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Now showing 1 - 10 of 23
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    PublicationOpen Access
    A principle of universal strife: Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty's critiques of Marxist universalism, 1953-1956
    (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015) Department of Philosophy; Chouraqui, Frank; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities
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    Against phylogenetic conceptions of race
    (Springer, 2023) N/A; Academic Writing Program; Osmanoğlu, Kamuran; Teaching Faculty; Academic Writing Program; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 320685
    Biological racial realism (BRR) continues to be a much-discussed topic, with several recent papers presenting arguments for the plausibility of some type of "biological race." In this paper, the focus will be on the phylogenetic conceptions of race, which is one of the most promising views of BRR, that define races as lineages of reproductively isolated breeding populations. However, I will argue that phylogenetic conceptions of race fail to prove that races are biologically real. I will develop and defend my argument against the phylogenetic views of race by relying on current research in population genetics, human evolution, and social sciences. Ultimately, I will argue that (i) race is not a biologically legitimate category and (ii) philosophers should direct their resources to understand problems that arise due to racialization, and thereby they should find solutions to those problems.
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    Animality in Lacan and Derrida: the deconstruction of the other
    (Springer, 2018) Department of Philosophy; Direk, Zeynep; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 5771
    In The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida's last seminar, Derrida criticizes Lacan for making no room for animality in the Other, in the unconscious transindividual normativity of language. In this paper, I take into account the history of Derrida's interactions with Lacan's psychoanalysis to argue that Derrida's early agreement with Lacan's conception of subjectivity as split by the signifier gives place in his late thought to a deconstruction of Lacan's fall into humanist metaphysics, which makes a sharp moral distinction between the animal and the human in order to subordinate animals to the domination of mankind.
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    Bataille and Kristeva on religion
    (Fordham University Press, 2015) Department of Philosophy; Direk, Zeynep; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 5771
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    Conditional uniqueness
    (inst Philosophy Slovak acad Sciences and inst Philosophy Czech acad Sciences, 2022) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390
    in this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. the moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other.
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    Critical philosophy of race as political phenomenology: questions for Robert Bernasconi
    (Routledge Journals, Taylor and Francis Ltd, 2017) Department of Philosophy; Direk, Zeynep; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 5771
    This article is a response to Robert Bernasconi's critical philosophy of race. I start by speaking of the specific style in which life and philosophy are related in his work. I argue that he devises a political phenomenology which considers the lived experiences of racialization and inquires into their historical conditions, which have become "practico-inert" in facticity. Bernasconi's thesis that the history of race is not determined by racial essentialism and his account of race as a border concept call for an expansion of the notion of race that will better serve the cause of the global fight against racism.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Dilemma for epistemic infinitism
    (Beytulhikme Felsefe Çevresi, 2020) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390
    I argue that epistemic infinitism can offer a non-skeptical stance only by forgoing the very ground for thinking that it is true. / Epistemik sonsuzluğun, ancak, doğru olduğunu düşünmek için zemin hazırlayarak kuşkucu-olmayan bir duruş sunabileceğini iddia ediyorum.
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    Epistemic infinitism and the conditional character of inferential justification
    (Springer, 2018) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities
    In this paper, I will present and defend an argument from the conditional character of inferential justification (the argument from conditionality) against the version of epistemic infinitism Klein advances. More specifically, after proposing a distinction between propositional and doxastic infinitism, which is based on a standard distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, I will describe in considerable detail the argument from conditionality, which is mainly an argument against propositional infinitism, and clarify some of its main underlying assumptions. There are various responses to be found in Klein's works to this argument, and my aim is to show that none of those responses can be plausibly held without infinitism losing its title to being a genuine non-skeptical alternative.
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    Harman on mental paint and the transparency of experience
    (Institute of Philosophy (SAS), 2020) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390
    Harman famously argues that a particular class of anti-functionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing "properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object" and by realizing that the latter are not introspectively accessible (or are transparent). More specifically, Harman argues that we are or can be introspectively aware only of the properties of the object of an experience but not the properties of the experience of an object and hence that the fact that functionalism leaves out the properties of the experience of an object does not show that it leaves out anything mentally relevant. In this paper, I argue that Harman's attempt to defuse the anti-functionalist arguments in question is unsuccessful. After making a distinction between the thesis of experiencing-act transparency and the thesis of mental-paint transparency, (and casting some doubt on the former,) I mainly target the latter and argue that it is false. The thesis of mental-paint transparency is false, I claim, not because mental paint involves some introspectively accessible properties that are different from the properties of the objects of experiences but because what I call the identity thesis is true, viz. that mental paint is the same as (an array of) Properties of the object of experience. The identification of mental paint with properties of the object of experience entails that the anti-functionalist arguments Harman criticizes cannot be rightly accused of committing the fallacy of confusing the two.
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    Human cognitive closure and mysterianism: reply to Kriegel
    (Springer, 2017) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390
    In this paper, I respond to Kriegel's criticism of McGinn's mysterianism (the thesis that humans are cognitively closed with respect to the solution of the mind-body problem). Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.