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Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/6

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Indexed at: search.filters.indexed.ScopusSubject: search.filters.subject.International Relations

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    PublicationOpen Access
    How do mega-bank merger policy and regulations contribute to financial stability? Evidence from Australia and Canada
    (Taylor _ Francis, 2017) Department of International Relations; Bakır, Caner; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 108141
    Although the role of financial regulatory failures in the global financial crisis (GFC) has been explored extensively in the post-GFC literature, our knowledge of the role of bank merger and takeover policy and regulation in reinforcing financial stability is limited. Based on an exploratory case study of Australia, which is examined in comparison to Canada, this article argues that competition policy and regulation contributed to financial stability by insulating the largest Australian and Canadian banks from domestic or foreign hostile takeover threats, and by limiting their asset size, and thus their internationalization and interconnections with the global banking community.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Ethnicity and religiosity-based prejudice in Turkey: evidence from a survey experiment
    (Sage, 2017) Department of International Relations; Aytaç, Selim Erdem; Çarkoğlu, Ali; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 224278; 125588
    Threat perceptions and prejudice underlie a large number of intergroup conflicts. In this article we explore prejudicial attitudes in Turkey regarding ethnic Kurdish and devout Muslim religious identities as opposed to Turkish and less observant, secular identities. Utilizing a population-based survey experiment, we use vignettes about a hypothetical family as a neighbour, with randomized ethnicity and religiosity-related cues. We find evidence for prejudice against Kurdish ethnicity, especially among older, lowly-educated and economically dissatisfied individuals. The level of prejudice against Kurds does not seem to be related to the relative size of the Kurdish population in the local population. We do not observe prejudice against devout Muslim or less observant, secular identities. Our findings indicate that prejudice against Kurds in Turkey does not have a sui generis nature. The lack of prejudice across the religiosity dimension suggests that major socio-political cleavages do not necessarily affect intergroup attitudes.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    The role of democratic governance and indirect expropriation in international investment treaty violations
    (International Relations Council of Turkey (IRCT) / Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi Derneği, 2021) Ziegler, Jeffrey; Department of International Relations; Carlson, David George; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics
    Democracies are thought to violate treaties less frequently than non-democracies, yet democracies violate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) just as often as non-democracies. Though democratic governments may intend to meet their international obligations, and though democratic institutions provide greater political constraints to encourage compliance, investment agreements may conflict with the goal of maintaining domestic public support. Specifically, we argue that credible elections create strong incentives for governments to side with domestic voters, and to pass legislation that violates investment agreements. The results suggest that the ability of voters to sanction leaders is an important mechanism that incentivizes governments to pass legislation that potentially violates investment treaties through indirect expropriation. / Demokratik rejimlerin, yaptıkları anlaşmaları demokratik olmayan rejimlerden daha nadir olarak ihlal ettikleri varsayılır; fakat demokratik rejimler, iki taraflı yatırım anlaşmalarını demokratik olmayan rejimler kadar sık ihlal eder. Demokratik hükümetler uluslararası yükümlülüklerini yerine getirme niyetinde olsa ve demokratik kurumlar bu yükümlülüklere riayeti destekleyen daha fazla siyasi kısıtlama sağlasa da yatırım anlaşmaları, yurtiçinde kamuoyu desteğini devam ettirme hedefleriyle çatışabilir. Bu çalışmada, meşru seçimlerin, hükümetleri yurtiçindeki seçmenlerin yanında durmaya ve yatırım anlaşmalarını ihlal eden yasalar geçirmeye teşvik ettiğini savunmaktayız. Araştırmamızın sonuçları gösteriyor ki seçmenlerin yöneticiler üzerinde yaptırım gücüne sahip olması, hükümetleri yatırım anlaşmalarını dolaylı kamulaştırma yoluyla ihlal edebilecek yasalar geçirmeye yönlendiren önemli bir teşvik mekanizması yaratıyor