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Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/6
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Publication Open Access Do dividend distributions and dividend commitments of a target company violate the prohibition of financial assistance (TCC Article 380/1)?(İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2018) Paslı, Ali; Veziroğlu, Cem; Faculty Member; Law School; 265198Pursuant to Turkish Commercial Code ("TCC") Article 380 paragraph 1, "[L]egal transactions concluded between the company and another person for acquisition of its shares and the subject of which is granting of advance, loan or security, shall be null and void." According to this provision, a public company cannot provide financial assistance to a third party with a view to acquiring its shares. This article examines a target company's dividend payout or commitment to its buyer (who would be a shareholder following an acquisition of the target company's shares) that is financed by a bank loan or from its retained earnings (i.e., without using any external source). We ask whether use of such funds in acquisition finance constitute "financial assistance" in the meaning of TCC 380/1. According to TCC, the prohibition of financial assistance applies only if three conditions exist cumulatively: (1) There must be an acquisition of shares; (2) there must be a financial assistance transaction, and (3) financial assistance must be made for the acquisition of shares. Therefore, the aforementioned transactional mechanism must be filtered through these three conditions. In our view, dividend payouts or commitments to the buyer following her share acquisition does not violate the prohibition of financial assistance, regardless of whether such amount is funded by a bank loan or the company's retained earnings. Using profits distributed by the target company in order to finance the acquisiton of the target company's shares makes no differrence according to our analysis. It is also possible that a commitment may be given for the target company's dividend payout in certain periods and for certain amounts in order to ensure repayment of the credit provided for the acquisition. The obligor of the said commitment may be the buyer or the target company (as a legal entity). If the target company is the obligor, the consequences for violating the commitment will vary according to the modality of the undertaking. Nonetheless, we believe that the target company's dividend payout must be made in compliance with the rules and procedures laid down by the TCC and by the company's articles of association. Otherwise, in addition to sanctions with respect to distribution of profit (TCC 512), the prohibition of financial assistance may step in. Hence, both the general assembly's resolution towards dividend payout and the payment of dividend (act of disposal) may be considered null and void regardless of whether the buyer's receipt of the dividend was wrongful and in bad faith. / 6102 sayılı Türk Ticaret Kanunu’nun (“TTK”) 380. maddesinin 1. fıkrası uyarınca “[P]aylarının iktisap edilmesi amacıyla, şirketin başka bir kişiyle yaptığı, konusu avans, ödünç veya teminat verilmesi olan hukuki işlemler batıldır”. Anılan hüküm, payları üçüncü kişi tarafından iktisap edilen anonim ortaklığın alıcıya finansal yardımda bulunmasını yasaklamaktadır. İşbu makalede incelediğimiz husus hedef anonim ortaklığın bir bankadan kredi temin etmesinin ardından söz konusu meblağı, yahut dış finansman kullanmaksızın birikmiş kârını, şirketin paylarını iktisap ederek pay sahibi sıfatını kazanan alıcıya kâr dağıtımı yoluyla aktarması ve bu kaynağın devralma işleminin finansmanında kullanılmasının TTK 380/1 anlamında “finansal yardım” sayılıp sayılmayacağıdır. Finansal yardım yasağının uygulama alanı bulabilmesi için şu üç şartın bir arada bulunması gerekmektedir. Bunlar; (1) pay iktisabı, (2) finansal yardım işlemi ve (3) finansal yardımın alıcının pay iktisabı amacıyla yapılmasıdır. O halde yukarıda açıklanan işlem örgüsü de bu üç şartın süzgecinden geçirilmelidir. Kanımızca bir bankanın anonim ortaklığa kredi temin etmesi ve söz konusu kredinin, anonim ortaklığın paylarını iktisap ederek pay sahibi sıfatını kazanan alıcıya kâr dağıtımı yoluyla aktarılması, yahut zaten hedef şirketin malvarlığına dâhil olan mevcut kaynağın kâr dağıtımı suretiyle alıcıya tahsis edilmesi TTK 380/1’de düzenlenen finansal yardım yasağının kapsamına girmemektedir. Ulaştığımız bu sonuç açısından, hedef şirketin nakit ihtiyacı sebebiyle bankanın sağlayacağı kredi neticesinde hedef şirketin dağıtacağı kârın, yine hedef şirketin paylarının iktisabı amacıyla kullanılacak olması da hiçbir fark yaratmamaktadır. Aynı şekilde, hedef şirketin paylarının iktisabının ve bunun finansmanı için sağlanan kredinin geri ödenmesini teminen, hedef şirketin