Publications with Fulltext

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/6

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    PublicationOpen Access
    Why some countries are immune from the resource curse: the role of economic norms
    (Taylor _ Francis, 2016) Mousseau, Michael; Department of International Relations; Aytaç, Selim Erdem; Örsün, Ömer Faruk; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 224278; N/A
    The political resource curse - the detrimental effect of natural resource dependence on democracy - is a well-established correlate of authoritarianism. A long-standing puzzle, however, is why some countries seem to be immune from it. We address this issue systematically by distinguishing two kinds of economies: contract-intensive, where individuals normally obtain their incomes in the marketplace; and clientelist, where individuals normally obtain their incomes in groups that compete over state rents. We theorize that the institutionalized patronage opportunities in clientelist economies are an important precondition for the resource curse, and that nations with contract-intensive economies are immune from it. Analysis of 150 countries from 1973 to 2000 yields robust support for this view. By introducing clientelist economy as a prerequisite for the resource curse, this study offers an important advance in understanding how nations democratize.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    When and whom to join: the expansion of ongoing violent interstate conflicts
    (Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2014) Joyce, Kyle A.; Ghosn, Faten; Department of International Relations; Bayer, Reşat; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 51395
    The opportunity and willingness framework has received much attention in research on interstate conflict expansion. This framework is extended here by examining when and what side third parties join during ongoing conflicts. It is maintained that without examining both timing and side selection, understanding of conflict expansion is limited. The timing and side joined in interstate disputes between 1816 and 2001 are analysed using a competing risks duration model. The findings contribute novel insights into many key debates in conflict research such as balancing versus bandwagoning, as well as alliance reliability and the democratic peace. The results also indicate that relying on statistical models that do not distinguish between which side a third party can join may produce misleading results.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Why do people join backlash protests? lessons from Turkey
    (Sage, 2018) Schiumerini, Luis; Stokes, Susan; Department of International Relations; Aytaç, Selim Erdem; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 224278
    When people learn that demonstrators are being subjected to harsh treatment by the police, sometimes their reaction is to join demonstrations. What explains the potentially mobilizing power of repression? Information-oriented theories posit that repression changes people's beliefs about the likely success of the protests or the type of the government, thus encouraging them to join. Social-psychological theories posit that repression provokes a moral and emotional reaction from bystanders, and these emotional reactions are mobilizing. Our research offers a rare opportunity to test these theories, empirically, against one another. We offer experimental evidence from Turkey after the 2013 Gezi uprising. In this setting, emotional reactions appear to be the link between repression and backlash mobilization. Information-oriented theories of backlash mobilization may be less germane in democracies, in which people already have access to information about their governments, and in highly polarized polities, in which few people's political affinities are up for grabs.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Taking sides: determinants of support for a presidential system in Turkey
    (Routledge, 2017) Department of International Relations; Aytaç, Selim Erdem; Çarkoğlu, Ali; Yıldırım, Kerem; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities; 224278; 125588; N/A
    A key issue on the Turkish political agenda concerns a transition to presidentialism, with a constitutional amendment proposal submitted in December 2016. While the positions of political elites are well known, we lack a detailed analysis of the electorate's views on such a transition. To fill this gap, we present cross-sectional and panel data collected over the period from spring 2015 to winter 2015-16. Partisanship emerges as the key factor shaping views on presidentialism, and reflections of the centre-periphery cleavage in Turkish politics are also visible. The shift of the Turkish nationalist constituency's views in favour of presidentialism has been a significant trend in the aftermath of the June 2015 general election.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Buy-out of the oppressed minority's shares in joint stock companies: a comparative analysis of Turkish, Swiss and English law
    (Springer, 2018) N/A; Veziroğlu, Cem; Faculty Member; Law School
    Article 531 of the Turkish Commercial Code grants the right to request corporate dissolution for just causes to shareholders representing at least 10% of the capital in joint stock companies, and 5% in publicly traded companies. In addition to dissolution, the court can order purchase of the claimant's shares at real value (buy-out remedy) or adopt a different solution. This article conducts an economic analysis of the buy-out remedy against minority oppression and compares Turkish law with Swiss and English legislation. The buy-out remedy is supposed to provide an ex post control on the controller's conduct, and it is expected to function as a put option conditional upon oppression. However, the current provision does not provide the expected incentives. Addressing this issue, I suggest that: (1) the relief sought by the claimant should be taken into account; (2) the purchaser of the claimant's shares should be the oppressive controller, rather than the company in question; (3) the standard of 'just cause' to be proven should not be equal for each remedy, and thus, the courts should be able to give a buy-out order even if the facts do not justify corporate dissolution; (4) dissolution orders should not be given in cases where there is a going-concern value to protect; and finally, (5) the valuation of the claimant's shares should, in principle, be made on a going concern and pro rata basis, and any depreciation of the claimant's shares due to the controller's abusive conducts should be taken into account.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Wallets, ballots, or bullets: does wealth, democracy, or military capabilities determine war outcomes?
