Researcher:
Veziroğlu, Cem

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Cem

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Veziroğlu

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Veziroğlu, Cem

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2018 - 20194

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    Arbitration of corporate law disputes in joint stock companies under Turkish law: A2 comparative analysis
    (De Gruyter, 2019) Veziroğlu, Cem; Faculty Member; Law School; 265198
    This study addresses the arbitrability of corporate law disputes and the validity of arbitration clauses stipulated in the articles of association (AoA) of joint stock companies, and compares Turkish law with German and Swiss jurisdictions in particular. While corporate law disputes are considered arbitrable, disputes concerning invalidity of corporate decisions and actions for dissolution are heavily debated. The paper argues that both types of disputes are arbitrable, albeit judicial dissolution requests accommodate practical hurdles. It is also argued that arbitral awards should be granted the erga omnes effect, as long as the interested third parties are provided with the necessary procedural protection. Furthermore, arbitration clauses can be validly stipulated in the AoA of privately held joint stock companies. However, the binding effect of the arbitration clause in question depends on its legal nature, namely, korporative or formell. Addressing this issue, the paper proposes to adopt a two-step test. Finally, it suggests practicable legislative recommendations and a model arbitration clause in order to enable and facilitate arbitration in corporate law disputes.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Do dividend distributions and dividend commitments of a target company violate the prohibition of financial assistance (TCC Article 380/1)?
    (İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2018) Paslı, Ali; Veziroğlu, Cem; Faculty Member; Law School; 265198
    Pursuant to Turkish Commercial Code ("TCC") Article 380 paragraph 1, "[L]egal transactions concluded between the company and another person for acquisition of its shares and the subject of which is granting of advance, loan or security, shall be null and void." According to this provision, a public company cannot provide financial assistance to a third party with a view to acquiring its shares. This article examines a target company's dividend payout or commitment to its buyer (who would be a shareholder following an acquisition of the target company's shares) that is financed by a bank loan or from its retained earnings (i.e., without using any external source). We ask whether use of such funds in acquisition finance constitute "financial assistance" in the meaning of TCC 380/1. According to TCC, the prohibition of financial assistance applies only if three conditions exist cumulatively: (1) There must be an acquisition of shares; (2) there must be a financial assistance transaction, and (3) financial assistance must be made for the acquisition of shares. Therefore, the aforementioned transactional mechanism must be filtered through these three conditions. In our view, dividend payouts or commitments to the buyer following her share acquisition does not violate the prohibition of financial assistance, regardless of whether such amount is funded by a bank loan or the company's retained earnings. Using profits distributed by the target company in order to finance the acquisiton of the target company's shares makes no differrence according to our analysis. It is also possible that a commitment may be given for the target company's dividend payout in certain periods and for certain amounts in order to ensure repayment of the credit provided for the acquisition. The obligor of the said commitment may be the buyer or the target company (as a legal entity). If the target company is the obligor, the consequences for violating the commitment will vary according to the modality of the undertaking. Nonetheless, we believe that the target company's dividend payout must be made in compliance with the rules and procedures laid down by the TCC and by the company's articles of association. Otherwise, in addition to sanctions with respect to distribution of profit (TCC 512), the prohibition of financial assistance may step in. Hence, both the general assembly's resolution towards dividend payout and the payment of dividend (act of disposal) may be considered null and void regardless of whether the buyer's receipt of the dividend was wrongful and in bad faith. / 6102 sayılı Türk Ticaret Kanunu’nun (“TTK”) 380. maddesinin 1. fıkrası uyarınca “[P]aylarının iktisap edilmesi amacıyla, şirketin başka bir kişiyle yaptığı, konusu avans, ödünç veya teminat verilmesi olan hukuki işlemler batıldır”. Anılan hüküm, payları üçüncü kişi tarafından iktisap edilen anonim ortaklığın alıcıya finansal yardımda bulunmasını yasaklamaktadır. İşbu makalede incelediğimiz husus hedef anonim ortaklığın bir bankadan kredi temin etmesinin ardından söz konusu meblağı, yahut dış finansman kullanmaksızın birikmiş kârını, şirketin paylarını iktisap ederek pay sahibi sıfatını kazanan alıcıya kâr dağıtımı yoluyla aktarması ve bu kaynağın devralma işleminin finansmanında kullanılmasının TTK 380/1 anlamında “finansal