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Publication Metadata only A test for reverse causality in the democratic peace relationship(Sage, 1999) Shi, Yuhang; Department of International Relations; Mousseau, Michael; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/ASeveral studies have suggested the possibility of reverse causation in the 'democratic peace' relationship: that the well-known extreme rarity of wars between democratic nations may be partially or wholly explained by a negative impact of war on democracy. Three kinds of war-on-regime effects are discussed. Anterior effects are regime changes that occur in preparation for wars; concurrent effects are those that occur during the course of a war; and posterior effects are regime changes that occur after a war concludes. Because studies have shown that democratic nations are rarely, if ever, on opposite sides in wars at their start, it is argued that reversed causation may affect the presence of causation from democracy to peace only if nations tend to become more autocratic as they prepare for impending wars. This proposition is examined with the observation of war events involving geographic neighbors or major powers, worldwide, from 1816 to 1992. With interrupted time-series analysis, it is found that nations are about as likely to become more institutionally autocratic as they are to become more democratic in the periods before the onset of wars. Moreover, this pattern holds even for the smaller subset of nations estimated to be democratic in the periods before major wars. These results indicate that studies of regime type and war participation have not been underspecified due to possible reverse causation before the onset of wars, and thus support the notion that the direction of causation in the democracy and war relationship is unidirectional from democracy to peace.Publication Metadata only Financial globalization, the democratic deficit, and recurrent crises in emerging markets: the Turkish experience in the aftermath of capital account liberalization(Taylor and Francis, 2003) Alper, C. Emre; Department of International Relations; Öniş, Ziya; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 7715Financial globalization offers both risks and benefits for countries of the semi-periphery or "emerging markets." Politics within the national space matters, yet acquires a new meaning, in the age of financial globalization. "Weak democracies" are characterized by limited accountability and transparency of the state and other key political institutions. Such democracies tend to suffer from populist cycles, which result in a low capacity to carry out economic reform. Financial globalization, in turn, magnifies populist cycles and renders their consequences more severe. Hence, "weak democracies" are confronted with the predominantly negative side of financial globalization, which includes overdependence on short-term capital flows, speculative attacks, and recurrent financial crises leading to slow growth and a more regressive income distributional profile. The relevance of these sets of propositions are illustrated with reference to the case of Turkey, which, indeed, experienced recurrent financial crises in the post-capital account liberalization era, with costly consequences for the real economy. Two general conclusions follow. First, there is a need to strengthen democracy in the developing world. Second, since this is hard to accomplish over a short period of time, serious questions are raised concerning the desirability of early exposure to financial globalization given the current state of the world.Publication Metadata only Globalization, democratization and the far right: Turkey's nationalist action party in critical perspective(Taylor and Francis, 2003) N/A; Department of International Relations; Öniş, Ziya; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 7715Ultra-nationalist political parties of the far right have been an endemic feature of European politics in recent years. This article investigates the rise of the Nationalist Action Party (the MHP) in Turkey, a party that has a number of characteristics in common with its European counterparts. The objective of the article is to illustrate a paradox. These types of parties tend to display a considerable degree of adaptability and exhibit a tendency to move in a more moderate direction. They shed some of their violent and extremist leaning in the process as they try to transform themselves from closed communities or networks to mass parties of national standing. This apparent moderation should not disguise, however, the key underlying weakness of such parties, namely their limited commitment to the core values of liberal democracy and political pluralism. Indeed, such parties can continue to play an important negative role in terms of their ability to block the process of democratic deepening in nascent democratic regimes.Publication Metadata only How the wealth of nations conditions the liberal peace(Sage Publications Ltd, 2003) Hegre, H; Oneal, JR; Department of International Relations; Mousseau, Michael; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/AOver the past decade the liberal peace-the finding that democracy and economic interdependence contribute to peace among nations has emerged as one of the strongest and most important results in the scientific study of international relations. Recent research indicates, however, that the pacific benefits of democracy and interdependence may not be unconditional but contingent upon the wealth of nations. We assess the independent and conditional influences of democracy, interdependence and economic development on the likelihood of fatal militarized disputes over the period 1885 to 1992. Economically important trade has an independent, substantively important pacifying effect, but the conflict-reducing effect of democracy depends on the level of economic development. If the less developed state in a dyad has a per capita GDP below 1400USD, joint democracy is not a significant force for peace. Our results indicate that the vast majority of past research on the democratic peace is imperfectly specified because the character of states' political institutions alone does not account for the likelihood of military conflict. To advance further the cause of peace, we must encourage increased global trade and development along with democratic institutions.