    (Wiley, 2013) Henderson, Errol A.; Department of International Relations; Bayer, Reşat; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 51395
    We examine the extent to which wealth, democracy, and/or relative military capabilities contribute to victory in interstate war. Examining contingency tables, we find that states with greater military capabilities are more likely to win their wars whether they are wealthier or democratic, and democratic states perform marginally better than wealthier states in war. Probit analyses indicate that although each of the variables has a robust and positive impact on war victory, relative capabilities has the strongest substantive impact, followed by wealth, then democracy. Hazard analyses reveal that states with greater military capabilities fight shorter wars than either democracies or wealthier states, and controlling for capabilities and wealth, the relationship between democracy and war duration is not significant, which challenges the view that democracies have a unique propensity to fight shorter wars. We also find that the democratic victory phenomenon is not universal, but is contingent on the placement of a single country, Israel, in the Western or non-Western democracy category. In sum, our analyses indicate that although each of the three factors contributes to war victory, relative military capability is the most powerful, consistent, and robust predictor to victory in interstate war.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Peaceful transitions and democracy
    (Sage, 2010) Department of International Relations; Bayer, Reşat; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 51395
    While there has been extensive interest in the role of democracy in reducing interstate violence, the role of democracy in reaching higher levels of peace has received much less attention. Since many countries have less than amicable relations, it is necessary to consider how the quality of peace can be improved. The quality of peace becomes particularly relevant when assessing relations of countries with a bellicose past. In order to capture improvement in relations this article relies upon a framework that captures the various levels of peace that countries experience. The study maintains that democracy contributes to former belligerents reaching the highest levels of peace but that it is not helpful at the lower levels especially if only one side is a democracy. The article tests arguments on a data set that captures the transitions from one level of peace to another for all former belligerents since 1816 and relies upon event history analysis. The results for peace are not the opposite of what is found for war. The findings demonstrate that democracy plays a substantial role in peaceful transitions at all levels. However, while joint democracy is important for reaching the highest levels of peace, democracy can hamper the progress of relations at the lowest levels of peace.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Bringing the economy back in: Hannah Arendt, Karl Marx, and the politics of capitalism
    (University of Chicago Press, 2016) Department of International Relations; İnce, Onur Ulaş; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 35075
    This article engages with the question of how to construct modern economic relations as an object of political theorizing by placing Hannah Arendt's and Karl Marx's writings in critical conversation. I contend that the political aspect of capitalism comes into sharpest relief less in relations of economic exploitation than in moments of expropriation that produce and reproduce the conditions of capitalist accumulation. To develop a theoretical handle on expropriation and thereby on the politics of capitalism, I syncretically draw on Marxian and Arendtian concepts by first examining expropriation through the Marxian analytic of "primitive accumulation of capital" and second delineating the political agency behind primitive accumulation through the Arendtian notion of "power." I substantiate these connections around colonial histories of primitive accumulation wherein expropriation emerges as a terrain of political contestation. From this perspective I conclude that such putatively "economic" questions as dispossession, exploitation, and accumulation appear as irreducibly political questions.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Presidents shaping public opinion in parliamentary democracies: a survey experiment in Turkey
    (Springer, 2018) Department of International Relations; Aytaç, Selim Erdem; Çarkoğlu, Ali; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 224278; 125588
    Many parliamentary democracies feature a president alongside a prime minister. While these presidents have a nonpartisan status as head of state, they often have had long political careers with partisan affiliations before assuming office. How do voters react when such actors make issue statements to shape public opinion? Are such statements filtered through voters' partisan lenses, provoked by the partisan background of these actors? Or perhaps partisan reactions are not invoked, owing to the nonpartisan status of the office? We argue that voters' reactions depend on the issue domain. Partisan reactions will be invoked only when the statements are about issues outside the president's prerogatives. We provide evidence for our argument from a population-based survey experiment in Turkey.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Turkish big business in the age of democratic consolidation: the nature and limits of its influence
    (Routledge, 2010) Department of International Relations; Bayer, Reşat; Öniş, Ziya; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities; 51395; 7715
    The article addresses the nature and limits of the contribution of big business to democratic consolidation by focusing on the role of TÜSİAD, the major association of big business interests in Turkey, during the country’s democratisation process in the 2000s. While TÜSİAD has been an important pro-democratisation actor, big business’s contribution to the consolidation process is contingent on the broader institutional and political environment. The issues of secularism and EU membership prospects play an important role in Turkish politics and in understanding TÜSİAD’s stance, as they have constrained its ability to act as the vanguard of democratisation reforms.