Researcher:
Mousseau, Michael

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Michael

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Researcher Of Publications: search.filters.isAuthorOfPublication.ae576b43-7fb0-4985-b803-40bdec4e029b

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Now showing 1 - 10 of 19
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    Coming to terms with the capitalist peace
    (Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2010) N/A; Department of International Relations; Mousseau, Michael; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
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    The sources of terrorism
    (Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Press, 2003) Knight, Charles; Murphy, Melissa; Department of International Relations; Mousseau, Michael; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
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    Market prosperity, democratic consolidation, and democratic peace
    (Sage, 2000) Department of International Relations; Mousseau, Michael; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
    A model is introduced that yields a single parsimonious explanation for a diverse range of political phenomena, including the processes of democratic consolidation and peace among democratic nations. The model predicts democratic values to arise from the norms of contract that are endemic in developed market economies and yields the novel contingent claim that the peace among democratic nations may be a pattern limited to those democracies with developed economies. Analyses of a large number of interstate dyads from 1950 to 1992 show strong support for this hypothesis. It seems that the pacifying impact of democracy is about twice as strong among developed countries compared with other dyads. Among conflict-prone contiguous dyads, the pacifying impact of democracy does not appear statistically significant among the poorest decile of joint democratic dyads. The study demonstrates the wide explanatory power of the simple postulate that social values and political preferences derive from socioeconomic norms.
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    Comparing new theory with prior beliefs market civilization and the democratic peace
    (Routledge, 2008) N/A; Department of International Relations; Mousseau, Michael; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
    Stuart Bremer counseled against the falsificationist convention of testing new models against the null hypothesis of no model. Instead, new models should be compared against prior beliefs, and theories should compete, whenever possible, on afield of equivalent test conditions. This article applies Stuart Bremer's notion of comparative theory testing by comparing a new model of contract norms with the prior institutionalist model of democratic peace. On afield of equivalent test conditions it is found that the hypothesis for contract norms (that the democratic peace is contingent upon economic development) is thousands of times more likely to be true than the hypothesis for institutionalist theory (that democracy pacifies all dyads regardless of economic conditions). Democracy appears to be a significant force for peace only in dyads that are above the median income: the richest 45%. The results indicate that scholars of war should update the widespread prior belief that democracy, alone, causes peace.
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    The contracting roots of human rights
    (Sage, 2008) N/A; Department of International Relations; Department of International Relations; Mousseau, Michael; Mousseau, Demet Yalçın; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A; N/A
    There is a broad consensus that democracy and economic development are among the key factors that promote better human rights practices in nations, but there is little agreement on how this happens. This article reports evidence that human rights, democracy, and development may all be at least partially explained by a fourth factor: market-contracting. Studies in economic history and sociology have established that in developing countries many exchanges of goods and services occur within social networks of friends and family. New institutionalist approaches posit that daily habits give rise to corresponding values and world-views. This study integrates these two fields of study to show how economic dependency on friends and family can promote perceived interests in discriminating strangers from out-groups and abiding by the orders of leaders. Dependency on strangers on a market, in contrast, can promote more individualistic identities and perceived interests in a state that enforces law and contracts with impartiality. This may cause the governments of nations with marketplace societies to be less likely than others to imprison political opponents and act contrary to law. on a large sample of nations from 1977 to 2000, robust support is found for this view: a change from weak to high levels of market-contracting is associated with a substantial 49% to 61% reduction in risk of state repression in nations. At least some of the variance in state repression accounted for by democracy and development may be attributed to market-contracting. This article introduces a new and robust variable in the field of human rights research, with direct policy implications: to reduce state repression, a crucial task is the achievement of market-oriented economic development.
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    Falling terrorism and rising conflicts: the Afghan contribution to polarization and confrontation in West and South Asia
    (Sage Publications Inc, 2005) N/A; Department of International Relations; Mousseau, Michael; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
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    An economic limitation to the zone of democratic peace and cooperation
    (Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2002) N/A; Department of International Relations; Mousseau, Michael; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
    The zone of democratic peace and cooperation is the premier nontrivial fact of international relations. Recent research, however, has shown that the democratic peace is substantially limited to the economically developed democracies (Mousseau, 2000). Is the zone of democratic cooperation also limited to the economically developed democracies? With the observation of most nations from 1919 to 1992, robust support is found for this hypothesis. It appears that economically developed democracies are more than eight times more likely than other states to engage each other in an intense form of interstate cooperation: collaboration in militarized conflict. Democracies with per capita incomes of less than $8,050, in contrast-77 percent of all joint democratic dyads-appear less likely than other types of states to collaborate with each other in militarized conflict. This result is consistent with the view that liberal political culture arises from economic development, and it is liberal political culture that explains the global zone of democracy, peace, prosperity, and interstate cooperation.
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    The democratic peace unraveled: it's the economy
    (Oxford University Press (OUP), 2013) N/A; Department of International Relations; Mousseau, Michael; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
    Mousseau, Michael. (2012) The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It's the Economy. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/isqu.12003 (c) 2012 International Studies Association Recent studies show that the democratic peace correlation is not significant once the potentially confounding variable that can cause both democracy and peace, contract-intensive economy, is considered; this pattern holds in analyses of wars, fatal militarized interstate conflicts (Mousseau 2009), and interstate crises (Mousseau etal. 2013). These studies rescind the primary evidence for democracy being a cause of the democratic peace and indicate that contract-intensive economy is the more likely explanation for it. This article addresses all recent defenses of the democratic peace correlation, reports results using a new measure of contract flows, and extends the investigation to all militarized interstate conflicts. Analyses of most nations from 1961 to 2001 show that there is no correlation of democracy with peace, and contract-intensive economy is one of the most powerful nontrivial variables in international conflict. The era of the democratic peace appears to be at an end, subsumed by an economic peace.
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    Globalization, markets and democracy: an anthropological linkage
    (European Physical Society, Qeod, 2003) N/A; Department of International Relations; Mousseau, Michael; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
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    The evolution of strategy: thinking of war from antiquity to the present
    (Cambridge Univ Press, 2012) N/A; Department of International Relations; Mousseau, Michael; Faculty Member; Department of International Relations; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
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