Researcher:
Canbolat, Pelin Gülşah

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Pelin Gülşah

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Canbolat

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Canbolat, Pelin Gülşah

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2017 - 201942020 - 20212

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    Bounded rationality in clearing service systems
    (Elsevier, 2020) Department of Industrial Engineering; Canbolat, Pelin Gülşah; Faculty Member; Department of Industrial Engineering; College of Engineering; 108242
    This paper considers a clearing service system where customers arrive according to a Poisson process, and decide to join the system or to balk in a boundedly rational manner. It assumes that all customers in the system are served at once when the server is available and times between consecutive services are independently and identically distributed random variables. Using logistic quantal-response functions to model bounded rationality, it first characterizes customer utility and system revenue for fixed price and degree of rationality, then solves the pricing problem of a revenue-maximizing system administrator. The analysis of the resulting expressions as functions of the degree of rationality yields several insights including: (i) for an individual customer, it is best to be perfectly rational if the price is fixed; however, when customers have the same degree of rationality and the administrator prices the service accordingly, a finite nonzero degree of rationality uniquely maximizes customer utility, (ii) system revenue grows arbitrarily large as customers tend to being irrational, (iii) social welfare is maximized when customers are perfectly rational, (iv) in all cases, at least 78% of social welfare goes to the administrator. The paper also considers a model where customers are heterogeneous with respect to their degree of rationality, explores the effect of changes in distributional parameters of the degree of rationality for fixed service price, provides a characterization for the revenue-maximizing price, and discusses the analytical difficulties arising from heterogeneity in the degree of bounded rationality. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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    Pricing in a transportation station with strategic customers
    (Wiley, 2017) N/A; Department of Industrial Engineering; Department of Industrial Engineering; Department of Industrial Engineering; Manou, Athanasia; Canbolat, Pelin Gülşah; Karaesmen, Fikri; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Department of Industrial Engineering; College of Engineering; College of Engineering; College of Engineering; N/A; 108242; 3579
    We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process, observe the delay information and the fee imposed by the administrator and decide whether to use the facility or not. a transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves all present customers at each visit. We assume that every customer maximizes her individual expected utility and the administrator is a profit maximizer. We model this situation as a two-stage game among the customers and the administrator, where customer strategies depend on the level of delay information provided by the administrator. We consider three cases distinguished by the level of delay information: observable (the exact waiting time is announced), unobservable (no information is provided) and partially observable (the number of waiting customers is announced). in each case, we explore how the customer reward for service, the unit waiting cost, and the intervisit time distribution parameters affect the customer behavior and the fee imposed by the administrator. We then compare the three cases and show that the customers almost always prefer to know their exact waiting times whereas the administrator prefers to provide either no information or the exact waiting time depending on system parameters.
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    Risk-sensitive control of branching processes
    (Taylor and Francis inc, 2021) Department of Industrial Engineering; Canbolat, Pelin Gülşah; Faculty Member; Department of Industrial Engineering; College of Engineering; 108242
    This article solves the risk-sensitive control problem for branching processes where the one-period progeny of an individual can take values from a finite set. the decision maker is assumed to maximize the expected risk-averse exponential utility (or to minimize the expected risk-averse exponential disutility) of the rewards earned in an infinite horizon. individuals are assumed to produce progeny independently, and with the same probability mass function if they take the same action. This article characterizes the expected disutility of stationary policies, identifies necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a stationary optimal policy that assigns the same action to all individuals in all periods, and discusses computational methods to obtain such a policy. are available for this article. See the publisher's online edition of IIE Transactions, datasets, Additional tables, detailed proofs, etc.
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    Finite-horizon Markov population decision chains with constant risk posture
