Publication: Discriminatory auctions with resale
dc.contributor.coauthor | Hafalir, Isa | |
dc.contributor.department | Department of Economics | |
dc.contributor.kuauthor | Kurnaz, Musab Murat | |
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstitute | College of Administrative Sciences and Economics | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-11-09T23:06:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.description.abstract | We consider multi-unit discriminatory auctions where ex ante symmetric bidders have single-unit demands and resale is allowed after the bidding stage. When bidders use the optimal auction to sell items in the resale stage, the equilibrium in the auction without resale is no longer an equilibrium in an auction with resale. We find a symmetric and monotone equilibrium when there are two units for sale, and, interestingly, we show that there may not be a symmetric and monotone equilibrium if there are more than two units. | |
dc.description.indexedby | WOS | |
dc.description.issue | 2 | |
dc.description.openaccess | NO | |
dc.description.publisherscope | International | |
dc.description.sponsoredbyTubitakEu | N/A | |
dc.description.sponsorship | National Science Foundation [SES-1326584] Hafalir acknowledges financial support from National Science Foundation Grant SES-1326584.. | |
dc.description.volume | 7 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s40505-018-0152-9 | |
dc.identifier.eissn | 2196-1093 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2196-1085 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0152-9 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/9041 | |
dc.identifier.wos | 538550200002 | |
dc.keywords | Multi-unit auctions | |
dc.keywords | Resale | |
dc.keywords | Discriminatory auctions | |
dc.keywords | Reserve price | |
dc.keywords | D44 | |
dc.keywords | C72 | |
dc.keywords | Pure-strategy equilibria | |
dc.keywords | 1st-Price auctions | |
dc.keywords | Demand reduction | |
dc.keywords | Existence | |
dc.keywords | Price | |
dc.keywords | Speculation | |
dc.keywords | Markets | |
dc.keywords | Games | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.publisher | Springer Heidelberg | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Economic Theory Bulletin | |
dc.subject | Economics | |
dc.title | Discriminatory auctions with resale | |
dc.type | Journal Article | |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
local.contributor.kuauthor | Kurnaz, Musab Murat | |
local.publication.orgunit1 | College of Administrative Sciences and Economics | |
local.publication.orgunit2 | Department of Economics | |
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