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    Critical notice: the science of virtue: a framework for research
    (Wiley, 2024) Zeller, Kaj Andre; Bahçeci, Berker; Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities
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    Dianoia & Plato's divided line
    (Brill, 2022) Department of Philosophy; Storey, Damien; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 293535
    This paper takes a detailed look at the Republic’s Divided Line analogy and considers how we should respond to its most contentious implication: that pistis and dianoia have the same degree of ‘clarity’ (σαφήνεια). It argues that we must take this implication at face value and that doing so allows us to better understand both the analogy and the nature of dianoia.
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    Hegel's world revolutions
    (Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2024) Department of International Relations; Başdaş, Umur; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics
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    Naive realism and phenomenological directness: reply to Millar
    (Springer, 2016) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390
    In this paper, I respond to Millar's recent criticism of na < ve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way) to na < ve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world). I intend to show that Millar's arguments are not convincing.
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    Physicalism and phenomenal concepts
    (Springer, 2013) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390
    Frank Jackson's famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of phenomenal concepts does not imply the metaphysical independence of phenomenal properties, physicalism is safe. This paper distinguishes between two versions of this novel physicalist strategy-Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS)-depending on how it cashes out "conceptual independence," and argues that neither helps the physicalist cause. A dilemma for PCS arises: cashing out "conceptual independence" in a way compatible with physicalism requires abandoning some manifest phenomenological intuitions, and cashing it out in a way compatible with those intuitions requires dropping physicalism. The upshot is that contra Brian Loar and others, one cannot "have it both ways.".