Publication: Moral occasionalism
Program
KU-Authors
KU Authors
Co-Authors
Sparks J.
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Type
Embargo Status
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Abstract
This chapter develops Moral Occasionalism, according to which moral facts are grounded in certain natural facts, which are called sub-moral grounds, and these sub-moral grounds influence us in such a way as to induce largely correct moral beliefs. Moral Occasionalism is designed to explain the correlation of moral beliefs with the moral facts—and to do so in a way that is consistent with non-interactionist views, according to which moral facts neither influence nor are influenced by moral beliefs. It is argued that moral non-naturalists and others who are committed to non-interactionist views ought to be in the business of defending Moral Occasionalism. The chapter shows that Moral Occasionalism has major advantages over its chief non-interactionist rival, namely David Enoch’s “godless pre-established harmony” view. The chapter anticipates and responds to several objections.
Source
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Subject
Philosphy
Citation
Has Part
Source
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Book Series Title
Edition
DOI
10.1093/oso/9780198911876.003.0013