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Publication Open Access Commercial research at universities and career choices of science and engineering doctoral students(Economics Bulletin, 2014) Ecer, Sencer; Huang, Youxin; Department of Economics; Sarpça, Sinan; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 52406Introduction: Herbal medicines are used for different purposes by applying them directly to the skin. Case Report: A 57-year-old female patient presented with erythema and swelling of the left knee. On examination, erythematous and bullous lesions were observed. In the story of 'Ranunculus Scleratus' plants 12 hours knee closed contact of the learned. Diagnosis; Fitokontakt thought of as Dermatitis patients to wet dressing is recommended. 1 month after hyperemia outside of a clinical finding out. Conclusion: Treatment with plants in our community are used as often as incorrect use can lead to harmful effects.
Publication Metadata only Discretionary bonuses and turnover(Elsevier, 2019) Department of Economics; Ekinci, Emre; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 309364This paper develops a signaling model to investigate the effects of discretionary bonuses and wage increases on turnover. When the worker's output is not contractible and the firm privately learns about the match quality between the firm and the worker, bonus payments and wage increases can convey the firm's private information to the worker. If the firm credibly communicates favorable information about the match quality to a worker, the worker develops higher expectations concerning her career outcomes at the firm (such as future wage increases and promotions) and, consequently, becomes less likely to separate. The analysis demonstrates that although a wage increase and a bonus reflect the same information regarding the match quality, each serves a distinctly different role in terms of the worker's turnover decision. Specifically, the firm pays bonuses to signal a good match while using wages to respond to competing offers the worker receives. The model yields testable predictions that concern how bonuses are related to wage increases and promotions and how bonuses and wage increases are related to turnover. The empirical analysis based on the data constructed from the personnel records of a large firm in the financial services industry provides support for the model's implications.Publication Open Access Gender, competitiveness, and socialization at a young age: evidence from a matrilineal and a patriarchal society(Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Press, 2013) Andersen, Steffen; Gneezy, Uri; List, John A.; Maximiano, Sandra; Department of Economics; Ertaç, Seda; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 107102Recent literature presents evidence that men are more competitively inclined than women. Since top-level careers usually require competitiveness, competitiveness differences provide an explanation for gender gaps in wages and differences in occupational choice. A natural question is whether women are born less competitive or whether they become so through the process of socialization. To pinpoint when in the socialization process the difference arises, we compare the competitiveness of children in matrilineal and patriarchal societies. We find that while there is no difference at any age in the matrilineal society, girls become less competitive around puberty in the patriarchal society.Publication Metadata only Has the financial crisis affected the real interest rate dynamics in Europe?(Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH, 2020) Aslanidis, Nektarios; Department of Economics; Demiralp, Selva; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 42533We investigate the effects of the financial crisis on the stationarity of real interest rates for a group of Euro area countries. We use a new unit root test developed by Pesaran et al. (J Econom 115(1): 53–74, 2013) that allows for multiple unobserved factors in a panel set up. In this multifactor framework, we make use of a number of additional variables such as the stock price volatility and monetary policy expectations that are assumed to share common factors with the real interest rate. Based on recursive (Pesaran et al. 2013) test statistics, our results suggest that while short-term and long-term real interest rates were stationary before the financial crisis, they became non-stationary during the crisis period. Robustness analysis shows that the results are not sensitive to the use of ex-post real interest rates versus ex-ante real interest rates.Publication Open Access Market selection and the information content of prices(Wiley, 2021) Ekmekçi, Mehmet; Department of Economics; Atakan, Alp Enver; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 39383We study information aggregation when n bidders choose, based on their private information, between two concurrent common-value auctions. There are k(s) identical objects on sale through a uniform-price auction in market s and there are an additional k(r) objects on auction in market r, which is identical to market s except for a positive reserve price. The reserve price in market r implies that information is not aggregated in this market. Moreover, if the object-to-bidder ratio in market s exceeds a certain cutoff, then information is not aggregated in market s either. Conversely, if the object-to-bidder ratio is less than this cutoff, then information is aggregated in market s as the market grows arbitrarily large. Our results demonstrate how frictions in one market can disrupt information aggregation in a linked, frictionless market because of the pattern of market selection by imperfectly informed bidders.Publication Open Access Optimal