Researcher:
Carlson, David George

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David George

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Carlson

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Carlson, David George

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2021 - 20224

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Researcher Of Publications: search.filters.isAuthorOfPublication.592a32f8-fd46-44a3-8465-ebf1dcc30229

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    Generation me: an intra-nationally bounded generational explanation for convergence and divergence in personal vs. social focus cultural value orientations
    (Elsevier Science Inc, 2022) Ergin, Canan; Ceylan, Savaş; Department of Business Administration; Department of International Relations; Marcus, Justin; Carlson, David George; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Department of Business Administration; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 124653; N/A
    Responding to calls by international business scholars to examine contextual factors driving cultural change in developing and traditionally collectivistic countries, we examine cultural values shift in one such country, Turkey, from 1998 to 2019. Confirming study hypotheses, results evidenced a trajectory toward individualism. The percentage of respondents endorsing personal focus values in 2019 was over double that in 2009. Generational differences drove this shift - Late Millennials (born 1992-2001) in 2019 were over twice as likely to endorse personal over social focus values as same-age Early Millennials (born 1982-1991) in 2009. These trends were most pronounced in the most urbanized Turkish provinces.
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    Electoral support and militants' targeting strategies
    (Sage, 2022) Aksoy, Deniz; Department of International Relations; Carlson, David George; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
    Militant groups that are in armed conflict with a government often coexist with political parties that have ethnic or ideological connections to them. In this article, we explore the extent to which electoral support received by militant associated opposition parties and nationally incumbent political parties influences subnational variation in militant attacks. We argue, and empirically demonstrate, that militants strategically target localities where the levels of electoral support for the opposition party and the nationally incumbent party are close in an effort to negatively influence the electoral performance of the incumbent party. To illustrate this dynamic we examine subnational data from 1995 to 2015 Turkish legislative elections and attacks organized by the Kurdish militants within the same time period. We also examine the impact of June 2015 legislative elections on militant attacks until the snap elections in November 2015. Our empirical examination shows that militants target localities where electoral support for the governing party and Kurdish opposition party is close. Moreover, increase in violence negatively influences the electoral performance of the governing party. However, it does not consistently have a significant influence on the opposition. The findings illustrate that militants strategically choose the location of their attacks based on electoral dynamics, and attacks can pose an electoral challenge to the governing party.
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    The role of democratic governance and indirect expropriation in international investment treaty violations
    (Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi Derneği, 2021) Ziegler, Jeffrey; Department of International Relations; Carlson, David George; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
    Democracies are thought to violate treaties less frequently than non-democracies, yet democracies violate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) just as often as non-democracies. Though democratic governments may intend to meet their international obligations, and though democratic institutions provide greater political constraints to encourage compliance, investment agreements may conflict with the goal of maintaining domestic public support. Specifically, we argue that credible elections create strong incentives for governments to side with domestic voters, and to pass legislation that violates investment agreements. The results suggest that the ability of voters to sanction leaders is an important mechanism that incentivizes governments to pass legislation that potentially violates investment treaties through indirect expropriation. / Öz: Demokratik rejimlerin, yaptıkları anlaşmaları demokratik olmayan rejimlerden daha nadir olarak ihlal ettikleri varsayılır; fakat demokratik rejimler, iki taraflı yatırım anlaşmalarını demokratik olmayan rejimler kadar sık ihlal eder. Demokratik hükümetler uluslararası yükümlülüklerini yerine getirme niyetinde olsa ve demokratik kurumlar bu yükümlülüklere riayeti destekleyen daha fazla siyasi kısıtlama sağlasa da yatırım anlaşmaları, yurtiçinde kamuoyu desteğini devam ettirme hedefleriyle çatışabilir. Bu çalışmada, meşru seçimlerin, hükümetleri yurtiçindeki seçmenlerin yanında durmaya ve yatırım anlaşmalarını ihlal eden yasalar geçirmeye teşvik ettiğini savunmaktayız. Araştırmamızın sonuçları gösteriyor ki seçmenlerin yöneticiler üzerinde yaptırım gücüne sahip olması, hükümetleri yatırım anlaşmalarını dolaylı kamulaştırma yoluyla ihlal edebilecek yasalar geçirmeye yönlendiren önemli bir teşvik mekanizması yaratıyor.
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    The role of democratic governance and indirect expropriation in international investment treaty violations
    (International Relations Council of Turkey (IRCT) / Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi Derneği, 2021) Ziegler, Jeffrey; Department of International Relations; Carlson, David George; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics
    Democracies are thought to violate treaties less frequently than non-democracies, yet democracies violate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) just as often as non-democracies. Though democratic governments may intend to meet their international obligations, and though democratic institutions provide greater political constraints to encourage compliance, investment agreements may conflict with the goal of maintaining domestic public support. Specifically, we argue that credible elections create strong incentives for governments to side with domestic voters, and to pass legislation that violates investment agreements. The results suggest that the ability of voters to sanction leaders is an important mechanism that incentivizes governments to pass legislation that potentially violates investment treaties through indirect expropriation. / Demokratik rejimlerin, yaptıkları anlaşmaları demokratik olmayan rejimlerden daha nadir olarak ihlal ettikleri varsayılır; fakat demokratik rejimler, iki taraflı yatırım anlaşmalarını demokratik olmayan rejimler kadar sık ihlal eder. Demokratik hükümetler uluslararası yükümlülüklerini yerine getirme niyetinde olsa ve demokratik kurumlar bu yükümlülüklere riayeti destekleyen daha fazla siyasi kısıtlama sağlasa da yatırım anlaşmaları, yurtiçinde kamuoyu desteğini devam ettirme hedefleriyle çatışabilir. Bu çalışmada, meşru seçimlerin, hükümetleri yurtiçindeki seçmenlerin yanında durmaya ve yatırım anlaşmalarını ihlal eden yasalar geçirmeye teşvik ettiğini savunmaktayız. Araştırmamızın sonuçları gösteriyor ki seçmenlerin yöneticiler üzerinde yaptırım gücüne sahip olması, hükümetleri yatırım anlaşmalarını dolaylı kamulaştırma yoluyla ihlal edebilecek yasalar geçirmeye yönlendiren önemli bir teşvik mekanizması yaratıyor