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Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems

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dc.contributor.coauthorKonishi, Hideo
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.contributor.kuauthorÜnver, Utku
dc.contributor.kuprofileFaculty Member
dc.contributor.otherDepartment of Economics
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteCollege of Administrative Sciences and Economics
dc.contributor.yokidN/A
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-09T23:51:56Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.description.abstractIt is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems. pairwise-stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations. unlike in many-to-one matching problems (Blair. 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences. A credibly group-stable matching is immune to any "executable" group deviations with an appropriate definition of executability. Under the same preference restriction. we also show the equivalence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition-proof Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic-form game.
dc.description.indexedbyWoS
dc.description.indexedbyScopus
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.openaccessYES
dc.description.publisherscopeInternational
dc.description.volume129
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.001
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.quartileQ3
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-33745104115
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.001
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/14783
dc.identifier.wos238923500003
dc.keywordsMany-to-many matching
dc.keywordsPairwise stability
dc.keywordsGroup stability
dc.keywordsCredible deviation
dc.keywordsCoalition-proof
dc.keywordsNash equilibrium college admissions
dc.keywordsPhysicians
dc.keywordsMarriage
dc.keywordsMarket
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.sourceJournal of Economic Theory
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.titleCredible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
dc.typeJournal Article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.contributor.authorid0000-0001-7693-1635
local.contributor.kuauthorÜnver, M. Utku
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication7ad2a3bb-d8d9-4cbd-a6a3-3ca4b30b40c3
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscovery7ad2a3bb-d8d9-4cbd-a6a3-3ca4b30b40c3

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