<link rel="stylesheet" href="styles.f3b1fba60ec7970c.css">

Publication:
Inan on objectual and propositional ignorance

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Departments

Item type:Organizational Unit,

School / College / Institute

Program

Organization Authors

Co-Authors

Date

Language

Embargo Status

N/A

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Alternative Title

Abstract

In this note, I would like to focus on the two central distinctions Inan draws between varieties of ignorance. One is the distinction between "objectual" and "propositional" ignorance, and the other is the distinction between "truth-ignorance" and "fact-ignorance," which is a distinction between two types of propositional ignorance. According to Inan, appreciating these distinctions allow us to see what is wrong with the "received view," according to which ignorance (or awareness of it) is "always about truth," and enables us to "overcome our [philosophers'] propositional- bias." I will argue for two theses. First, fact-ignorance appears to be a form of objectual ignorance; and, if this is so, there are no two distinctions but only one distinction that Inan in effect offers, which is between objectual and propositional ignorance. Second, what Inan calls "the received view" can raise some reasonable worries about objectual ignorance that are not taken into account by him.

Source

Publisher

Kruzak

Citation

item.page.haspartof

Source

Croatian Journal of Philosophy

item.page.ispartofseries

item.page.edition

DOI

item.page.datauri

item.page.link

Rights

N/A

Copyrights Note

Rights and licensing

N/A

Endorsement

Review

Supplemented By

Referenced By

Related Patent

Related Goal

Google Scholar
Scholar'da Ara ↗
Bu yayında DOI yok — Altmetric/Dimensions/PlumX/BIP! rozetleri DOI gerektirir.