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Decentralized inventory control in a two-stage capacitated supply chain

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Jemai, Zied

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This paper investigates a two-stage supply chain consisting of a capacitated supplier and a retailer that faces a stationary random demand. Both the supplier and the retailer employ base stock policies for inventory replenishment. All unsatisfied demand is backlogged and the customer backorder cost is shared between the supplier and the retailer. We investigate the determination of decentralized inventory decisions when the two parties optimize their individual inventory-related costs in a noncooperative manner. We explicitly characterize the Nash equilibrium inventory strategies and identify the causes of inefficiency in the decentralized operation. We then study a set of simple linear contracts to see whether these inefficiencies can be overcome. Finally, we investigate Stackelberg games where one of the parties is assumed to be dominating.

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Taylor & Francis Inc

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Engineering, Industrial engineering, Operations research, Management science

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IIE Transactions

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10.1080/07408170601180536

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