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Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/6
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Publication Open Access Foucault, critique, subjectivity(Routledge, 2017) Department of Philosophy; Rossi, Andrea; Teaching Faculty; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and HumanitiesThis article interprets Foucault's intellectual project by analysing the relation between his understanding of critique and the political conditions of subjectivation out of which it emerged. After reviewing some of the most typical criticisms of Foucault's work (and especially those maintaining that genealogy can only be rooted in a non-genealogical and universal conception of power), the argument shows in what sense he conceived of critique as a form of resistance and how the latter, in turn, was theorised as a force co-extensive to the power it counters. The paper goes on to argue that his theory of resistance is not necessarily to be viewed as a metaphysical representation of the immutable nature of political struggle, but might well be interpreted in performative terms, i.e. as a strategic re-inscription of existing political-discursive formations. More precisely, the analysis shows in what way Foucault's articulation of critique represented an attempt to displace the forms of subjectivation that underpin anthropological thought and the government of the self in the modern age.Publication Open Access What is wrong with Baldy? radical non-referring view of "I"(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2020) Department of Philosophy; Özaltun, Eylem; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 219281That the study of the first-person reports of intentional actions, happenings, thoughts, and sensations as revealing the structure of self-consciousness was a central theme of Anscombe's work in philosophy of mind has not been sufficiently registered in the literature. I aim to show that this theme animated many of her works throughout her writing career and her "The First Person" (1974) can be best understood as one of these works and in the light of others. / Que l’estudi dels informes de primera persona d’accions intencionals, esdeveniments, pensaments i sensacions com a reveladors de l’estructura de l’autoconsciència va ser un tema central del treball d’Anscombe en filosofia de la ment és quelcom que no ha estat prou considerat en la literatura sobre el tema. El meu objectiu és mostrar que aquest tema va animar moltes de les seves obres al llarg de la seva carrera com a filòsofa i que el seu «The first person» (1974) pot entendre’s millor com una d’aquestes obres i tenint-ne en compte d’altres.Publication Open Access Harman on mental paint and the transparency of experience(Institute of Philosophy (SAS), 2020) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390Harman famously argues that a particular class of anti-functionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing "properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object" and by realizing that the latter are not introspectively accessible (or are transparent). More specifically, Harman argues that we are or can be introspectively aware only of the properties of the object of an experience but not the properties of the experience of an object and hence that the fact that functionalism leaves out the properties of the experience of an object does not show that it leaves out anything mentally relevant. In this paper, I argue that Harman's attempt to defuse the anti-functionalist arguments in question is unsuccessful. After making a distinction between the thesis of experiencing-act transparency and the thesis of mental-paint transparency, (and casting some doubt on the former,) I mainly target the latter and argue that it is false. The thesis of mental-paint transparency is false, I claim, not because mental paint involves some introspectively accessible properties that are different from the properties of the objects of experiences but because what I call the identity thesis is true, viz. that mental paint is the same as (an array of) Properties of the object of experience. The identification of mental paint with properties of the object of experience entails that the anti-functionalist arguments Harman criticizes cannot be rightly accused of committing the fallacy of confusing the two.Publication Open Access A principle of universal strife: Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty's critiques of Marxist universalism, 1953-1956(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015) Department of Philosophy; Chouraqui, Frank; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and HumanitiesPublication Open Access Nietzsche’s science of love(De Gruyter, 2015) Department of Philosophy; Chouraqui, Frank; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and HumanitiesIn this paper, I examine the possibility of constructing an ontological phenomenology of love by tracing Nietzsche’s questioning about science. I examine how the evolution of Nietzsche’s thinking about science and his increasing suspicion towards it coincide with his interest for the question of love. Although the texts from the early and middle period praise science