximizing system administrator. The analysis of the resulting expressions as functions of the degree of rationality yields several insights including: (i) for an individual customer, it is best to be perfectly rational if the price is fixed; however, when customers have the same degree of rationality and the administrator prices the service accordingly, a finite nonzero degree of rationality uniquely maximizes customer utility, (ii) system revenue grows arbitrarily large as customers tend to being irrational, (iii) social welfare is maximized when customers are perfectly rational, (iv) in all cases, at least 78% of social welfare goes to the administrator. The paper also considers a model where customers are heterogeneous with respect to their degree of rationality, explores the effect of changes in distributional parameters of the degree of rationality for fixed service price, provides a characterization for the revenue-maximizing price, and discusses the analytical difficulties arising from heterogeneity in the degree of bounded rationality. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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    Pricing in a transportation station with strategic customers
    (Wiley, 2017) N/A; Department of Industrial Engineering; Department of Industrial Engineering; Department of Industrial Engineering; Manou, Athanasia; Canbolat, Pelin Gülşah; Karaesmen, Fikri; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Department of Industrial Engineering; College of Engineering; College of Engineering; College of Engineering; N/A; 108242; 3579
    We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process, observe the delay information and the fee imposed by the administrator and decide whether to use the facility or not. a transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves all present customers at each visit. We assume that every customer maximizes her individual expected utility and the administrator is a profit maximizer. We model this situation as a two-stage game among the customers and the administrator, where customer strategies depend on the level of delay information provided by the administrator. We consider three cases distinguished by the level of delay information: observable (the exact waiting time is announced), unobservable (no information is provided) and partially observable (the number of waiting customers is announced). in each case, we explore how the customer reward for service, the unit waiting cost, and the intervisit time distribution parameters affect the customer behavior and the fee imposed by the administrator. We then compare the three cases and show that the customers almost always prefer to know their exact waiting times whereas the administrator prefers to provide either no information or the exact waiting time depending on system parameters.
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    Risk-sensitive control of branching processes
    (Taylor and Francis inc, 2021) Department of Industrial Engineering; Canbolat, Pelin Gülşah; Faculty Member; Department of Industrial Engineering; College of Engineering; 108242
    This article solves the risk-sensitive control problem for branching processes where the one-period progeny of an individual can take values from a finite set. the decision maker is assumed to maximize the expected risk-averse exponential utility (or to minimize the expected risk-averse exponential disutility) of the rewards earned in an infinite horizon. individuals are assumed to produce progeny independently, and with the same probability mass function if they take the same action. This article characterizes the expected disutility of stationary policies, identifies necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a stationary optimal policy that assigns the same action to all individuals in all periods, and discusses computational methods to obtain such a policy. are available for this article. See the publisher's online edition of IIE Transactions, datasets, Additional tables, detailed proofs, etc.