Publication: Epistemic infinitism, the reason-giving game, and the regress skeptic
Loading...
Program
KU-Authors
Organization Authors
Co-Authors
Date
Language
Type
Embargo Status
N/A
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Alternative Title
Abstract
Epistemic infi nitism is one of the logically possible responses to the epistemic regress problem, claiming that the justifi cation of a given proposition requires an infi nite and non-circular structure of reasons. In this paper, I will examine the dialectic between the epistemic infi nitist and the regress skeptic, the sort of skeptic that bases his attack to the possibility of justifi cation on the regress of reasons. I aim to show that what makes epistemic infi nitism appear as well-equipped to silence the regress skeptic is the very same thing that renders it susceptible to a powerful skeptical assault by the regress skeptic. © 2020 Kruzak. All rights reserved.
Source
Publisher
Kruzak
Subject
Citation
item.page.haspartof
Source
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
item.page.ispartofseries
item.page.edition
DOI
item.page.datauri
item.page.link
Rights
N/A
Copyrights Note
Rights and licensing
N/A
Collections
Endorsement
Review
Supplemented By
Referenced By
Google Scholar
Scholar'da Ara ↗ Bu yayında DOI yok — Altmetric/Dimensions/PlumX/BIP! rozetleri DOI gerektirir.
