Publication: Decentralized inventory control in a two-stage capacitated supply chain
Program
KU-Authors
KU Authors
Co-Authors
Jemai, Zied
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Type
Embargo Status
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Volume Title
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Abstract
This paper investigates a two-stage supply chain consisting of a capacitated supplier and a retailer that faces a stationary random demand. Both the supplier and the retailer employ base stock policies for inventory replenishment. All unsatisfied demand is backlogged and the customer backorder cost is shared between the supplier and the retailer. We investigate the determination of decentralized inventory decisions when the two parties optimize their individual inventory-related costs in a noncooperative manner. We explicitly characterize the Nash equilibrium inventory strategies and identify the causes of inefficiency in the decentralized operation. We then study a set of simple linear contracts to see whether these inefficiencies can be overcome. Finally, we investigate Stackelberg games where one of the parties is assumed to be dominating.
Source
Publisher
Taylor & Francis Inc
Subject
Engineering, Industrial engineering, Operations research, Management science
Citation
Has Part
Source
IIE Transactions
Book Series Title
Edition
DOI
10.1080/07408170601180536