as an antidote to asceticism, the later texts seem to associate the scientific spirit with asceticism. I argue that this shift is motivated by Nietzsche’s realization that asceticism and science share the same fetish of facts. It is now for Nietzsche no longer a matter of proving the socalled facts of the backworlds wrong (something science is very capable of doing), but a matter of rejecting the very structure of thought that reduces a shapeless reality into a series of facts, subjects and objects. It is this second attitude that Nietzsche regards as the common core of science and asceticism. From this critique of science and its correlative critique of facts, Nietzsche begins searching for a counter-attitude able to perform the reduction of the factual attitude. This is the attitude he calls love. Although Nietzsche’s concept of love has often been elucidated in terms of its object or its subject, I argue that such interpretations precisely defeat Nietzsche’s point, which is to recover a ground that precedes the division of the world into facts, subjects and objects. Love becomes the name of this intra-relationship of being, opening up to new perspectives on Nietzsche’s ontology of the will to power.Publication Open Access Book review: The idea of comedy: history, theory, critique(Penn State University Press, 2007) Department of Philosophy; Freydberg, Bernard; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and HumanitiesPublication Open Access Smooth infinitesimals in the metaphysical foundation of spacetime theories(Springer Nature, 2022) Department of Philosophy; Chen, Lu; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 329122I propose a theory of space with infinitesimal regions called smooth infinitesimal geometry (SIG) based on certain algebraic objects (i.e., rings), which regiments a mode of reasoning heuristically used by geometricists and physicists (e.g., circle is composed of infinitely many straight lines). I argue that SIG has the following utilities. (1) It provides a simple metaphysics of vector fields and tangent space that are otherwise perplexing. A tangent space can be considered an infinitesimal region of space. (2) It generalizes a standard implementation of spacetime algebraicism (according to which physical fields exist fundamentally without an underlying manifold) called Einstein algebras. (3) It solves the long-standing problem of interpreting smooth infinitesimal analysis (SIA) realistically, an alternative foundation of spacetime theories to real analysis (Lawvere Cahiers de Topologie et Geometrie Differentielle Categoriques, 21(4), 277-392, 1980). SIA is formulated in intuitionistic logic and is thought to have no classical reformulations (Hellman Journal of Philosophical Logic, 35, 621-651, 2006). Against this, I argue that SIG is (part of) such a reformulation. But SIG has an unorthodox mereology, in which the principle of supplementation fails.Publication Open Access The translation of Republic 606A3-B5 and Plato's partite psychology(The University of Chicago Press, 2019) Department of Philosophy; Storey, Damien; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and HumanitiesPublication Open Access Epistemic infinitism and the conditional character of inferential justification(Springer, 2018) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and HumanitiesIn this paper, I will present and defend an argument from the conditional character of inferential justification (the argument from conditionality) against the version of epistemic infinitism Klein advances. More specifically, after proposing a distinction between propositional and doxastic infinitism, which is based on a standard distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, I will describe in considerable detail the argument from conditionality, which is mainly an argument against propositional infinitism, and clarify some of its main underlying assumptions. There are various responses to be found in Klein's works to this argument, and my aim is to show that none of those responses can be plausibly held without infinitism losing its title to being a genuine non-skeptical alternative.Publication Open Access Phenomenology and ethics: from value theory to an ethics of responsibility(Philosophy Documentation Center, 2014) DeWit, David J.; DuBois, David; Larose, Simon; Lipman, Ellen L.; Spencer, Renee; Department of Philosophy; Direk, Zeynep; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 5771There seems to be a shift in phenomenology in the 20th century from an ethics based on value theory to an ethics based on responsibility. This essay attempts to show the path marks of this transition. It begins with the historical development that led Husserl to address the question of ethical objectivity in terms of value theory, with a focus on Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. It then explains Husserl’s phenomenology of ethics as grounded in value theory, and takes into account Heidegger’s objections to it. Finally, it considers Sartre as a transitional fi gure between value theory and an ethics of responsibility and attempts to show in what sense, if at all, Levinas’ phenomenology of ethics could be an absolute break with a phenomenological ethics based on values.