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Strategic customers in a transportation station: when is it optimal to wait?

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Manou, Athanasia
Economou, Antonis

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We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves at each visit a random number of customers according to its capacity. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the strategic behavior of the customers and determine their symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies under two levels of information.

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Management, Operations research, Management science

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Operations Research

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10.1287/opre.2014.1280

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