belirli süreler içinde ve belirli oranlarda kâr dağıtımı yapacağına dair bir taahhüdün verilmiş olması da mümkündür. Söz konusu taahhüdün yükümlüsü alıcı olabileceği gibi, hedef şirket tüzel kişiliği de olabilir. Yükümlülüğün şirket üzerinde olması şeklindeki ikinci ihtimalde taahhüde aykırılığın sonuçları, taahhüdün veriliş şekline göre değişiklik gösterecektir. Ancak bunun için, hedef şirket nezdinde yapılacak kâr dağıtımının TTK ve esas sözleşmede öngörülen usul ve esaslara riayet edilerek gerçekleştirilmesi gerekmektedir. Aksi hâlde hedef şirket tarafından pay sahibine yapılacak malvarlığı aktarımına ilişkin kâr dağıtımını düzenleyen hükümlerde öngörülen yaptırımlara (TTK 512) ek olarak, finansal yardım yasağının da uygulanması riski doğabilecektir. Keza bu durumda pay sahibi konumundaki alıcının, kâr payını haksız yere ve kötü niyetle alıp almadığına bakılmaksızın, hem genel kurulun kâr payı dağıtım kararı hem de tasarruf işlemi niteliğindeki hedef şirketin temettü ödeme işlemleri kesin hükümsüz sayılabilecektir.Publication Open Access Why some countries are immune from the resource curse: the role of economic norms(Taylor _ Francis, 2016) Mousseau, Michael; Department of International Relations; Aytaç, Selim Erdem; Örsün, Ömer Faruk; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 224278; N/AThe political resource curse - the detrimental effect of natural resource dependence on democracy - is a well-established correlate of authoritarianism. A long-standing puzzle, however, is why some countries seem to be immune from it. We address this issue systematically by distinguishing two kinds of economies: contract-intensive, where individuals normally obtain their incomes in the marketplace; and clientelist, where individuals normally obtain their incomes in groups that compete over state rents. We theorize that the institutionalized patronage opportunities in clientelist economies are an important precondition for the resource curse, and that nations with contract-intensive economies are immune from it. Analysis of 150 countries from 1973 to 2000 yields robust support for this view. By introducing clientelist economy as a prerequisite for the resource curse, this study offers an important advance in understanding how nations democratize.Publication Open Access Turkey and the Arab revolutions: boundaries of regional power influence in a turbulent Middle East(Taylor _ Francis, 2014) Department of International Relations; Öniş, Ziya; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 7715The recent Turkish involvement in the Middle East constitutes an important test case for establishing the boundaries of regional power influence in a changing global context. The AKP government in Turkey has become a major supporter of political change and democratization in the era of the Arab revolutions. Accumulating empirical evidence suggests, however, that the highly assertive and pro-active foreign policy of the AKP government in recent years has not been effective in terms of facilitating reform or regime change in Syria or helping to influence the direction of political change in Egypt towards a durable pluralistic order. Indeed, the policy might have been counter-productive in terms of undermining Turkey's image of a benign regional power, by drawing it to sectarian conflicts and over-engagement in the domestic politics of key Arab states. Turkey has the potential to play an important role model in the highly uncertain world of the Arab revolutions. Its ability to perform this role, however, requires an improvement in its own democratic credentials, rather than being excessively involved in the domestic politics of individual states.Publication Open Access Legal position of third party in transfer of indirect possession by an agreement between transferor and transferee compared to lessee in case of transfer of leased property(İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2021) N/A; Karaşahin, Yasin Alperen; Law School; 257378In Turkish and Swiss law, if a bailee (third party) is in possession based on a legal relationship with the bailor, the bailor (transferor) can transfer the indirect (constructive) possession by an agreement with the transferee without the consent of the third-party bailee. The Turkish Civil Code (CC) - like the Swiss Civil Code - contains some provisions intended to prevent any negative effect from such an agreement on the interests of the third party. First, the transfer of indirect possession by agreement between transferor and transferee has no legal effect on the third party until that party is notified by the transferor (Article 979/11 of Turkish Civil Code [CC]). This period of ineffectiveness ends upon notice to the third party. However, the third party can refuse delivery to the transferee based on the same defenses that could be invoked against the transferor (Article 979/III CC). Contrary to the prevailing view in Turkish and Swiss literatures, this study argues that the above-referenced provision allows the third party to invoke defenses based on personal rights besides those based on property rights. However, this provision is only applicable to the transfer of indirect possession of chattel. In contrast to a recent opinion in Swiss literature, notice of the transfer does not cause the transferee to become a new party to the legal relationship between the original third-party bailee and transferor. Turkish and Swiss law includes only a provision about lease contracts to that effect. This provision is applicable with regard to the lease of personal and real property. However, in contracts for the lease of chattels, Article 979/III CC, as interpreted in this study, would have been sufficient to protect the lessee's interests without a disproportionate interference in the freedom of contract. / Türk ve İsviçre hukuklarında, zilyetliğin havalesi, özel bir hukukî ilişkiye dayanarak eşyaya zilyet olan üçüncü kişinin rızası aranmaksızın, devreden ile devralan arasında yapılan bir sözleşme ile devralana dolaylı zilyetlik kazandırılması imkânını yaratmaktadır. Üçüncü kişinin rızası olmaksızın yapılan bu işlemin onun menfaatlerini ihlâl etmemesi için kanunda bazı düzenlemeler yer almaktadır. Türk Medenî Kanunu’nun 979. maddesinin 2. fıkrasına göre, zilyetliğin havalesi, üçüncü kişiye devreden tarafından bildirilmesinden önce üçüncü kişi açısından hüküm ve sonuç doğurmamaktadır. Bu hüküm ile öngörülen nisbî etkisizlik, üçüncü kişiye yapılan bildirim ile sona ermektedir; dolayısıyla üçüncü kişiye geçici bir koruma sağlamaktadır. Türk Medenî Kanunu’nun 979. maddesinin 3. fıkrasına göre, üçüncü kişi devredene karşı ileri sürebildiği savunmalara dayanarak eşyayı devralana teslimden kaçınabilir. Türk ve İsviçre oktrinlerinde hâkim olan görüşün aksine, bu hüküm aynî hakka dayanan savunmaların yanında şahsî (nisbî) hakka dayanan savunmaların da devralana ileri sürülmesine imkân vermektedir. Söz konusu düzenleme, hükmün sözünde açıklık olmasa da, sadece taşınırlar üzerinde devralana aynî hak kazandırılması için zilyetliğin devri gereken hâllerde uygulanmalıdır. İsviçre doktrininde savunulan yeni görüşün aksine, zilyetliğin havalesinin bildirimi üzerine, üçüncü kişi ile devreden arasındaki ilişkide devredenin yerini devralanın alması söz konusu değildir. Türk ve İsviçre hukuklarında, kira sözleşmesinin kurulmasından sonra kiralananın devri durumunda, devreden yerine devralanın kiraya veren olması yönünde açık bir düzenleme yer almaktadır. Bu düzenleme kiralananın taşınır veya taşınmaz olması açısından bir fark getirmemektedir. Bu makalede savunulan görüşe göre, kira sözleşmesine dair özel hüküm olmasaydı bile, kiralanan taşınırın mülkiyetinin zilyetliğin havalesi ile devri durumunda üçüncü kişi (kiracı) kiralananı kira süresinin sonuna kadar teslimden kaçınabilirdi. Bu nedenle, taşınır kiraları açısından kiralananın devrine dair özel düzenleme, kiracının irade serbestîsine ölçüsüz bir müdahale teşkil etmektedir.Publication Open Access Turkey-US relations in an age of regional and global turmoil: challenges and prospects introduction(Routledge, 2013) Department of International Relations; Öniş, Ziya; Yılmaz, Şuhnaz Özbağcı; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 7715; 46805Publication Open Access When and whom to join: the expansion of ongoing violent interstate conflicts(Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2014) Joyce, Kyle A.; Ghosn, Faten; Department of International Relations; Bayer, Reşat; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 51395The opportunity and willingness framework has received much attention in research on interstate conflict expansion. This framework is extended here by examining when and what side third parties join during ongoing conflicts. It is maintained that without examining both timing and side selection, understanding of conflict expansion is limited. The timing and side joined in interstate disputes between 1816 and 2001 are analysed using a competing risks duration model. The findings contribute novel insights into many key debates in conflict research such as balancing versus bandwagoning, as well as alliance reliability and the democratic peace. The results also indicate that relying on statistical models that do not distinguish between which side a third party can join may produce misleading results.Publication Open Access Why do people join backlash protests? lessons from Turkey(Sage, 2018) Schiumerini, Luis; Stokes, Susan; Department of International Relations; Aytaç, Selim Erdem; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 224278When people learn that demonstrators are being subjected to harsh treatment by the police, sometimes their reaction is to join demonstrations. What