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Publication Restricted Corruption, democracy, and growth: an empirical analysis(Koç University, 2017) Kimya, Fırat; Aytaç, Selim Erdem; 0000-0002-6544-8717; Koç University Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities; International Relations; 224278Publication Restricted Inclusiveness, contestation and conflict processes(Koç University, 2015) Örsün, Ömer Faruk; Bayer, Reşat; 0000-0002-6566-1622; Koç University Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities; International Relations; 51395Publication Restricted Intra-party competition & party's performance in elections: The leaders' tenure(Koç University, 2008) Şakirler, Mehmet Remzi; Yılmaz, Kamil; 0000-0003-2455-2099; Koç University Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities; Economics; 6111Publication Restricted Lakatosian analysis and evolving conseptions of peace: The story of the democratic peace research program(Koç University, 2011) Ungerer, Jameson Lee; Mousseau, Michael; 0000-0002-7996-4595; Koç University Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities; International RelationsPublication Open Access Mapping civil society in the Middle East: the cases of Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey(Taylor _ Francis, 2012) Department of International Relations; Olcay, Özlem Altan; İçduygu, Ahmet; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A; 207882This article comparatively assesses the meaning of civil society in Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey, by utilising the results of a study conducted among civil society actors. In recent decades, civil society has become integral to discussions of political liberalisation. At the same time, there is a growing rift between international democracy promotion through investment in civil society and the more critical literature on the relationship between the two. This article makes three contributions to these debates by comparing the actual experiences of civil society actors. First, it argues that the boundaries between states and civil societies are indeterminate, making it problematic to expect civil society organisations alone to become catalysts for regime transformation. Second, it shows that expectations of monolithic generation of civic values through civil society organisations do not reflect the actual experience of actors in this realm. Finally, it argues for taking into consideration other sources of mobilisation as potential contributors to meaningful political and social transformation.Publication Restricted Role of business elites in democratic consolidation: Turkey in the light of Spain's experience(Koç University, 2010) Çalımlı, Merve; Öniş, Ziya; 0000-0002-0129-2944; Koç University Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities; International Relations; 7715Publication Open Access Secular state and religious society: two forces in play in Turkey(Oxford University Press (OUP), 2013) Department of International Relations; Somer, Murat; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 110135Publication Open Access Wallets, ballots, or bullets: does wealth, democracy, or military capabilities determine war outcomes?(Wiley, 2013) Henderson, Errol A.; Department of International Relations; Bayer, Reşat; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 51395We examine the extent to which wealth, democracy, and/or relative military capabilities contribute to victory in interstate war. Examining contingency tables, we find that states with greater military capabilities are more likely to win their wars whether they are wealthier or democratic, and democratic states perform marginally better than wealthier states in war. Probit analyses indicate that although each of the variables has a robust and positive impact on war victory, relative capabilities has the strongest substantive impact, followed by wealth, then democracy. Hazard analyses reveal that states with greater military capabilities fight shorter wars than either democracies or wealthier states, and controlling for capabilities and wealth, the relationship between democracy and war duration is not significant, which challenges the view that democracies have a unique propensity to fight shorter wars. We also find that the democratic victory phenomenon is not universal, but is contingent on the placement of a single country, Israel, in the Western or non-Western democracy category. In sum, our analyses indicate that although each of the three factors contributes to war victory, relative military capability is the most powerful, consistent, and robust predictor to victory in interstate war.