yardım” sayılıp sayılmayacağıdır. Finansal yardım yasağının uygulama alanı bulabilmesi için şu üç şartın bir arada bulunması gerekmektedir. Bunlar; (1) pay iktisabı, (2) finansal yardım işlemi ve (3) finansal yardımın alıcının pay iktisabı amacıyla yapılmasıdır. O halde yukarıda açıklanan işlem örgüsü de bu üç şartın süzgecinden geçirilmelidir. Kanımızca bir bankanın anonim ortaklığa kredi temin etmesi ve söz konusu kredinin, anonim ortaklığın paylarını iktisap ederek pay sahibi sıfatını kazanan alıcıya kâr dağıtımı yoluyla aktarılması, yahut zaten hedef şirketin malvarlığına dâhil olan mevcut kaynağın kâr dağıtımı suretiyle alıcıya tahsis edilmesi TTK 380/1’de düzenlenen finansal yardım yasağının kapsamına girmemektedir. Ulaştığımız bu sonuç açısından, hedef şirketin nakit ihtiyacı sebebiyle bankanın sağlayacağı kredi neticesinde hedef şirketin dağıtacağı kârın, yine hedef şirketin paylarının iktisabı amacıyla kullanılacak olması da hiçbir fark yaratmamaktadır. Aynı şekilde, hedef şirketin paylarının iktisabının ve bunun finansmanı için sağlanan kredinin geri ödenmesini teminen, hedef şirketin belirli süreler içinde ve belirli oranlarda kâr dağıtımı yapacağına dair bir taahhüdün verilmiş olması da mümkündür. Söz konusu taahhüdün yükümlüsü alıcı olabileceği gibi, hedef şirket tüzel kişiliği de olabilir. Yükümlülüğün şirket üzerinde olması şeklindeki ikinci ihtimalde taahhüde aykırılığın sonuçları, taahhüdün veriliş şekline göre değişiklik gösterecektir. Ancak bunun için, hedef şirket nezdinde yapılacak kâr dağıtımının TTK ve esas sözleşmede öngörülen usul ve esaslara riayet edilerek gerçekleştirilmesi gerekmektedir. Aksi hâlde hedef şirket tarafından pay sahibine yapılacak malvarlığı aktarımına ilişkin kâr dağıtımını düzenleyen hükümlerde öngörülen yaptırımlara (TTK 512) ek olarak, finansal yardım yasağının da uygulanması riski doğabilecektir. Keza bu durumda pay sahibi konumundaki alıcının, kâr payını haksız yere ve kötü niyetle alıp almadığına bakılmaksızın, hem genel kurulun kâr payı dağıtım kararı hem de tasarruf işlemi niteliğindeki hedef şirketin temettü ödeme işlemleri kesin hükümsüz sayılabilecektir.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Arbitration of corporate law disputes in joint stock companies under Turkish law: a comparative analysis
    (De Gruyter, 2019) N/A; Veziroğlu, Cem; Faculty Member; Law School; 265198
    This study addresses the arbitrability of corporate law disputes and the validity of arbitration clauses stipulated in the articles of association (AoA) of joint stock companies, and compares Turkish law with German and Swiss jurisdictions in particular. While corporate law disputes are considered arbitrable, disputes concerning invalidity of corporate decisions and actions for dissolution are heavily debated. The paper argues that both types of disputes are arbitrable, albeit judicial dissolution requests accommodate practical hurdles. It is also argued that arbitral awards should be granted the erga omnes effect, as long as the interested third parties are provided with the necessary procedural protection. Furthermore, arbitration clauses can be validly stipulated in the AoA of privately held joint stock companies. However, the binding effect of the arbitration clause in question depends on its legal nature, namely, korporative or formell. Addressing this issue, the paper proposes to adopt a two-step test. Finally, it suggests practicable legislative recommendations and a model arbitration clause in order to enable and facilitate arbitration in corporate law disputes.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Buy-out of the oppressed minority's shares in joint stock companies: a comparative analysis of Turkish, Swiss and English law
    (Springer, 2018) N/A; Veziroğlu, Cem; Faculty Member; Law School
    Article 531 of the Turkish Commercial Code grants the right to request corporate dissolution for just causes to shareholders representing at least 10% of the capital in joint stock companies, and 5% in publicly traded companies. In addition to dissolution, the court can order purchase of the claimant's shares at real value (buy-out remedy) or adopt a different solution. This article conducts an economic analysis of the buy-out remedy against minority oppression and compares Turkish law with Swiss and English legislation. The buy-out remedy is supposed to provide an ex post control on the controller's conduct, and it is expected to function as a put option conditional upon oppression. However, the current provision does not provide the expected incentives. Addressing this issue, I suggest that: (1) the relief sought by the claimant should be taken into account; (2) the purchaser of the claimant's shares should be the oppressive controller, rather than the company in question; (3) the standard of 'just cause' to be proven should not be equal for each remedy, and thus, the courts should be able to give a buy-out order even if the facts do not justify corporate dissolution; (4) dissolution orders should not be given in cases where there is a going-concern value to protect; and finally, (5) the valuation of the claimant's shares should, in principle, be made on a going concern and pro rata basis, and any depreciation of the claimant's shares due to the controller's abusive conducts should be taken into account.