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Three and a half ways to a hybrid view in animal ethics

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streiffer, Robert

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The distinctive feature of a hybrid view (such as Nozick’s “utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people”) is that it divides moral patients into two classes: call them dersons and uersons. Dersons have a deontological kind of moral status: they have moral rights against certain kinds of optimific harms. Uersons, by contrast, have a utilitarian kind of moral status: their interests are morally important (in proportion to the magnitude of those interests), but uersons do not have deontological moral rights or any other kinds of deontological protections. In this paper, we discuss and critically evaluate three ways of supporting a hybrid view: a case-based argument; an autonomy-based rationale; and a rationale based in a capacity for what we call deep commitments. Finally, we discuss a way in which considerations about the moral significance of relationships might support an approximation of a hybrid view. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.

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Springer Science and Business Media B.V.

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Philosophy

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Philosophical Studies

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10.1007/s11098-022-01816-3

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