Publication:
Cooperation in assembly systems: the role of knowledge sharing networks

dc.contributor.coauthorBernstein, Fernando
dc.contributor.coauthorMeca, Ana
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Business Administration
dc.contributor.kuauthorKök, Abdullah Gürhan
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteCollege of Administrative Sciences and Economics
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-09T23:44:37Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.description.abstractProcess improvement plays a significant role in reducing production costs over the life cycle of a product. We consider the role of process improvement in a decentralized assembly system in which a buyer purchases components from several first-tier suppliers. These components are assembled into a finished product, which is sold to the downstream market. The assembler faces a deterministic demand/production rate and the suppliers incur variable inventory costs and fixed setup production costs. In the first stage of the game, which is modeled as a non-cooperative game among suppliers, suppliers make investments in process improvement activities to reduce the fixed production costs. Upon establishing a relationship with the suppliers, the assembler establishes a knowledge sharing network - this network is implemented as a series of meetings among suppliers and also mutual visits to their factories. These meetings facilitate the exchange of best practices among suppliers with the expectation that suppliers will achieve reductions in their production costs from the experiences learned through knowledge sharing. We model this knowledge exchange as a cooperative game among suppliers in which, as a result of cooperation, all suppliers achieve reductions in their fixed costs. In the non-cooperative game, the suppliers anticipate the cost allocation that results from the cooperative game in the second stage by incorporating the effect of knowledge sharing in their cost functions. Based on this model, we investigate the benefits and challenges associated with establishing a knowledge sharing network. We identify and compare various cost allocation mechanisms that are feasible in the cooperative game and show that the system optimal investment levels can be achieved only when the most efficient supplier receives the incremental benefits of the cost reduction achieved by other suppliers due to the knowledge transfer.
dc.description.indexedbyWOS
dc.description.indexedbyScopus
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.openaccessNO
dc.description.publisherscopeInternational
dc.description.sponsoredbyTubitakEuN/A
dc.description.sponsorshipMinisterio de Ciencia e Innovacion [MTM2008-06778-C02-01, MTM2011-23205]
dc.description.sponsorshipGeneralitat Valenciana [ACOMP/2014] The authors are grateful to the reviewers for helpful comments that have helped to improve the paper. The authors also acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion through Projects MTM2008-06778-C02-01 and MTM2011-23205, and the Generalitat Valenciana through Project ACOMP/2014.
dc.description.volume240
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ejor.2014.06.013
dc.identifier.eissn1872-6860
dc.identifier.issn0377-2217
dc.identifier.quartileQ1
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84906951602
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2014.06.013
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/13679
dc.identifier.wos343380100013
dc.keywordsSupply chain management
dc.keywordsGame theory
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Journal of Operational Research
dc.subjectManagement
dc.subjectOperations research
dc.subjectManagement science
dc.titleCooperation in assembly systems: the role of knowledge sharing networks
dc.typeJournal Article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.contributor.kuauthorKök, Abdullah Gürhan
local.publication.orgunit1College of Administrative Sciences and Economics
local.publication.orgunit2Department of Business Administration
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relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryca286af4-45fd-463c-a264-5b47d5caf520
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relation.isParentOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscovery972aa199-81e2-499f-908e-6fa3deca434a

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