sales and production rollover strategies under capacity constraints(Elsevier, 2021) Schwarz, Justus Arne; Department of Business Administration; Tan, Barış; Faculty Member; Department of Business Administration; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 28600Firms regularly replace their old product generation by a newer generation to sustain and increase their market share and profit. The product rollover problem of deciding on the number of old products to be pre-produced before the introduction of the new generation, and then deciding on the prices, sales volumes, and production volumes of the old and the new generation during the introduction under capacity constraint is considered. Production capacity limitations are common during the introduction period of a new product. We provide the first study that examines how a production capacity constraint affects the optimal decisions. The optimal decisions for a deterministic period-based model are provided in closed-form. A single sales/production rollover strategy implies that the sales/production of the old generation is discontinued before introducing the new generation. With a dual sales/production rollover strategy, the old and the new generation are sold/produced simultaneously. Depending on the capacity shortage, there are two types of mitigation actions: (i) increasing the prices, (ii) changing the sales and/or production rollover strategies with pre-production while adjusting the prices accordingly. If the capacity is unlimited, aligned sales and production rollover strategies are always optimal. We establish the conditions under which limited capacity leads to a combination of a single production rollover with a dual sales rollover strategy. We show that the selection of optimal rollover strategies is non-monotone in the available capacity. This implies that a change in the rollover strategy in response to limiting capacity has to be revoked for more severe capacity shortages.Publication Open Access Sharing and cooperativism: designing for economies(Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2020) Fedosov, A.; Bates, O.; Lampinen, A.; Light, A.; Department of Media and Visual Arts; Subaşı, Özge; Faculty Member; Department of Media and Visual Arts; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 240920Recent work on sharing and cooperativism has helped widen our understanding of the emerging systems for exchanges, interactions, and relationships beyond mainstream economic models, in particular through studying local cooperatives and their sharing practices across various domains. These efforts also indicate that design has the potential to shape our engagements with the global political economy. However, so far, there are few design resources tailored for exploring and further developing design insights from empirical and conceptual research on sharing and cooperativism. Therefore, we invite the community to discuss the role of design in relation to economies of sharing and cooperativism. In this workshop, we will gather a diverse group of scholars, designers, and activists to think together how designs for sustainable economies can be created and circulated across cooperatives and platforms, with the aim to springboard social and economic aspects of sharing cultures.Publication Open Access Starting small to communicate(Elsevier, 2020) Kubilay, Elif; Department of Economics; Atakan, Alp Enver; Koçkesen, Levent; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 39383; 37861We analyze a repeated cheap-talk game in which the receiver is privately informed about the conflict of interest between herself and the sender and either the sender or the receiver controls the stakes involved in their relationship. We focus on payoff-dominant equilibria that satisfy a Markovian property and show that if the potential conflict of interest is large, then the stakes increase over time, i.e., “starting small” is the unique equilibrium arrangement. In each period, the receiver plays the sender's ideal action with positive probability and the sender provides full information as long as he has always observed his ideal actions in the past. We also show that as the potential conflict of interest increases, the extent to which the stakes are back-loaded increases, i.e., stakes are initially smaller but grow faster.Publication Open Access Strategic effects of renegotiation-proof contracts(De Gruyter, 2012) Gerratana, Emanuele; Department of Economics; Koçkesen, Levent; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 37861It is well known that non-renegotiable contracts with third parties may have an effect on the outcome of a strategic interaction and thus serve as a commitment device. We address this issue when contracts are renegotiable. More precisely, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of two-stage games with renegotiation-proof third-party contracts in relation to the equilibrium outcomes of the same game without contracts. We assume that one of the parties in the contractual relationship is unable to observe everything that happens in the game when played by the other party. We first show that when contracts are non-renegotiable, the set of equilibrium outcomes of the game with contracts is restricted to a subset of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the original game. Introducing renegotiation, in general, imposes further constraints and in some games implies that only subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the original game can be supported. However, there is a large class of games in which non-subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes can also be supported, and hence, third-party contracts still have strategic implications even when they are renegotiable.