Publication:
On an argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure

dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Philosophy
dc.contributor.kuauthorDemircioğlu, Erhan
dc.contributor.kuprofileFaculty Member
dc.contributor.otherDepartment of Philosophy
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteCollege of Social Sciences and Humanities
dc.contributor.yokid193390
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-09T23:57:49Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I aim to show that McGinn's argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.
dc.description.indexedbyWoS
dc.description.indexedbyScopus
dc.description.issue3
dc.description.openaccessNO
dc.description.publisherscopeInternational
dc.description.volume26
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11023-016-9396-z
dc.identifier.eissn1572-8641
dc.identifier.issn0924-6495
dc.identifier.quartileQ1
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84975256689
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-016-9396-z
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/15360
dc.identifier.wos383247100003
dc.keywordsMysterianism
dc.keywordsCognitive closure
dc.keywordsThe mind-body problem
dc.keywordsColin McGinn mind-body problem
dc.keywordsSolve
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.sourceMinds And Machines
dc.subjectComputer science
dc.subjectArtificial intelligence
dc.titleOn an argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure
dc.typeJournal Article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.contributor.authorid0000-0002-1579-7505
local.contributor.kuauthorDemircioğlu, Erhan
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication005b6224-491a-49b4-9afc-a4413d87712b
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscovery005b6224-491a-49b4-9afc-a4413d87712b

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