Publication:
On the design of effective sanctions: the case of bans on exports to Russia

dc.contributor.coauthorHausmann, Ricardo
dc.contributor.coauthorSchetter, Ulrich
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.contributor.kuauthorYıldırım, Muhammed Ali
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteCollege of Administrative Sciences and Economics
dc.date.accessioned2024-12-29T09:37:09Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractWe build on Baqaee and Farhi (2019, 2021) and derive a theoretically grounded criterion that allows targeting bans on exports to a sanctioned country at the level of ~5,000 six-digit HS products. The criterion implies that the costs to the sanctioned country are highly convex in the market share of the sanctioning parties. Hence, there are large benefits from coordinating export bans among a broad coalition of countries. Applying our results to Russia reveals that sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are not systematically related to our arguments once we condition on Russia’s total imports of a product from participating countries. We discuss drivers of these differences and then provide a quantitative evaluation of the export bans to show that (i) they are very effective with the welfare loss typically ~ 100 times larger for Russia than for the sanctioners; (ii) improved coordination of the sanctions and targeting sanctions based on our criterion allows to increase the costs to Russia by about 80% with little to no extra cost to the sanctioners; and (iii) there is scope for increasing the cost to Russia further by expanding the set of sanctioned products.
dc.description.indexedbyWOS
dc.description.indexedbyScopus
dc.description.issue117
dc.description.publisherscopeInternational
dc.description.sponsoredbyTubitakEuN/A
dc.description.volume39
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/epolic/eiad043
dc.identifier.eissn1468-0327
dc.identifier.issn0266-4658
dc.identifier.quartileQ1
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85185295591
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiad043
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/22283
dc.identifier.wos1181531200001
dc.keywordsF13
dc.keywordsF15
dc.keywordsF51
dc.keywordsAlliances
dc.keywordsEmbargoes
dc.keywordsInput-output linkages
dc.keywordsQuantitative trade model
dc.keywordsRussia
dc.keywordsSanctions
dc.keywordsUkraine
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherOxford Univ Press
dc.relation.ispartofEconomic Policy
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.titleOn the design of effective sanctions: the case of bans on exports to Russia
dc.typeJournal Article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.contributor.kuauthorYıldırım, Muhammed Ali
local.publication.orgunit1College of Administrative Sciences and Economics
local.publication.orgunit2Department of Economics
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relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscovery7ad2a3bb-d8d9-4cbd-a6a3-3ca4b30b40c3
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