explains the potentially mobilizing power of repression? Information-oriented theories posit that repression changes people's beliefs about the likely success of the protests or the type of the government, thus encouraging them to join. Social-psychological theories posit that repression provokes a moral and emotional reaction from bystanders, and these emotional reactions are mobilizing. Our research offers a rare opportunity to test these theories, empirically, against one another. We offer experimental evidence from Turkey after the 2013 Gezi uprising. In this setting, emotional reactions appear to be the link between repression and backlash mobilization. Information-oriented theories of backlash mobilization may be less germane in democracies, in which people already have access to information about their governments, and in highly polarized polities, in which few people's political affinities are up for grabs.Publication Open Access Mapping civil society in the Middle East: the cases of Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey(Taylor _ Francis, 2012) Department of International Relations; Olcay, Özlem Altan; İçduygu, Ahmet; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A; 207882This article comparatively assesses the meaning of civil society in Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey, by utilising the results of a study conducted among civil society actors. In recent decades, civil society has become integral to discussions of political liberalisation. At the same time, there is a growing rift between international democracy promotion through investment in civil society and the more critical literature on the relationship between the two. This article makes three contributions to these debates by comparing the actual experiences of civil society actors. First, it argues that the boundaries between states and civil societies are indeterminate, making it problematic to expect civil society organisations alone to become catalysts for regime transformation. Second, it shows that expectations of monolithic generation of civic values through civil society organisations do not reflect the actual experience of actors in this realm. Finally, it argues for taking into consideration other sources of mobilisation as potential contributors to meaningful political and social transformation.Publication Open Access Taking sides: determinants of support for a presidential system in Turkey(Routledge, 2017) Department of International Relations; Aytaç, Selim Erdem; Çarkoğlu, Ali; Yıldırım, Kerem; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities; 224278; 125588; N/AA key issue on the Turkish political agenda concerns a transition to presidentialism, with a constitutional amendment proposal submitted in December 2016. While the positions of political elites are well known, we lack a detailed analysis of the electorate's views on such a transition. To fill this gap, we present cross-sectional and panel data collected over the period from spring 2015 to winter 2015-16. Partisanship emerges as the key factor shaping views on presidentialism, and reflections of the centre-periphery cleavage in Turkish politics are also visible. The shift of the Turkish nationalist constituency's views in favour of presidentialism has been a significant trend in the aftermath of the June 2015 general election.Publication Open Access The triumph of conservative globalism: the political economy of the AKP era(Taylor _ Francis, 2012) Department of International Relations; Öniş, Ziya; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 7715The Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP), following its third successive electoral victory appears to be far more entrenched than its earlier center-right counterparts in Turkish politics. This article highlights the key political economy fundamentals that have rendered the AKP experience unique within the Turkish context. Accordingly, strong economic performance in context of ""regulatory neo-liberalism"" helped by a favorable global liquidity environment in the early parts of the decade was a key contributor to the party's continued electoral success. The party also made effective use of a variety of formal and informal redistributive mechanisms, which is referred as ""controlled neo-populism"" in this article, to enlarge its electoral coalition. Furthermore, the fact that Turkey did not suffer a typical old-style economic crisis in the context of the global turmoil of 2008-2009 was important for the AKP's electoral fortunes. Concomitantly, the AKP government was quite effective in managing the global financial crisis politically and it took advantage of its assertive ""new"" foreign policy approach. Finally, this study argues that the AKP also benefited from the fragmented opposition.
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