Organizational Unit: Department of Philosophy
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Publication Metadata only Sex, wealth, and courage: kinds of goods and the power of appearance in plato's protagoras(Philosophy Documentation Center, 2018) Department of Philosophy; Storey, Damien; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 293535I offer a reading of the two conceptions of the good found in Plato’s Protagoras: the popular conception—‘the many’s’ conception—and Socrates’ conception. I pay particular attention to the three kinds of goods Socrates introduces: (a) bodily pleasures like food, drink, and sex; (b) instrumental goods like wealth, health, or power; and (c) virtuous actions like courageously going to war. My reading revises existing views about these goods in two ways. First, I argue that the many are only ‘hedonists’ in a very attenuated sense. They do not value goods of kind (b) simply as means to pleasures of kind (a); rather, they have fundamentally different attitudes to (a) and (b). Second, the hedonism that Socrates’ defends includes a distinction between kinds of pleasures: (a) bodily pleasures and (c) the pleasures of virtuous actions. This distinction between kinds of pleasures—some that do and some that do not exert the ‘power of appearance’—allows Socrates to address one of the central beliefs in the popular conception of akrasia, namely that it involves a special kind of unruly desire: non-rational appetites for pleasures like food, drink, or sex. Socrates replaces the motivational push of non-rational appetites with the epistemic pull of the appearance of immediate pleasures like food, drink, and sex.Publication Metadata only Between Socrates and Kant. Thinking and sensus communis in Arendt's conception of the banality of evil(Edizioni Ets, 2017) Department of Philosophy; Roney, Patrick; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; N/AThe aim of this paper is to show how Hannah Arendt develops her concept of the banality of evil through a phenomenological appropriation of Kant's theory of judgment and of the principle of sensus communis in particular. Even though Arendt initially defined the banality of evil as a form of thoughtlessness grounded upon her understanding of thinking as an inner dialogue with one's 'other' self, I argue that she develops the concept much more extensively in relation to Kant's doctrine of reflective judgment and the possibility of a sensus communis as a pre-conceptual model of unforced consensus for the public space. I further argue that her reading of Kant is carried out together with both an existential-ontological re-appraisal of appearances and its relation to the transcendental imagination. Through the emphasis on the sensus communis, the banality of evil can then be re-defined as a refusal of the same.Publication Metadata only Sloterdijk’s anthropotechnics(Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2021) Roney, Patrick; Department of Philosophy; Rossi, Andrea; Teaching Faculty; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; N/AN/APublication Metadata only Consciousness as objective activity: a historical-genetic approach(Guilford Publications Inc, 2011) Department of Philosophy; Azeri, Siyaveş; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; N/AMental phenomena and consciousness can be located in sign and in language. Since these latter belong to the objective world of human interaction, consciousness emerges as a part of objectivity. A sign is the product of the interaction between consciousnesses. Thus, admitting the existence of the sign presumes the existence of action. Activity is a social phenomenon; thus, it is objective. It is the objectivization of human needs and desires as production and reproduction of these needs in society. Human consciousness emerges as co-knowing or co-consciousness through linguistic activity. Consciousness as co-knowing emphasizes the genesis of human subjectivity not as a mere assertion but as something the existence of which is to be shown. Consciousness and selfhood, thus, appear as objective, mediating but subjective action. In this view, the self is emancipated consciousness. Therefore, the psyche emerges as the subjective image of objectivity.Publication Metadata only What is the moral of davidson's carbon copier? Towards an anscombean account of practical knowledge(Routledge, 2022) N/A; Department of Philosophy; Özaltun, Eylem; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 219281N/APublication Metadata only Conditional uniqueness(inst Philosophy Slovak acad Sciences and inst Philosophy Czech acad Sciences, 2022) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390in this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. the moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other.Publication Metadata only Can we "effectivize" spacetime?