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Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/6
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Publication Open Access Random assignment under weak preferences(Elsevier, 2009) Department of Economics; Yılmaz, Özgür; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 108638The natural preference domain for many practical settings of the assignment problems is the one in which agents are allowed to be indifferent between objects, the weak preference domain. Most of the existing work on assignment problems assumes strict preferences. There are important exceptions. but they provide solutions only to the assignment problems with a social endowment, where agents own objects collectively and there are no private endowments. We consider the general class of assignment problems with private endowments and a social endowment. Our main contribution is a recursive solution for the weak preference domain. Our solution satisfies individual rationality, ordinal efficiency and a recently introduced fairness axiom, no justified-envy.Publication Open Access The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments(Elsevier, 2010) Department of Economics; Yılmaz, Özgür; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 108638A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects. When there are no private endowments, the set of ordinally efficient random assignments is characterized by the eating algorithm (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001). When there are private endowments, the main requirement is individual rationality; however, the eating algorithm fails to deliver this property. Our contribution is the natural generalization of the eating algorithm for this general class of problems. The family of this generalized eating algorithm characterizes the set of individually rational and ordinally efficient random assignments. A special solution in this family, the individually rational probabilistic serial (PS(IR)), also achieves a new fairness axiom, no justified-envy. However, it is not immune to strategic manipulation. We show that individual rationality, no justified-envy and strategy-proofness are incompatible.Publication Open Access Modeling the density of US yield curve using Bayesian semiparametric dynamic Nelson-Siegel model(Taylor _ Francis, 2019) Department of Economics; Çakmaklı, Cem; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 107818This paper proposes the Bayesian semiparametric dynamic Nelson-Siegel model for estimating the density of bond yields. Specifically, we model the distribution of the yield curve factors according to an infinite Markov mixture (iMM). The model allows for time variation in the mean and covariance matrix of factors in a discrete manner, as opposed to continuous changes in these parameters such as the Time Varying Parameter (TVP) models. Estimating the number of regimes using the iMM structure endogenously leads to an adaptive process that can generate newly emerging regimes over time in response to changing economic conditions in addition to existing regimes. The potential of the proposed framework is examined using US bond yields data. The semiparametric structure of the factors can handle various forms of non-normalities including fat tails and nonlinear dependence between factors using a unified approach by generating new clusters capturing these specific characteristics. We document that modeling parameter changes in a discrete manner increases the model fit as well as forecasting performance at both short and long horizons relative to models with fixed parameters as well as the TVP model with continuous parameter changes. This is mainly due to fact that the discrete changes in parameters suit the typical low frequency monthly bond yields data characteristics better.Publication Open Access Starting small to communicate(Elsevier, 2020) Kubilay, Elif; Department of Economics; Atakan, Alp Enver; Koçkesen, Levent; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 39383; 37861We analyze a repeated cheap-talk game in which the receiver is privately informed about the conflict of interest between herself and the sender and either the sender or the receiver controls the stakes involved in their relationship. We focus on payoff-dominant equilibria that satisfy a Markovian property and show that if the potential conflict of interest is large, then the stakes increase over time, i.e., “starting small” is the unique equilibrium arrangement. In each period, the receiver plays the sender's ideal action with positive probability and the sender provides full information as long as he has always observed his ideal actions in the past. We also show that as the potential conflict of interest increases, the extent to which the stakes are back-loaded increases, i.e., stakes are initially smaller but grow faster.Publication Open Access A practitioner’s guide to handling irregularities resulting from the 2014 revisions of the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey(Boğaziçi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, 2021) Poyraz, Meltem; Department of Economics; Demirci, Murat; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 272082We document the implications of the 2014 revisions to the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey and offer guidance on how to handle the irregularities in population and unemployment statistics that resulted from two particular revisions. First, new population projections were adopted to assign survey weights. Second, a narrower definition of unemployment was adopted. We propose methods to adjust the survey weights for the pre-2014 period in order to discern changes in population statistics by age groups and regions without interruption over time and to calculate the unemployment rates according to both broader and narrower definitions since 2004. / Bu çalışmada TÜİK Hanehalkı İşgücü Anketi’ninde 2014 yılında yapılan düzenlemelerden kaynaklanan bazı sonuçları bulguluyor, nüfus ve işsizlik istatistiklerinde yapılan revizyonların özellikle ikisinden kaynaklanan sorunların nasıl ele alınması gerektiği hakkında yol gösteriyoruz. İlk revizyon, anket ağırlıklarının dayandırıldığı yeni nüfus projeksiyonlarının kabul edilmesidir. İkincisi ise, dar tanımlı bir işsizlik tanımına geçilmesidir. Bu çalışmada 2014 öncesindeki anket ağırlıklarını nüfus istatistiklerinde yaş bazında ve bölgesel olarak kopma olmayacak şekilde yeniden ayarlamak ve işsizlik oranlarını geniş ve dar tanımlı olarak 2004 yılından itibaren hesaplamak için yöntemler öneriyoruz.Publication Open Access Determinants of delegation: evidence from British establishment data(Boğaziçi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, 2021) Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos; Department of Economics; Ekinci, Emre; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 309364This paper provides an empirical analysis of firms’ delegation decisions by using a matched employer-employee dataset from Britain. In our analysis, we first investigate if firm-provided training is positively related to delegating authority, as predicted by the existing theories. We then consider variables that can potentially increase the value of delegation. In particular, we conjecture that firms become more likely to delegate authority as they face higher uncertainty or as the employees acquire more precise information. To test these hypotheses, we use market conditions to measure uncertainty and correlates of worker productivity to measure the precision of the employee’s information. / Bu çalışma, Britanya’da oluşturulan eşlenmiş işveren-çalışan veri setini kullanarak, firmaların yetkilendirme (delegasyon) kararlarının ampirik bir analizini sunmaktadır. Analizimizde ilk olarak, mevcut teorilerin öngördüğü üzere firma tarafından sağlanan eğitim ile yetkilendirme kararları arasında pozitif bir ilişkili olup olmadığını araştırıyoruz. Daha sonra, yetkilendirmenin değerini potansiyel olarak artırabilecek değişkenleri ele alıyoruz. Özellikle, daha yüksek belirsizlikle karşılaştıklarında veya çalışanların daha kesin bilgiler edinmelerinin mümkün olduğu ortamlarda firmaların yetkilendirme olasılıklarının arttığı hipotezini test ediyoruz. Bu analizde, belirsizliği ölçmek için piyasa koşullarını kullanırken, çalışanın edinebileceği bilgilerinin kesinliğini ölçmek için ise işçi üretkenliğini etkileyen değişkenleri kullanmaktayız.