Publication:
A matheuristic for leader-follower games involving facility location-protection-interdiction decisions

dc.contributor.coauthorAras, Necati
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Business Administration
dc.contributor.kuauthorAksen, Deniz
dc.contributor.kuprofileFaculty Member
dc.contributor.otherDepartment of Business Administration
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteCollege of Administrative Sciences and Economics
dc.contributor.yokid40308
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-09T23:21:48Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractThe topic of this chapter is the application of a matheuristic to the leaderfollower type of games-also called static Stackelberg games-that occur in the context of discrete location theory. The players of the game are a system planner (the leader) and an attacker (the follower). The decisions of the former are related to locating/relocating facilities as well as protecting some of those to provide service. The attacker, on the other hand, is interested in destroying (interdicting) facilities to cause the maximal possible disruption in service provision or accessibility. The motivation in the presented models is to identify the facilities that are most likely to be targeted by the attacker, and to devise a protection plan to minimize the resulting disruption on coverage as well as median type supply/demand or service networks. Stackelberg games can be formulated as a bilevel programming problem where the upper and the lower level problems with conflicting objectives belong to the leader and the follower, respectively. In this chapter, we first discuss the state of the art of the existing literature on both facility and network interdiction problems. Secondly, we present two fixed-charge facility location-protection-interdiction models applicable to coverage and median-type service network design problems. Out of these two, we focus on the latter model which also involves initial capacity planning and post-attack capacity expansion decisions on behalf of the leader. For this bilevel model, we develop a matheuristic which searches the solution space of the upper level problem according to tabu search principles, and resorts to a CPLEXbased exact solution technique to tackle the lower level problem. In addition, we also demonstrate the computational efficiency of using a hash function, which helps to uniquely identify and record all the solutions visited, thereby avoids cycling altogether throughout the tabu search iterations
dc.description.indexedbyScopus
dc.description.openaccessYES
dc.description.publisherscopeInternational
dc.description.volume482
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-642-37838-6_5
dc.identifier.isbn9783-6423-7837-9
dc.identifier.issn1860-949X
dc.identifier.linkhttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84893099368&doi=10.1007%2f978-3-642-37838-6_5&partnerID=40&md5=d38f3aa51b768432310e41e58b4acc69
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84893099368
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-37838-6_5
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/10958
dc.keywordsAttack
dc.keywordsSequential game
dc.keywordsContest success function
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.sourceStudies in Computational Intelligence
dc.subjectArtificial intelligence
dc.titleA matheuristic for leader-follower games involving facility location-protection-interdiction decisions
dc.typeJournal Article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.contributor.authorid0000-0003-1734-2042
local.contributor.kuauthorAksen, Deniz
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublicationca286af4-45fd-463c-a264-5b47d5caf520
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryca286af4-45fd-463c-a264-5b47d5caf520

Files