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Now showing 1 - 10 of 22
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    PublicationOpen Access
    A principle of universal strife: Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty's critiques of Marxist universalism, 1953-1956
    (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015) Department of Philosophy; Chouraqui, Frank; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities
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    Against phylogenetic conceptions of race
    (Springer, 2023) N/A; Academic Writing Program; Osmanoğlu, Kamuran; Teaching Faculty; Academic Writing Program; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 320685
    Biological racial realism (BRR) continues to be a much-discussed topic, with several recent papers presenting arguments for the plausibility of some type of "biological race." In this paper, the focus will be on the phylogenetic conceptions of race, which is one of the most promising views of BRR, that define races as lineages of reproductively isolated breeding populations. However, I will argue that phylogenetic conceptions of race fail to prove that races are biologically real. I will develop and defend my argument against the phylogenetic views of race by relying on current research in population genetics, human evolution, and social sciences. Ultimately, I will argue that (i) race is not a biologically legitimate category and (ii) philosophers should direct their resources to understand problems that arise due to racialization, and thereby they should find solutions to those problems.
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    Animality in Lacan and Derrida: the deconstruction of the other
    (Springer, 2018) Department of Philosophy; Direk, Zeynep; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 5771
    In The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida's last seminar, Derrida criticizes Lacan for making no room for animality in the Other, in the unconscious transindividual normativity of language. In this paper, I take into account the history of Derrida's interactions with Lacan's psychoanalysis to argue that Derrida's early agreement with Lacan's conception of subjectivity as split by the signifier gives place in his late thought to a deconstruction of Lacan's fall into humanist metaphysics, which makes a sharp moral distinction between the animal and the human in order to subordinate animals to the domination of mankind.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Dilemma for epistemic infinitism
    (Beytulhikme Felsefe Çevresi, 2020) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390
    I argue that epistemic infinitism can offer a non-skeptical stance only by forgoing the very ground for thinking that it is true. / Epistemik sonsuzluğun, ancak, doğru olduğunu düşünmek için zemin hazırlayarak kuşkucu-olmayan bir duruş sunabileceğini iddia ediyorum.
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    Dretske on non-epistemic seeing
    (Wiley, 2017) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390
    In this article, I make a distinction between two versions of non-epistemicism about seeing, and bring explicitly into view and argue against a particular version defended by Dretske. More specifically, I distinguish non-epistemic seeing as non-conceptual seeing, where concept possession is assumed to be cognitively demanding, from non-epistemic seeing as seeing without noticing, where noticing is assumed to be relatively cognitively undemanding. After showing that Dretske argues for the possibility of non-epistemic seeing in both senses of the term, I target his thesis that a given subject (non-epistemically) sees all the objects that are visually differentiated in her visual field, where visual differentiation does not require that she notice those objects. I argue that the notion of a visual field deployed in the formulation of the thesis cannot be phenomenal and therefore that seeing without noticing amounts to mere visual confrontation (in a sense to be specified). I further argue that since the epistemicist does not (and need not) deny the existence of seeing without noticing in the sense of mere visual confrontation, there is a clear sense in which Dretske's non-epistemicism turns out to be trivial.
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    Dummett and Davidson on the dependence of thought on language
    (Beytulhikme Felsefe Cevresi, 2021) N/A; Department of Philosophy; Özaltun, Eylem; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 219281
    Both Dummett and Davidson believe that language is constitutive of thought. However, they do not believe exactly the same thing. Dummett believes that language is prior to thought, whereas Davidson believes that neither is prior to the other. Still, they share a common core that can be put as follows: language is necessary for thought. In order to understand this claim that I look at their arguments and show that for both philosophers the argument from objectivity is the main argument to secure their conclusion. I argue that for both of them natural language is the source of the objectivity of thoughts.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Epistemic infinitism and the conditional character of inferential justification
    (Springer, 2018) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities
    In this paper, I will present and defend an argument from the conditional character of inferential justification (the argument from conditionality) against the version of epistemic infinitism Klein advances. More specifically, after proposing a distinction between propositional and doxastic infinitism, which is based on a standard distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, I will describe in considerable detail the argument from conditionality, which is mainly an argument against propositional infinitism, and clarify some of its main underlying assumptions. There are various responses to be found in Klein's works to this argument, and my aim is to show that none of those responses can be plausibly held without infinitism losing its title to being a genuine non-skeptical alternative.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Harman on mental paint and the transparency of experience
    (Institute of Philosophy (SAS), 2020) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390
    Harman famously argues that a particular class of anti-functionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing "properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object" and by realizing that the latter are not introspectively accessible (or are transparent). More specifically, Harman argues that we are or can be introspectively aware only of the properties of the object of an experience but not the properties of the experience of an object and hence that the fact that functionalism leaves out the properties of the experience of an object does not show that it leaves out anything mentally relevant. In this paper, I argue that Harman's attempt to defuse the anti-functionalist arguments in question is unsuccessful. After making a distinction between the thesis of experiencing-act transparency and the thesis of mental-paint transparency, (and casting some doubt on the former,) I mainly target the latter and argue that it is false. The thesis of mental-paint transparency is false, I claim, not because mental paint involves some introspectively accessible properties that are different from the properties of the objects of experiences but because what I call the identity thesis is true, viz. that mental paint is the same as (an array of) Properties of the object of experience. The identification of mental paint with properties of the object of experience entails that the anti-functionalist arguments Harman criticizes cannot be rightly accused of committing the fallacy of confusing the two.
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    Human cognitive closure and mysterianism: reply to Kriegel
    (Springer, 2017) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390
    In this paper, I respond to Kriegel's criticism of McGinn's mysterianism (the thesis that humans are cognitively closed with respect to the solution of the mind-body problem). Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    In defense of conditional uniqueness
    (University of Warsaw, 2022) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390
    The Uniqueness Thesis (U), defended by the uniquer and rejected by the permissivist, asserts that, necessarily, there is at most one rational doxastic attitude one can take towards a proposition, given a particular body of evidence. U faces a well-known, paralyzing objection from the permissivist, which I call “the simplicity objection,” which rests on the idea that evidence is not the sole determinant of rationality. In this paper, after maintaining that the ongoing dialectic between the uniquer and the permissivist has led to an exaggeration of differences, I bring into focus another, non-equivalent yet substantive (non-trivial) thesis in the vicinity, which I call “the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis” (U*), according to which if evidence is the sole determinant of rationality, then U is true. The hope is to achieve a rapprochement between the uniquer and the permissivist by showing that U* is true. To this end, I examine the argument Roger White offers in favor of U, which I call “the argument from evidential support” (AES), and argue that it is both unpersuasive for the defender of the simplicity objection and unnecessarily strong for establishing its own conclusion. I then offer a sufficiently weakened version of AES, which I call AES*, and argue that AES* is sound, if interpreted as an argument for U*.