(Elsevier Sci Ltd, 2022) Department of Philosophy; Chen, Lu; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 329122According to effective realism, scientific theories give us knowledge about the unobservable world, but not at the fundamental level. This view is supported by the well-received effective -field-theory (EFT) approach to high energy physics, according to which even our most successful physical theories are only applicable up to a certain energy scale and expected to break down beyond that. In this paper, I advance new challenges for effective realism and the EFT approach. I argue that effective quantum gravity (EQG) does not give us a realistic theory of spacetime even within its scope of validity. This also exposes a general interpretative dilemma faced by all EFTs concerning their indispensable references to classical spacetime beyond their scope of validity.Publication Metadata only Reasons, rationalization, and rationality(Springer) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390In this paper, I provide an answer to the question "what is it for a reason to be the reason for which a belief is held?" After arguing against the causal account of the reason-for-which connection, I present what I call the rationalization account, according to which a reason R a subject S has for a belief P is the reason for which S holds P just in case R is the premise in S's rationalization for P, where the argument from R to P becomes S's rationalization in virtue of her endorsing it. In order to bring explicitly into view the version of the rationalization account I aim to argue for, I draw two distinctions, one between occurrent and dispositional endorsement and the other between personal and public endorsement. I show that the version of the rationalization account thus clarified receives intuitive support from various cases and survives some formidable objections that might be tempting to level against it.Publication Metadata only Negative dialectics as a new way of listening(Pinhan Yayıncılık, 2020) Department of Philosophy; Şimşon, Elis; Teaching Faculty; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 184354This article is centered on the claim that the entire philosophical enterprise of Theodor W. Adorno could be construed as an effort to develop and employ a new way of listening, which is modeled on Schoenberg’s “New Music” which celebrates the “emancipation of dissonance.” New music allows the unresolved and unreconciled social antagonisms to be heard. The experience of listening provided by new music lies at the very foundation of his thinking as the motor of his philosophy. Governed by the mechanisms ofconceptualization,inwhicheverythingthatisnon-conceptualis eliminated or destructed, identity thinking represents a certain way of doing philosophy, which strives for the reconciliation of the contradictions. However, “negative dialectics,” reveals itself to be a never-ending self-interrogation of philosophy by making the non-conceptual the main issue of the concept itself, thus signaling at a “new” way of doing philosophy. What is new is precisely this new way of listening adopted by non-identity thinking, which allows us to remain at a critical distance towards the possibility reconciliation promised by identity thinking. By this new way of listening, our ears become attuned to hearing the repressed suffering of the singular and the non-conceptual within the totality. / Bu çalışmanın odağındaki iddia, Theodor W. Adorno’nun tüm felsefi çabasının yeni bir dinleme biçimi geliştirme teşebbüsü olarak okunabileceğini ileri sürer. Bu yeni dinleme biçimi,modelini, Arnold Schoenberg’in “disonansın özgürleşimi”ilkesine dayanan “Yeni Müzik”ten alır.Yeni Müzik, dinleyicisini bir şok etkisiyle yüzleştirerek çözülmeyen, uzlaştırılmayan, uysallaştırılmayan toplumsal çelişkileri duyulur kılar ve bunların üzerini örtmek için her an seferber olan rahatlatıcı ve regresif dinleme biçimlerini sürekli kesintiye uğratır. Adorno’nun müzik yazılarında detaylandırdığı bu yeni duyma ve dinleme biçiminin, yalnızca müzikle sınırlı kalmadığını, bunu felsefi düşüncesinin temeline yerleştirdiğini Negatif Diyalektik adlı eserinde görmek mümkündür. Kavram dışı olan şeyin yok sayıldığı, eritildiği, saf dışı bırakıldığı ve hatta katledildiği özdeşlik düşüncesi belirli bir felsefe yapma biçimine işaret eder; çelişkilerin uzlaştırıldığı bir diyalektiktir bu. Adorno’nun “negatif diyalektik” olarak adlandırdığı ise, esasen, kavram dışı olanın kavramın en önemli meselesi haline gelmesi itibarıyla “yeni” bir felsefe yapma biçimidir. Burada “yeni” olan, felsefenin yeni bir dinleme stratejisi benimsemesidir. Bu dinleme biçimi bizi özdeşliğin vaat ettiği uzlaşmaya karşı eleştirel bir mesafede tutacak olan şeydir; dolayısıyla bu dinleme biçimi sayesinde kulağımız bütünlük ve nesnellik içinde sakatlanan, kavram dışı diye yaftalanıp sessizliğe gömülen, dilsizleştirilen tekilliğin ıstırabını ve acı çığlıklarını duymaya yatkınlaşacaktır.Publication Metadata only On an argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure(Springer, 2016) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390In this paper, I aim to show that McGinn's argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.