Publication:
Starting small to communicate

dc.contributor.coauthorKubilay, Elif
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.contributor.kuauthorAtakan, Alp Enver
dc.contributor.kuauthorKoçkesen, Levent
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteCollege of Administrative Sciences and Economics
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-09T12:00:29Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstractWe analyze a repeated cheap-talk game in which the receiver is privately informed about the conflict of interest between herself and the sender and either the sender or the receiver controls the stakes involved in their relationship. We focus on payoff-dominant equilibria that satisfy a Markovian property and show that if the potential conflict of interest is large, then the stakes increase over time, i.e., “starting small” is the unique equilibrium arrangement. In each period, the receiver plays the sender's ideal action with positive probability and the sender provides full information as long as he has always observed his ideal actions in the past. We also show that as the potential conflict of interest increases, the extent to which the stakes are back-loaded increases, i.e., stakes are initially smaller but grow faster.
dc.description.fulltextYES
dc.description.indexedbyWOS
dc.description.indexedbyScopus
dc.description.openaccessYES
dc.description.publisherscopeInternational
dc.description.sponsoredbyTubitakEuEU - TÜBİTAK
dc.description.sponsorshipEuropean Union (European Union)
dc.description.sponsorshipEuropean Research Council (ERC)
dc.description.sponsorshipScientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK)
dc.description.versionPublisher version
dc.description.volume121
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.001
dc.identifier.embargoNO
dc.identifier.filenameinventorynoIR02150
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.quartileQ4
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85081905411
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/946
dc.identifier.wos528252000014
dc.keywordsCareer path
dc.keywordsCheap talk
dc.keywordsCommunication
dc.keywordsGradualism
dc.keywordsRepeated games
dc.keywordsReputation
dc.keywordsStarting small
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.grantnoERC 681460
dc.relation.grantno 112K496
dc.relation.ispartofGames and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.urihttp://cdm21054.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/IR/id/8773
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.titleStarting small to communicate
dc.typeJournal Article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.contributor.kuauthorAtakan, Alp Enver
local.contributor.kuauthorKoçkesen, Levent
local.publication.orgunit1College of Administrative Sciences and Economics
local.publication.orgunit2Department of Economics
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relation.isParentOrgUnitOfPublication972aa199-81e2-499f-908e-6fa3deca434a
relation.isParentOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscovery972aa199-81e2-499f-908e-6fa3deca434a

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