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Discriminatory auctions with resale

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dc.contributor.coauthorHafalir, Isa
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.contributor.kuauthorKurnaz, Musab Murat
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteCollege of Administrative Sciences and Economics
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-09T23:06:48Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.description.abstractWe consider multi-unit discriminatory auctions where ex ante symmetric bidders have single-unit demands and resale is allowed after the bidding stage. When bidders use the optimal auction to sell items in the resale stage, the equilibrium in the auction without resale is no longer an equilibrium in an auction with resale. We find a symmetric and monotone equilibrium when there are two units for sale, and, interestingly, we show that there may not be a symmetric and monotone equilibrium if there are more than two units.
dc.description.fulltextNo
dc.description.harvestedfromManual
dc.description.indexedbyWOS
dc.description.openaccessNO
dc.description.peerreviewstatusN/A
dc.description.publisherscopeInternational
dc.description.readpublishN/A
dc.description.sponsoredbyTubitakEuN/A
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation [SES-1326584] Hafalir acknowledges financial support from National Science Foundation Grant SES-1326584..
dc.description.versionN/A
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s40505-018-0152-9
dc.identifier.eissn2196-1093
dc.identifier.embargoN/A
dc.identifier.issn2196-1085
dc.identifier.quartileBakılacak
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0152-9
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/9041
dc.identifier.wos538550200002
dc.keywordsMulti-unit auctions
dc.keywordsResale
dc.keywordsDiscriminatory auctions
dc.keywordsReserve price
dc.keywordsD44
dc.keywordsC72
dc.keywordsPure-strategy equilibria
dc.keywords1st-Price auctions
dc.keywordsDemand reduction
dc.keywordsExistence
dc.keywordsPrice
dc.keywordsSpeculation
dc.keywordsMarkets
dc.keywordsGames
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer Heidelberg
dc.relation.affiliationKoç University
dc.relation.collectionKoç University Institutional Repository
dc.relation.ispartofEconomic Theory Bulletin
dc.relation.openaccessN/A
dc.rightsN/A
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.titleDiscriminatory auctions with resale
dc.typeJournal Article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.contributor.kuauthorKurnaz, Musab Murat
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