Publication: Strategic customers in a transportation station: when is it optimal to wait?
Program
KU-Authors
KU Authors
Co-Authors
Manou, Athanasia
Economou, Antonis
Publication Date
Language
Type
Embargo Status
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Alternative Title
Abstract
We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves at each visit a random number of customers according to its capacity. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the strategic behavior of the customers and determine their symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies under two levels of information.
Source
Publisher
Informs
Subject
Management, Operations research, Management science
Citation
Has Part
Source
Operations Research
Book Series Title
Edition
DOI
10.1287/opre.2014.1280