    (Wiley, 2018) White, Amanda M; Department of Industrial Engineering; Canbolat, Pelin Gülşah; Faculty Member; Department of Industrial Engineering; College of Engineering; 108242
    A Markov population decision chain concerns the control of a population of individuals in different states by assigning an action to each individual in the system in each period. This article solves the problem of finding policies that maximize expected system utility over a finite horizon in Markov population decision chains with finite state-action space under the following assumptions: (1) The utility function exhibits constant risk posture, (2) the progeny vectors of distinct individuals are independent, and (3) the progeny vectors of individuals in a state who take the same action are identically distributed. The main result is that it is possible to solve the problem with the original state-action space without augmenting it to include information about the population in each state or any other aspect of the system history. In particular, there exists an optimal policy that assigns the same action to all individuals in a given state and period, independently of the population in that period and such a policy can be computed efficiently. The optimal utility operators that find the maximum of a finite collection of polynomials (rather than affine functions) yield an optimal solution with effort linear in the number of periods. (c) 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 65: 580-593, 2018
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    Stochastic contests with linex utility functions
    (İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2019) Department of Industrial Engineering; Canbolat, Pelin Gülşah; Faculty Member; Department of Industrial Engineering; College of Engineering; 108242
    In this paper, we analyze the Nash equilibrium in a class of winner-takes-all stochastic contests among players with linearexponential (linex) utility functions. In this contest, players are required to make upfront investments, which collectively determine their winning probabilities. We first show that a Nash equilibrium for such a contest exists and is unique, then set the equilibrium conditions, and study the properties of these conditions to gain insights into the structure of equilibrium. We show that the total equilibrium investment is bounded below and above, that the equilibrium has a cut characterization with respect to wealth, and that wealthier players invest more. The latter implies that richer is likely to get richer. For the special case with identical players, we show that an increase in the wealth or a decrease in the weight on the nonlinear component of the linex utility function results in an increase in the equilibrium investment. / Öz: Bu çalışmada tercihleri doğrusal-üstel yarar fonksiyonları ile belirlenen oyuncular arasında gerçekleşen ve tek kazananın olduğu yarışmaları incelenmektedir. Modelde oyuncuların yarışmanın başında yatırımlarını belirledikleri ve bütün bu yatırımların beraberce her bir oyuncunun kazanma olasılığını belirlediği varsayılmaktadır. Öncelikle bu modelin tek bir Nash dengesinin olduğunu gösterilmekte, ardından denge koşullarını belirlenip bu koşulların özellikleri incelenerek dengenin yapısı hakkında çıkarımlarda bulunulmaktadır. Bu çıkarımlar arasında dengede toplam yatırımın alt ve üst sınırlarının bulunduğu, yatırımların oyuncuların başlangıçtaki zenginliklerine göre bir kesi şeklinde gösterilebileceği, zengin oyuncuların daha fazla yatırım yaptıkları, dolayısıyla zenginlerin yarışmanın sonunda büyük olasılıkla daha da zengin olacakları yer almaktadır. Bunlar dışında, oyuncuların eşit zenginliğe sahip olduğu özel durumlarda zenginlikte bir artışın veya yarar fonksiyonunun doğrusal olmayan kısmının ağırlığında bir azalmanın yatırımlarda artışa neden olduğu kanıtlanmaktadır.
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    Constant risk aversion in stochastic contests with exponential completion times
    (Wiley, 2019) Rothblum, Uriel G.; Department of Industrial Engineering; Canbolat, Pelin Gülşah; Faculty Member; Department of Industrial Engineering; College of Engineering; 108242
    This article analyzes a class of stochastic contests among multiple players under risk-averse exponential utility. In these contests, players compete over the completion of a task by simultaneously deciding on their investment, which determines how fast they complete the task. The completion time of the task for each player is assumed to be an exponentially distributed random variable with rate linear in the player's investment and the completion times of different players are assumed to be stochastically independent. The player that completes the task first earns a prize whereas the remaining players earn nothing. The article establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the Nash equilibrium of this contest with respect to risk-averse exponential utilities and the nonnegative solution of a nonlinear equation. Using the properties of the latter, it proves the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, and provides an efficient method to compute it. It exploits the resulting representation of the equilibrium investments to determine the effects of risk aversion and the differences between the outcome of the Nash equilibrium and that of a centralized version.(c) 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 66:4-14, 2019