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Epistemic infinitism, the reason-giving game, and the regress skeptic

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Epistemic infi nitism is one of the logically possible responses to the epistemic regress problem, claiming that the justifi cation of a given proposition requires an infi nite and non-circular structure of reasons. In this paper, I will examine the dialectic between the epistemic infi nitist and the regress skeptic, the sort of skeptic that bases his attack to the possibility of justifi cation on the regress of reasons. I aim to show that what makes epistemic infi nitism appear as well-equipped to silence the regress skeptic is the very same thing that renders it susceptible to a powerful skeptical assault by the regress skeptic. © 2020 Kruzak. All rights reserved.

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Kruzak

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Croatian Journal of Philosophy

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