Reliabilism, the generality problem, and the basing relation

Abstract

In A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem, Comesana argues, inter alia, for three main claims. One is what I call the unavoidability claim: Any adequate epistemological theory needs to appeal, either implicitly or explicitly, to the notion of a belief's being based on certain evidence. Another is what I call the legitimacy claim: It is perfectly legitimate to appeal to the basing relation in solving a problem for an epistemological theory. According to Comesana, the legitimacy claim follows straightforwardly from the unavoidability claim. The third is what I call the basing solution claim: An appeal to the notion of basing relation is all we need to solve the generality problem for (process) reliabilism. In this article, I argue that the unavoidability claim and the basing solution claim are false and that the legitimacy claim might be true only in a qualified sense.