Publication:
Cheating and incentives in a performance context: evidence from a field experiment on children

dc.contributor.coauthorAlan, Şule
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.contributor.departmentGraduate School of Sciences and Engineering
dc.contributor.kuauthorErtaç, Seda
dc.contributor.kuauthorGümren, Mert
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteCollege of Administrative Sciences and Economics
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteGRADUATE SCHOOL OF SCIENCES AND ENGINEERING
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-10T00:02:16Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstractWe study cheating behavior in a large sample of elementary school children in the context of a creative performance task, in the presence and absence of performance incentives. Our data come from a sample of 720 elementary school children with an average age of 8, and contain rich information on a large set of correlates, such as risk and time preferences, IQ, gender and family characteristics. We document that children with higher IQ and higher socioeconomic status have a higher likelihood of cheating. We find that the presence of incentives for better performance does not increase cheating behavior. We also document an interesting interaction between altruism and incentives: altruistic students cheat significantly less in the presence of incentives. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.description.indexedbyWOS
dc.description.indexedbyScopus
dc.description.openaccessNO
dc.description.publisherscopeInternational
dc.description.sponsoredbyTubitakEuN/A
dc.description.sponsorshipScientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) [111K444] We would like to thank participants in 2018 Turkish Workshop on Experimental and Behavioral Economics at Bogazici University, and the 2017 Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications at Lisbon School of Economics for helpful comments. Ertac thanks the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) for generous financial support (Grant No. 111K444) for the experiments in this paper, and the Turkish Academy of the Sciences (GEBIP program) and the Science Academy (BAGEP program) for general support.
dc.description.volume179
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.015
dc.identifier.eissn1879-1751
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.quartileQ3
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85064316802
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.015
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/16114
dc.identifier.wos582798600037
dc.keywordsCheating
dc.keywordsIncentives
dc.keywordschildren
dc.keywordsField experiment gender-differences
dc.keywordsCreative-thinking
dc.keywordsLying aversion
dc.keywordsDishonesty
dc.keywordsMotivation
dc.keywordsHonest
dc.keywordsLie
dc.keywordsSocialization
dc.keywordsPreferences
dc.keywordsCompetition
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.titleCheating and incentives in a performance context: evidence from a field experiment on children
dc.typeJournal Article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.contributor.kuauthorErtaç, Seda
local.contributor.kuauthorGümren, Mert
local.publication.orgunit1College of Administrative Sciences and Economics
local.publication.orgunit1GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SCIENCES AND ENGINEERING
local.publication.orgunit2Department of Economics
local.publication.orgunit2Graduate School of Sciences and Engineering
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