Publication:
Incentivized outsourced computation resistant to malicious contractors

dc.contributor.coauthorN/A
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Computer Engineering
dc.contributor.kuauthorKüpçü, Alptekin
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteCollege of Engineering
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-10T00:00:22Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.description.abstractWith the rise of Internet computing, outsourcing difficult computational tasks became an important need. Yet, once the computation is outsourced, the job owner loses control, and hence it is crucial to provide guarantees against malicious actions of the contractors involved. One may want to ensure that both the job itself and any inputs to it are hidden from the contractors, while still enabling them to perform the necessary computation. Furthermore, one would check that the computation was carried out correctly. In this paper, we are not concerned with hiding the job or the data, but our main task is to ensure that the job is computed correctly. We also observe that not all contractors are malicious; rather, majority are rational. Thus, our approach brings together elements from cryptography, as well as game theory and mechanism design. We achieve the following results: (1) We incentivize all the rational contractors to perform the outsourced job correctly, (2) we guarantee high fraction (e.g., 99.9 percent) of correct results even in the existence of a relatively large fraction (e.g., 33 percent) of malicious irrational contractors in the system, (3) and we show that our system achieves these while being almost as efficient as running the job locally (e.g., with only 3 percent overhead). Such a high correctness guarantee was not known to be achieved with such efficiency.
dc.description.indexedbyWOS
dc.description.indexedbyScopus
dc.description.issue6
dc.description.openaccessYES
dc.description.sponsoredbyTubitakEuN/A
dc.description.sponsorshipTUBITAK, Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey [111E019]
dc.description.sponsorshipEuropean Union COST Action [IC1306] The author acknowledges the support of TUBITAK, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey, under project number 111E019, as well as European Union COST Action IC1306. The author also thanks Said Tahsin Dane, Onur Yuksel, Ezgi Kurt, and Egeyar Ozlen Bagcioglu.
dc.description.volume14
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TDSC.2015.2499738
dc.identifier.eissn1941-0018
dc.identifier.issn1545-5971
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85038216695
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2015.2499738
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/15769
dc.identifier.wos415714300006
dc.keywordsOutsourced computation
dc.keywordsCloud computation
dc.keywordsCrowdsourcing
dc.keywordsMalicious contractors
dc.keywordsFair payments
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherIEEE Computer Soc
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE Transactions On Dependable and Secure Computing
dc.subjectComputer science
dc.subjectInformation systems
dc.subjectSoftware engineering
dc.titleIncentivized outsourced computation resistant to malicious contractors
dc.typeJournal Article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.contributor.kuauthorKüpçü, Alptekin
local.publication.orgunit1College of Engineering
local.publication.orgunit2Department of Computer Engineering
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relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscovery89352e43-bf09-4ef4-82f6-6f9d0174ebae
relation.isParentOrgUnitOfPublication8e756b23-2d4a-4ce8-b1b3-62c794a8c164
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