Publication:
Random incentive systems in a dynamic choice experiment

dc.contributor.coauthorBaltussen, Guido
dc.contributor.coauthorvan den Assem, Martijn J.
dc.contributor.coauthorWakker, Peter P.
dc.contributor.departmentGraduate School of Business
dc.contributor.kuauthorPost, Gerrit Tjeerd
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteGRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-09T23:07:56Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractExperiments frequently use a random incentive system (RIS), where only tasks that are randomly selected at the end of the experiment are for real. The most common type pays every subject one out of her multiple tasks (within-subjects randomization). Recently, another type has become popular, where a subset of subjects is randomly selected, and only these subjects receive one real payment (between-subjects randomization). In earlier tests with simple, static tasks, RISs performed well. The present study investigates RISs in a more complex, dynamic choice experiment. We find that between-subjects randomization reduces risk aversion. While within-subjects randomization delivers unbiased measurements of risk aversion, it does not eliminate carry-over effects from previous tasks. Both types generate an increase in subjects' error rates. These results suggest that caution is warranted when applying RISs to more complex and dynamic tasks.
dc.description.indexedbyWOS
dc.description.indexedbyScopus
dc.description.issue3
dc.description.openaccessYES
dc.description.publisherscopeInternational
dc.description.sponsoredbyTubitakEuN/A
dc.description.volume15
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10683-011-9306-4
dc.identifier.eissn1573-6938
dc.identifier.issn1386-4157
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84864409372
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-011-9306-4
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/9234
dc.identifier.wos306790700003
dc.keywordsRandom incentive system
dc.keywordsIncentives
dc.keywordsExperimental measurement
dc.keywordsRisky choice
dc.keywordsRisk aversion
dc.keywordsDynamic choice
dc.keywordsTremble
dc.keywordsWithin-subjects design
dc.keywordsBetween-subjects design willingness-to-pay
dc.keywordsUtility-theory
dc.keywordsPreference reversals
dc.keywordsStochastic choice
dc.keywordsRisk attitudes
dc.keywordsHot hand
dc.keywordsDecisions
dc.keywordsViolations
dc.keywordsAversion
dc.keywordsBehavior
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.relation.ispartofExperimental Economics
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.titleRandom incentive systems in a dynamic choice experiment
dc.typeJournal Article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.contributor.kuauthorPost, Gerrit Tjeerd
local.publication.orgunit1GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
local.publication.orgunit2Graduate School of Business
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